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ABSTRACT—Few contest the importance of a robust transparency regime 
in a democratic system of government. In the United States, the “crown 
jewel” of this regime is the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Yet 
despite widespread agreement about the importance of transparency in 
government, few are satisfied with FOIA. Since its enactment, the statute 
has engendered criticism from transparency advocates and critics alike for 
insufficiently serving the needs of both the public and the government. 
Legal scholars have widely documented these flaws in the federal public 
records law. 
In contrast, scholars have paid comparatively little attention to 
transparency laws at the state and local level. This is surprising. The role of 
state and local government in the everyday lives of citizens has increased in 
recent decades, and many critical government functions are fulfilled by 
state and local entities today. Moreover, crucial sectors of the public—
namely, media and advocacy organizations—rely as heavily on state public 
records laws as they do on FOIA to hold the government to account. Yet 
these state laws and their effects remain largely overlooked, creating gaps 
in both local government law and transparency law scholarship. 
This Article attempts to fill these gaps by surveying the state and local 
transparency regime, focusing on public records laws in particular. 
Drawing on hundreds of public records datasets, along with qualitative 
interviews, the Article demonstrates that in contrast with federal law, state 
transparency law introduces comparatively greater barriers to disclosure 
and comparatively higher burdens upon government. Further, the Article 
highlights the existence of “transparency deserts,” or localities in which a 
combination of poorly drafted transparency laws, hostile government 
actors, and weak local media and civil society impedes effective public 
oversight of government. 
The Article serves as a corrective to the scholarship’s current, myopic 
focus on federal transparency law. In doing so, it makes three central 
contributions. First, it provides a much-needed descriptive account of the 
state and local transparency regime. Second, it makes a normative 
contribution. It mines empirical and qualitative public records data to 
evaluate the costs and benefits of the current transparency regime and then 
applies those insights to contemporary academic and policy-oriented 
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debates. In the process, the Article reveals that unique features of state and 
local government both heighten the salience of statutory transparency 
mechanisms and challenge dominant strands of thought in the 
contemporary transparency scholarship. Third, the Article has implications 
for ongoing public law debates, demonstrating that failures in the local 
transparency regime undermine certain theories of federalism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 2018, Sheri Fink, a Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter 
for the New York Times, was finishing up a months-long investigation into 
the local government’s response to Hurricane Harvey.1 Her report focused 
on civilian fatalities during the hurricane and the extent to which 
communication and coordination failures among emergency response 
providers may have contributed to these deaths.2 As part of the 
newsgathering process, Fink submitted multiple public records requests 
under the Texas public records law to state and local agencies involved 
with emergency response efforts.3 She requested 9-1-1 call logs, after-
action reports, emergency dispatches, officials’ e-mails, and an array of 
other government records. Some government entities handed over the 
requested records quickly and with little or no objection.4 Others invoked 
tenuous legal arguments to avoid disclosing records or simply failed to 
respond at all.5 
The City of Houston issued a particularly illogical response. Fink had 
submitted a request for the city’s Hurricane Harvey after-action report, a 
type of document routinely produced in the aftermath of natural disasters 
that analyzes the government’s response to the event and outlines areas for 
improvement.6 But Houston refused to release the results of its 
investigation.7 Texas’s public records law—like virtually every public 
records law in the country—is structured with a presumption of openness,8 
 
 1 E-mail from Sheri Fink, Correspondent, The N.Y. Times Co., to author (Oct. 25, 2019, 01:25 
PST) (on file with author). The author previously served as an attorney at the New York Times and 
assisted Fink with some of these public records requests and appeals. 
 2 Sheri Fink, Lost in the Storm, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/08/30/magazine/hurricane-harvey-houston-floods-texas-
emergency.html [https://perma.cc/J3RC-T6TU]. 
 3 E-mail from Sheri Fink, supra note 1. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 For example, Harris County—which encompasses the City of Houston, as well as the surrounding 
areas—voluntarily released its after-action report to the public. See HARRIS CTY. OFFICE OF HOMELAND 
SEC. AND EMERGENCY MGMT., HURRICANE HARVEY AFTER-ACTION REPORT 1 (2018), 
https://www.readyharris.org/Portals/43/PDFs/Hurricane%20Harvery%20AAR_Final.pdf?ver=2018-05-
14-144548-187 [https://perma.cc/DM8H-AA28]; see also Press Release, Harris Cty., Harris County 
Releases Hurricane Harvey After Action Report (May 21, 2018), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20180617175635/https:/www.readyharris.org/News-Information/Ready-
Harris-News/Post/32479 [https://perma.cc/53MV-ZPN7] (announcing the county’s release of the report 
to the public). 
 7 E-mail from Sheri Fink, supra note 1. 
 8 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.302 (West 2005) (“[I]nformation requested in writing is presumed 
to be subject to required public disclosure.”). 
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requiring that every record held by a covered government entity be turned 
over to the public unless it falls within a specific statutory exemption.9 In 
this case, the city argued that the report was protected from disclosure by a 
statute permitting the government to withhold records relating to “an act of 
terrorism or related criminal activity.”10 
Fink pointed out that a natural disaster like a hurricane cannot 
plausibly be categorized as either “an act of terrorism” or “related criminal 
activity.” She argued that the city was stretching the bounds of this 
exemption to the point of absurdity.11 But the city’s attorneys held firm. 
This left the Times in a bind. It would most likely cost $20,000–$30,000 to 
hire local counsel in Texas and contest the decision in court.12 
Newspapers—even the largest in the country—are rarely able to afford that 
type of legal challenge given the substantial uncertainty involved.13 Such 
cases often linger for years, and even when the newspaper does prevail in 
court, the records at issue are often no longer newsworthy by the time they 
are disclosed. The costs become difficult to justify. 
Fink’s experience touches upon a number of critical and interrelated 
threads raised by public records laws, including the willingness of a local 
agency to stretch the plain meaning of a statute intended to facilitate 
government oversight; the motivations and capabilities of the government 
officials responding to public records requests; the peculiarities of each 
state’s public records law; and the ability of Fink and the Times to appeal 
the city’s decision and enforce the requirements of the Texas statute. These 
are not necessarily new issues or concerns. What is unique is that they 
surfaced in the context of a local government public records request. 
There has been a proliferation of scholarship in recent years focused 
on federal transparency laws in general,14 and on the Freedom of 
 
 9 See id. §§ 552.101–552.160 (listing exemptions). 
 10 Letter from James M. Graham, Assistant Att’y Gen., Att’y Gen. of Tex. Open Records Div., to 
Rahat Huq, Assistant City Att’y (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www2.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/ 
openrecords/51paxton/orl/2018/pdf/or201827608.pdf [https://perma.cc/JX4K-E8TS]. 
 11 Letter from David McCraw, Vice President and Deputy Gen. Counsel, The N.Y. Times Co., to 
Ken Paxton, Att’y Gen. of Tex. (Sept. 7, 2018) (on file with author).  
 12 E-mail from David McCraw, Senior Vice President and Deputy Gen. Counsel, The N.Y. Times 
Co., to author (Oct. 24, 2019, 06:13 PST) (on file with author). This amount generally doubles if the 
newspaper follows up with an appeal. Id. In this specific instance, the Times ended up pursuing an 
interim step and contesting the withholding through an appeal process with the state attorney general’s 
office. The newspaper achieved a partial legal victory and ultimately obtained a redacted version of the 
report. See Letter from James M. Graham, supra note 10. 
 13 See discussion infra Section III.D.3.a. 
 14 See, e.g., Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885 (2006) (outlining the 
ways in which excessive transparency can undermine effective governance); David E. Pozen, 
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Information Act (FOIA) in particular.15 The scholarship on this topic is 
both deep and diverse, but many articles are concerned, in one way or 
another, with the same central questions: whether the benefits of 
transparency laws such as FOIA outweigh the costs and whether these laws 
can be successfully amended to better serve the underlying goals of 
transparency advocates while minimizing the burdens to government.16 
Despite this profusion of legal scholarship examining federal transparency 
laws, scholars have been curiously silent on transparency law issues at the 
subfederal level. There have been a handful of articles addressing particular 
slices of state-level transparency statutes.17 But scholars have not yet taken 
 
Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100 (2018) [hereinafter Pozen, Transparency’s 
Ideological Drift] (demonstrating that many federal transparency requirements serve more neoliberal 
goals today such as reduced regulation and smaller government); Cass R. Sunstein, Output 
Transparency vs. Input Transparency, in TROUBLING TRANSPARENCY 187 (David E. Pozen & Michael 
Schudson eds., 2018) (arguing that input transparency is often less beneficial and more costly than 
output transparency); Andrew Keane Woods, The Transparency Tax, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2018) 
(arguing that transparency’s real cost “is the loss of expressive ambiguity”). 
 15 See, e.g., Margaret B. Kwoka, First-Person FOIA, 127 YALE L.J. 2204 (2018) [hereinafter 
Kwoka, First-Person FOIA] (examining the extent to which FOIA is used to fulfill the personal 
interests of individual requesters); Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361 (2016) 
[hereinafter Kwoka, FOIA, Inc.] (examining the extent to which FOIA serves commercial interests); 
Margaret B. Kwoka, The Freedom of Information Act Trial, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 217 (2011) (criticizing 
procedural irregularities in FOIA lawsuits); David E. McCraw, The “Freedom from Information” Act: 
A Look Back at Nader, FOIA, and What Went Wrong, 126 YALE L.J. F. 232 (2016) (chronicling the 
flaws of FOIA and describing how these flaws have changed over time); David E. Pozen, Freedom of 
Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097 (2017) [hereinafter 
Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act] (describing the failures of 
FOIA and arguing for a more radical revision of the law). 
 16 One strand of this scholarship argues that the harms imposed upon the government by the law 
warrant a significant reevaluation of the law’s continuing viability. See, e.g., Pozen, Freedom of 
Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, supra note 15, at 1156 (arguing in favor of 
“displacing FOIA requests as the lynchpin of transparency policy and shoring up alternative 
strategies”); Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, 6 REGULATION 14, 15 
(1982) (characterizing FOIA as “the Sistine Chapel of Cost-Benefit Analysis Ignored”). Another strand 
argues that the law is flawed but necessary, and proposes reforms. See, e.g., Erin C. Carroll, Protecting 
the Watchdog: Using the Freedom of Information Act to Preference the Press, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 193, 
195 (proposing reforms to FOIA that would privilege the press); Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of 
Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1071–79 (2008) (using 
the example of FOIA requests during the “Global War on Terror” to argue that many of the perceived 
shortcomings of FOIA in fact have beneficial effects); Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information 
Act: A Short Case Study in the Perils and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J. 
649, 664–83 (1984) (describing the costs of the law and proposing reforms).  
 17 See, e.g., Mark Fenster, The Informational Ombudsman: Fixing Open Government by 
Institutional Design, 2 INT’L J. OPEN GOV’T 275 (2015) (examining the role of ombudsman in state 
public records laws); Katherine Fink, State FOI Laws: More Journalist-Friendly, or Less?, in 
TROUBLING TRANSPARENCY, supra note 14, at 100–09 (examining the percentage of media requests 
sent to state environmental agencies across the country); Sarah Geraghty & Melanie Velez, Bringing 
Transparency and Accountability to Criminal Justice Institutions in the South, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
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a more comprehensive look at how these statutes impact state government. 
And there has been virtually no scholarship at all examining transparency 
issues at the local level.18 
This Article attempts to remedy this gap. It does so by focusing 
attention on one category of state transparency laws: public records laws.19 
It surveys the costs and benefits of these laws, concluding that these 
transparency statutes are both less effective and more critical to democratic 
governance at the state level than they are at the federal level. Based on this 
analysis, the Article then maps out the three central features that comprise a 
local transparency ecosystem: the substance of these transparency statutes; 
the attitudes of the government officials that implement them; and the 
strength of the media and civil society actors who monitor the government 
externally. It argues that when all three prongs of this transparency 
ecosystem fail—when the statutes themselves are poorly written, 
implemented by government actors hostile to transparency efforts, and 
enforced by weak or nonexistent civil society organizations—this creates a 
downward spiral of reduced government disclosure and public oversight, 
what I refer to as a “transparency desert.”20 
The lack of scholarly attention to such transparency failures at the 
state and local level is surprising. The power and influence of state and 
local governments have expanded in recent years, and these entities now 
fulfill a myriad of critical government functions. The size of state and local 
government dwarfs that of the federal government today.21 And these state 
 
REV. 455, 456–70 (2011) (examining the persistent violation of public records laws by criminal justice 
institutions in southern states); Michele Bush Kimball, Law Enforcement Records Custodians’ 
Decision-Making Behaviors in Response to Florida’s Public Records Law, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 313, 
326–50 (2003) (examining the behavior and attitudes of law enforcement records’ custodians in 
Florida); Claudia Polsky, Open Records, Shuttered Labs: Ending Political Harassment of Public 
University Researchers, 66 UCLA L. REV. 208, 212 (2019) (examining the impact of public records 
laws on academic research and speech).  
 18 There is, however, a thoughtful but relatively small body of literature examining transparency 
issues in the context of local policing. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Secret Policing, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 99 (arguing in favor of greater transparency in domestic policing). 
 19 This Article uses the terms “public records laws,” “open records laws,” and “freedom of 
information laws” interchangeably.  
 20 This term borrows from the concept of “news deserts,” or geographic areas that lack local news 
outlets. See PENELOPE MUSE ABERNATHY, THE EXPANDING NEWS DESERT 8 (2018), 
https://www.cislm.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/The-Expanding-News-Desert-10_14-Web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UN4Z-BJJ3]. 
 21 “In 2014, the federal government civilian workforce was [roughly 2.7 million, while] . . . . the 
combined state and local workforce in 2013 [was] more than 16 million . . . .” RICHARD BRIFFAULT & 
LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 4 (8th ed. 
2016).  
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and local entities also exert greater political sway. State and local 
governments are now responsible for implementing large swaths of federal 
policy.22 Conversely, they also play a central role in resisting federal 
policies and actions.23 These state transparency laws take on increased 
importance as the governments they monitor assume a greater role in 
citizens’ lives. 
Moreover, an animating concern of the federal transparency 
scholarship is the extent to which the media is able to utilize FOIA to 
support its role as government watchdog.24 While FOIA was enacted to 
provide records access to the public at large, the law’s drafters were 
especially attuned to the needs of the news media. The law was designed 
largely to serve journalists, with the assumption that these journalists, in 
turn, would inform the general citizenry.25 Under this view of FOIA, the 
media serves as a kind of “surrogate” for the public.26 The media’s ability 
to use the statute becomes especially critical from this perspective. Legal 
scholars, in turn, have devoted outsized attention to the issue.27 
In contrast, there has been comparatively little scholarly focus on the 
media’s ability to effectively use these state-level transparency laws, even 
though many reporters themselves view state public records statutes as 
deeply integral to the reporting process. Certainly, local news outlets must 
turn to state laws to cover local government issues. But even at national 
media outlets, reporters rely heavily on state transparency laws—arguably 
as heavily as they rely on FOIA and other federal statutes.28 We cannot 
understand the ways in which transparency laws facilitate the media’s 
ability to perform its watchdog role without considering the role of these 
subfederal laws. 
 
 22 See Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1853 (2015). 
 23 See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 
118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009) (demonstrating the ways in which states use powers conferred by the federal 
government to resist federal policy).  
 24 See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 16, at 211–15; Kwoka, First-Person FOIA, supra note 15, at 2212–
15; Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 15, at 1369–71. 
25 See Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 15, at 1367–71.  
26 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (noting that the public 
learns about legal proceedings primarily through the press, “validat[ing] the media claim of functioning 
as surrogates for the public”).  
27 See supra note 24.  
 28 See, e.g., Interview with Steve Eder, Reporter, The N.Y. Times Co., in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Aug. 28, 
2018) (stating that he often submits requests through both FOIA and state public records logs but finds 
that he is better off “focusing energies on state” requests given the advantages they provide over FOIA, 
such as improved processing times). For further discussion of the specific advantages state public 
records laws provide over FOIA, see infra Section III.B. 
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This Article attempts to remedy this gap in the literature by exploring 
the example of state public records laws. The term “transparency” is broad 
and nebulous and can be interpreted to encompass a wide array of state 
statutes, including open meeting laws, open data laws, budgetary 
transparency requirements, and more.29 By focusing on one class of 
transparency laws, this Article sidesteps these definitional questions and 
narrows its analytical lens. This approach forecloses a more comprehensive 
examination of the ways in which various transparency laws interact with 
state and local governments. But homing in on one category of 
transparency law also offers considerable benefits. Much of the current 
transparency scholarship is focused on FOIA rather than on the array of 
other federal transparency statutes.30 As a result, an analysis of state-level 
public records laws, as well as the effects they have on state and local 
government, serves as a natural place to both push back on and fill the gaps 
within the existing literature. A robust theoretical and analytical framework 
already exists within which to plug an analysis of subfederal transparency 
laws. 
Moreover, a common obstacle facing local government scholars is the 
sheer number of government entities that exist in the United States. There 
are roughly 90,000 local governments in the country.31 And public records 
laws generally apply to multiple entities even within a single local 
government, such as local zoning boards or police departments. Each state 
also has dozens—sometimes hundreds—of state-level agencies or other 
state-level bodies that are covered by the public records law. The result is a 
profusion of state and local government entities subject to state open 
records laws.32 This multitude of state and local governments nationwide, 
 
 29 Cf. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, supra note 14, at 123–44 (examining various 
transparency measures in the federal context, including open records laws, open meetings laws, 
legislative transparency requirements, campaign finance transparency, and open data requirements). 
 30 See, e.g., Pozen & Schudson, Introduction, in TROUBLING TRANSPARENCY, supra note 14, at 2 
(explaining that the transparency anthology focuses on FOIA “both to contain what might otherwise be 
an unwieldy inquiry and because FOIA is an especially canonical transparency instrument, one of the 
ur-texts of the field”). 
 31 Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Reports There Are 89,004 Local 
Governments in the United States (Aug. 30, 2012), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/ 
releases/archives/governments/cb12-161.html [https://perma.cc/F5SG-T5RN] [hereinafter U.S. Census 
Bureau Press Release]. 
32 The executive director of New York’s Committee on Open Government estimates that there are 
10,000 government entities subject to the public records statute in New York State alone. Interview 
with Robert J. Freeman, Exec. Dir., N.Y. State Comm. on Open Gov’t, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Aug. 9, 2018). 
And in Washington State, there are roughly 2,300 state and local government entities subject to the state 
public records law. See Joint Legis. Audit and Rev. Comm., Public Records Data Collection System, 
2017 Data Set (Oct. 9, 2018) (on file with author) [hereinafter Washington State Dataset 2017]. 
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combined with the complexities of evaluating fifty separate and unique 
state laws, poses a research challenge. Focusing on one category of 
transparency laws allows for a more bounded area of inquiry as well as a 
deeper analysis of the laws’ effects than would be possible with a fifty-state 
survey of multiple transparency-related statutes. 
Elucidating this tangle of state public records laws and their effects—
both good and bad—serves as a corrective to the legal scholarship’s 
current, narrowed focus on federal law. In doing so, this Article makes 
three central contributions. First, it offers a descriptive account of a critical 
aspect of state and local governance. It examines the substance and 
application of state public records laws, as well as the extent to which 
distinctions in government structure at the federal, state, and local level 
complicate existing assumptions and theories about transparency law. One 
of the most significant obstacles to studying subfederal transparency 
issues—and state-level public records laws in particular—is lack of data. 
Few states track their public records laws at the state level, and no state 
tracks public records requests at the local level.33 This Article helps remedy 
this informational gap by drawing upon public records datasets from 
various state and local governments, as well as conversations with public 
records officers, to better understand the public records process at the 
subfederal level. 
Second, this Article makes a normative contribution. It mines this 
quantitative and qualitative data to evaluate the costs and benefits of the 
current public records regime. It then applies these insights to 
contemporary academic and policy-oriented debates. In doing so, it serves 
as a corrective to current scholarly and legislative discussions surrounding 
transparency laws. It undermines assumptions about transparency writ large 
that are embedded within the contemporary literature, revealing that certain 
claims that commonly surface in the transparency literature—such as the 
availability of traditional checks and balances as an alternative source of 
government transparency and accountability—do not necessarily hold up in 
the context of state and local government. And it shows that features 
unique to state and local government heighten the salience of statutory 
transparency mechanisms. 
Finally, this analysis has implications for ongoing public law debates. 
Local government scholars have paid little attention to transparency laws, 
despite their relevance to such questions as the costs and benefits of 
decentralization and the potential for local governments to enhance 
 
 33 See discussion infra Section III.A. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1470 
democratic participation.34 This Article helps bridge this divide. It 
highlights the formation of transparency deserts—or localities in which a 
combination of poorly drafted transparency laws, hostile government 
actors, and weak local media and civil society organizations combine to 
shield the government from public scrutiny. In doing so, it demonstrates 
that these transparency deserts challenge certain assumptions underpinning 
theories of federalism—for example, that smaller governments are more 
closely monitored by their citizens or that state and local governments 
serve as effective democratic laboratories. 
The Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I establishes a point of 
comparison by surveying the structure and application of FOIA, as well as 
the themes and preoccupations of the current transparency law scholarship. 
Part II addresses the history, structure, and application of state public 
records laws. Part III outlines the concept of state and local transparency 
ecosystems and evaluates the costs, benefits, and barriers to disclosure that 
exist at the state and local level. Part IV highlights the problem of 
transparency deserts and examines how these transparency deserts 
challenge certain theories of federalism. Finally, Part V addresses the 
ongoing viability of state transparency laws and outlines potential areas for 
reform. 
I. IN THE SHADOW OF FEDERAL LAW: 
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 
When legal scholars talk about government transparency, invariably 
they are referring to the web of federal statutes that comprise the federal 
transparency regime. Those statutes include the Government in Sunshine 
Act,35 the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,36 and the Digital 
Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014,37 among others. But the 
 
 34 See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 574, 625–29 
(2017) (describing the “missing focus on the institutions of administration in local-government legal 
scholarship”); discussion infra Section IV.B (discussing the ways in which transparency failures in state 
and local government have implications for federalism scholarship). Professor Miriam Seifter has begun 
to address the role of transparency in state-level governance, although further work still needs to be 
done in this arena. See Miriam Seifter, Further from the People? The Puzzle of State Administration, 
93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 107 (2018) [hereinafter Seifter, Further from the People?]. 
 35 Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. 
and 39 U.S.C.). 
 36 Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3. 
 37 Pub. L. No. 113-101, 128 Stat. 1146. 
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“crown jewel of transparency” is the Freedom of Information Act.38 FOIA 
casts a long shadow on transparency discussions in law and policy 
contexts. Indeed, as Professor David Pozen has written, the statute is 
“arguably the canonical piece of transparency legislation in the modern 
world.”39  
Yet this is not the only area where FOIA looms large. The federal 
statute has also bled into state transparency laws. State legislatures often 
incorporate the statutory language of FOIA directly into state law. And 
judges interpreting state public records laws routinely look to federal 
judicial interpretations of FOIA for guidance.40 Even though some state 
public records laws predate FOIA,41 virtually every state law must now be 
considered in light of its federal counterpart. Moreover, the federal statute 
dominates the transparency scholarship, at least within the legal literature.42 
As a result, in order to understand what is distinctive and important about 
state transparency laws in general—and state freedom of information laws 
in particular—it is helpful to look to FOIA as a point of reference. 
The basic outline of the law is most likely familiar to readers. The 
radical innovation of FOIA is that it establishes a private right of action: 
anyone can request a record under the law, and anyone may sue when their 
request is ignored or denied. The statute requires that all records held by 
federal government agencies are disclosed to the public upon request unless 
they fall within one of nine enumerated exemptions, the most significant of 
which offer protections for classified documents; interagency and other 
privileged communications; documents containing private information; and 
law enforcement records.43 Critically, the law applies only to federal 
agencies. The statute does not apply to the legislative and judicial branches, 
nor does it apply to the President and his immediate staff.44 
 
 38 Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, supra note 14, at 124 (quoting TED GUP, NATION OF 
SECRETS: THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY AND THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE 119 (2007)); see 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552 (2012). 
 39 Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, supra note 14, at 118. 
 40 See discussion infra Section II.A. 
 41 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1888, 1892 (Deering 1937); WIS. STAT. § 10.137 (1849). 
 42 See sources cited supra note 15. 
 43 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), (3), (5)–(7). FOIA also protects records related to the internal rules and 
process of an agency, id. § 552(b)(2); trade secrets, id. § 552(b)(4); records relating to agency 
regulation of a financial institution, id. § 552(b)(8); and geological and geophysical data, id. 
§ 552(b)(9).  
 44 Id. § 551(1). By its terms, the FOIA applies to “the Executive Office of the President,” id. 
§ 552(f), but this term does not include either “the President’s immediate personal staff” or any  
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These federal agencies receive a large and growing number of 
requests each year. In 2017, they received more than 800,000 FOIA 
requests.45 The identities and motivations of these requesters is a question 
that has preoccupied legal scholars in recent years. Professor Margaret 
Kwoka, in particular, has conducted extensive research on FOIA requesters 
in an effort to understand whether the law is serving the original intent of 
its drafters. She has found that certain federal agencies are flooded with 
requests from commercial entities,46 while others receive an overwhelming 
percentage of requests from “first-person” requesters—individuals seeking 
information about themselves.47 In both studies, Professor Kwoka raises the 
concern that even if there is some public benefit conferred by these 
requests, much of this commercial and first-person use of the statute is not 
necessarily consistent with the public oversight function that the drafters of 
the law envisioned.48 These requests also raise the costs of the Act. In 2017, 
the federal government employed roughly 4,500 full-time FOIA officers 
and spent more than half a billion dollars responding to record requests.49 
Despite years of criticism and multiple revisions to the law, few agree 
that FOIA adequately serves the needs of either requesters or the public. 
The Executive Branch argues that the number and scope of requests has 
ballooned and that agencies lack sufficient resources to adequately respond 
 
person of the Executive Office of the President “whose sole function is to advise and assist the 
President.” Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1291 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1380, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1974)). 
 45 OFFICE OF INFO. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS FOR 
FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 2 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/oip/page/file/1069396/download 
[https://perma.cc/H9PK-3L9R] [hereinafter SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS]. 
 46 Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 15, at 1379–81 (evaluating the FOIA logs of six federal agencies 
and finding that all six received far more requests from commercial entities than they did from the 
media). 
 47 Kwoka, First-Person FOIA, supra note 15, at 2210, 2221 (evaluating FOIA logs from nine 
federal agencies and determining that significant percentages were submitted by individuals for their 
own use in immigration proceedings, criminal proceedings, social security benefit proceedings, and 
genealogical research).  
 48 See id. at 2208 (noting that many first-person requests fail to “advance Congress’s primary goal 
in enacting FOIA: to promote public democratic oversight of government activities”); Kwoka, FOIA, 
Inc., supra note 15, at 1414–15 (noting that much of the commercial use of FOIA she uncovers “neither 
enhance[s] agency oversight nor promote[s] democratic participation in governance”); see also 
discussion supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text (noting that the drafters of FOIA were primarily 
concerned with ensuring an informed citizenry, and they envisioned that the media would play a central 
role in this process).  
 49 SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS, supra note 45, at 20. The government collected less than 
1% of these costs back from requesters. Id. 
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to requests.50 Members of Congress routinely accuse executive officials of 
creating obtuse procedures deliberately designed to confuse requesters.51 
And members of the media argue that enumerated exemptions have been 
construed so broadly that they swallow vast categories of records and that 
excessive time delays make the statute nearly unusable.52 Increasingly, 
scholars have taken up the question of whether the statute can be 
adequately reformed to better fulfill the needs of the government or the 
public.53 Yet despite these persistent critiques, the statute continues to loom 
large in the public imagination. Scholars have even characterized the law as 
a “super-statute,” one that has assumed a “quasi-constitutional valence” 
over time.54 
II. THE CENTERPIECE OF THE STATE TRANSPARENCY REGIME: STATE 
PUBLIC RECORDS LAWS 
Much like the federal transparency landscape, the local transparency 
regime consists of an overlapping network of state statutes. This Article 
homes in on the impact and efficacy of the most significant of these 
transparency requirements: state public records laws. Similar to the 
Freedom of Information Act’s role in the federal context, these state law 
equivalents serve as the foremost transparency mechanism for monitoring 
state and local government. 
A. The History of State Public Records Laws 
While legal scholars have explored the origins of the “right to know” 
in the American legal tradition, these historical inquiries are generally 
confined to the federal context.55 Despite scholars’ near-exclusive historical 
focus on federal law, the origin of the public access movement in the 
United States is in fact inextricably intertwined with state public records 
laws, which served as a precursor to FOIA. 
 
 50 See, e.g., MEGHAN M. STUESSY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41933, THE FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION ACT (FOIA): BACKGROUND, LEGISLATION, AND POLICY ISSUES 16 (2015) (noting that 
Department of Homeland Security officials had pointed to a “lack of funding” as one of the reasons the 
FOIA backlog had increased at the agency); see also Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the 
Freedom of Information Act, supra note 15, at 1123–31 (discussing the democratic costs of FOIA). 
 51 See, e.g., STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, 114TH CONG.,  
FOIA IS BROKEN: A REPORT, at iii–iv (2016), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=789831 
[https://perma.cc/8WTV-T7LW]. 
 52 See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 16, at 213–15 (chronicling the media’s frustration with FOIA). 
 53 See discussion supra note 15. 
 54 David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 314 n.204 (2010). 
 55 See discussion supra notes 14–15. 
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At common law, members of the public were entitled to inspect 
certain categories of public records, including the records of municipal 
corporations.56 State legislatures began to codify this common law right in 
the mid-nineteenth century. Wisconsin passed what was likely the nation’s 
first public records law in 1849,57 requiring that “[e]very sheriff, clerk of 
the circuit court, register of deeds, county treasurer, and clerk of the board 
of supervisors” keep “all books and papers . . . in their offices . . . open for 
the examination of any person.”58 The law’s enforcement mechanisms were 
robust: for each day that an officer neglected to comply with this open 
records requirement, he was required to pay a fee of $5—roughly the 
equivalent of $160 per day today.59 
Other states soon followed suit. In 1872, California enacted a limited 
statutory right of public access to the “written acts or records of the acts of 
the sovereign authority, of official bodies and tribunals, and of public 
officers, legislative, judicial, and executive.”60 By the turn of the century, 
Montana, Utah, Idaho, and Oregon had enacted similar provisions.61 And 
by 1940, at least twelve states had codified access rights to public records.62 
These laws were usually concise—often just a few sentences long—and 
lacked a clear definition as to their scope of coverage. Still, they served as 
an important precursor to FOIA.63 
The origins of the federal public records law are usually traced back to 
Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act,64 but no further.65 Yet the 
 
 56 See, e.g., Mushet v. Dep’t of Pub. Serv., 170 P. 653, 656 (Cal. Ct. App. 1917); State ex rel. 
Colescott v. King, 57 N.E. 535, 537, 538 (Ind. 1900); State ex rel. Wellford v. Williams, 75 S.W. 948, 
958–59 (Tenn. 1903); Clement v. Graham, 63 A. 146, 153–54 (Vt. 1906).  
 57 John A. Kidwell, Open Records Laws and Copyright, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1021, 1027. 
 58 WIS. STAT. § 10.137 (1849). 
 59 Id. 
 60 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1888, 1892 (Deering 1937). 
 61 See IDAHO C.C.P. §§ 902, 903 (1881), repealed by S.L. 1990; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 10541, 
3170–82 (1895), repealed by L. 2015, ch. 348, § 59; HILL’S ANN. LAWS OF OREGON §§ 717–18 (Hill 
1892); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-26-1–78-26-3 (1953); see also City of Kenai v. Kenai Peninsula 
Newspapers, Inc., 642 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Alaska 1982) (noting that the common law right of access was 
codified in 1900 in Alaska, and that the language of this provision was similar to existing laws in Idaho, 
Montana, Oregon, and Utah).  
 62 William Randolph Henrick, Comment, Public Inspection of State and Municipal Executive 
Documents: “Everybody, Practically Everything, Anytime, Except . . . .”, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1105, 
1107 (1977). 
 63 See HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW: LEGAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS 
AND PROCEEDINGS 39 (1953). 
 64 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).  
 65 See, e.g., STUESSY, supra note 50, at 1 (referring to FOIA “as the embodiment of ‘the people’s 
right to know’” and citing the APA as its precursor).  
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drafters of FOIA were strongly influenced by these state public access 
laws. They drew heavily on the work of Harold Cross, a former counsel for 
the New York Herald Tribune, who wrote a book that surveyed these state 
public records laws and argued in favor of a federal law that would offer 
similar rights of access.66 Cross himself served as a legal advisor to the 
congressional committee charged with drafting FOIA.67 Through Cross’s 
contributions, these existing state statutes influenced the structure and 
substance of the new federal public records law. 
The borders between these state and federal laws soon became 
permeable. FOIA began to influence the makeup of many state public 
records laws, even those that had been enacted prior to 1966.68 New state 
public records laws were enacted, some of which were patterned on 
FOIA.69 Amendments to existing state public records laws began to contain 
exemptions and provisions adopted from the federal law. And state court 
judges began to look to federal interpretations of analogous provisions of 
FOIA to guide their own interpretations of the state public records law.70 In 
this way, the federal and state statutory transparency regimes have become 
intertwined over time. 
B. The Substance and Application of State Public Records Laws 
The structure of state public records laws broadly mirrors that of 
FOIA: these state statutes generally begin with a presumption of openness, 
and they carve out specific categories of records that are protected from 
 
 66 See CROSS, supra note 63, at 7–9, 189, 201–202 (outlining state public records laws and arguing 
in favor of a federal equivalent); H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, pt. 2, at 23 (1966) (noting in a committee 
report on the bill to amend the Administrative Procedure Act that “[t]he broad outlines for legislative 
action to guarantee public access to Government information were laid out by Dr. Harold L. Cross in 
1953” in his book The People’s Right to Know). 
 67 MARK FENSTER, THE TRANSPARENCY FIX 32 (2017). 
 68 See, e.g., Linda de la Mora, Comment, The Wisconsin Public Records Law, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 
65, 66, 89–92 (1983) (noting that Wisconsin’s original public records law, enacted in 1917, was 
amended in 1983 to create a new deliberative process exemption similar to FOIA’s Exemption 5); 
Katherine Fink, State FOI Laws: More Journalist-Friendly, or Less?, in TROUBLING TRANSPARENCY, 
supra note 14, at 92 (noting that after FOIA was enacted, “new [state] FOI laws were passed and old 
laws were updated”). 
 69 See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police v. District of Columbia, 52 A.3d 822, 829 (D.C. 2012) 
(“Passed ten years after the federal FOIA, and two years after the federal FOIA was amended, the D.C. 
FOIA was inspired by and modeled on the federal legislation.”); Korner v. Madigan, 69 N.E.3d 892, 
895 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (noting that the Illinois public records law is “patterned” on FOIA).  
 70 See, e.g., Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. Rogers, 815 P.2d 900, 910 (Ariz. 1991); 
Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 813 P.2d 240, 247 (Cal. 1991); Police Patrol Sec. Sys., Inc. v. 
Prince George’s Cty., 838 A.2d 1191, 1203 n.8 (Md. 2003). 
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disclosure.71 Yet there are also important distinctions between state and 
federal public records laws, as well as among the various state statutes.  
One of the primary distinctions is in the size and scope of public 
records’ coverage. In contrast with FOIA, many state public records laws 
apply to state legislative and judicial bodies, as well as to state executive 
agencies.72 Further, at the local level, the sheer number of local 
governments affects how these public records laws are both constructed 
and applied. The roughly 90,000 local governments that exist today range 
from general-purpose governments, which supervise cities, towns, and 
counties, to special purpose districts that serve a very limited number of 
functions, such as providing educational, fire protection, water supply, or 
sewerage services.73 The size of a city or town will often dictate the number 
of local agencies—zoning boards, police commissions, education 
departments, etc.—that exist apart from the central governing unit.74 These 
various local legislative and executive bodies, as well as local agencies, are 
all subject to public records laws.  
This creates a diffuse and variegated public records system. It also 
makes it exceptionally difficult to gather public records data. State 
governments do not collect even basic statistics, such as the aggregate 
number of requests submitted in a year to state and local government 
entities.75 This has important research implications. The absence of data 
regarding the public records requests submitted in each state makes it 
difficult to reach broad-sweeping conclusions about the statutes 
themselves—how well they function, and whether they are worth the costs 
they impose. 
 
 71 See Eumi K. Lee, Monetizing Shame: Mugshots, Privacy, and the Right to Access, 70 RUTGERS 
U. L. REV. 557, 591–92 (2018) (“As with the FOIA, the state statutes begin with a broad presumption of 
openness, then provide specific statutory exceptions that are narrowly construed.”). 
 72 See infra notes 123–125 and accompanying text. 
 73 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 13–16; U.S. Census Bureau Press Release, supra 
note 31. 
74 The structure of government in large cities like New York, for example, resembles the complex 
structures found at the state level: a strong executive who oversees multiple executive agencies, an 
elected city council that exercises legislative authority, and a web of city courts that serve as an 
independent judicial branch. NYCdata: New York City (NYC) Governmental Structure, BARUCH COLL., 
https://www.baruch.cuny.edu/nycdata/nyc-government/index.html [https://perma.cc/6BZ3-RBG4]. In 
smaller cities, however, power is often much more centralized. In the council–manager organizational 
structure, for example, voters elect a city council, which in turn selects an executive—generally a city 
manager—who is then responsible for appointing department heads. ICMA, FORMS OF  
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 1 (2008), https://icma.org/documents/forms-local-government-structure/ 
[https://perma.cc/UZH2-SXZX]. 
 75 See discussion infra Section III.A. 
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That being said, various states collect different slices of data. A few 
states tally the aggregate number of requests submitted to state agencies, 
and this data allow for cautious insights.76 Texas, for example, reported that 
state agencies received nearly 650,000 public records requests in 2017, a 
surprisingly high figure that does not include requests to local government 
officials.77 This limited data also suggests that smaller states may receive 
more requests than might be expected given their population size, 
suggesting that the burden of responding to public records requests may be 
disproportionately higher for less populated states.78 
Further, this evidence reveals similarities in the types of state agencies 
that receive large numbers of requests. States organize their state agencies 
and state administrative responsibilities differently, making it difficult to 
draw direct comparisons between requests submitted to various agencies 
across different states. But patterns do emerge. For example, law 
enforcement agencies appear to consistently receive some of the highest 
numbers of requests,79 as do state public health agencies80 and corrections 
 
 76 For example, a nonprofit group that monitors public records in New York estimates that around 
200,000 public records requests are filed in that state each year. See Editorial Board, Opening Up New 
York’s Public Records, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/12/10/opinion/new-york-public-records.html [https://perma.cc/3URP-UDSW]. Washington State 
reported that the state and local governments received 285,000 requests in 2015. WASH. STATE 
AUDITOR’S OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AUDIT: THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC RECORDS REQUESTS ON STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 3 (2016), http://mrsc.org/getmedia/d3dbec02-f6f2-4aa7-b1dd-
94cd71a5fb4a/w3saoPRA.aspx [https://perma.cc/C74B-9VKD] [hereinafter WASH. STATE AUDITOR’S 
REPORT]. 
 77 Search for the number of open records requests for 2017 in Open Records Reports, ATT’Y GEN. 
OF TEX., https://www2.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/pia/reports/requests_tally.php?fy=2017&ag=all 
[https://perma.cc/7CKH-VB33] (reporting 642,945 requests in 2017) [hereinafter Texas State Dataset 
2017]; Open Records Reports, ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX., https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open-
government/governmental-bodies/open-records-reports [https://perma.cc/7RPM-RAMU] (noting that 
data are based on monthly reports from state agencies).  
 78 The population of Massachusetts was roughly eleven times the population of Vermont in 2017, 
but Massachusetts state agencies received only five times the number of requests as those received by 
Vermont agencies. Compare Sec’y of the Commonwealth of Mass., 2017 Agency Public Records 
Request Data as of 1/29/18, https://www.sec.state.ma.us/pre/prepra/prapdf/2017-Agency-Public-
Records-Request-Data-as-of-Jan-29-2018.xlsx [https://perma.cc/9B8L-7FVJ] [hereinafter 
Massachusetts State Dataset 2017] (showing that Massachusetts state agencies received 22,646 public 
records requests in 2017), with Agency of Admin., State of Vt., 2017 Statewide Public Records 
Requests Database (on file with author) [hereinafter Vermont State Dataset 2017] (showing that 
Vermont state agencies received 4,226 public records requests in 2017); compare Massachusetts 
Population, WORLD POPULATION REV., http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/massachusetts-
population [https://perma.cc/R6Z2-DYRS] (2017 population of 6,863,246), with Vermont Population, 
WORLD POPULATION REV., http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/vermont-population 
[https://perma.cc/9VXA-HC6H] (2017 population of 624,525). 
 79 See, e.g., Massachusetts State Dataset 2017, supra note 78 (the Department of State Police 
received the second highest number of requests); Texas State Dataset 2017, supra note 77 (the 
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departments.81 Yet even agencies that perform similar administrative 
functions across states often receive disparate numbers of requests.82 The 
number and type of requests submitted to various government entities 
varies substantially at the local level as well.83 
Very few requests are appealed administratively at the state and local 
level. Fewer than half of the states provide requesters the option of an 
administrative appeal.84 But even in states that do offer an administrative 
appeals process, few requesters take advantage85—with the exception of 
members of the media, who appear to submit a disproportionate number of 
appeals.86 Public records litigation is also curtailed at the state and local 
level. While litigation data are difficult to obtain,87 the limited evidence that 
is available suggests that very few requests proceed to litigation. In 2018, 
for example, only twelve public records lawsuits were filed in 
 
Department of Public Safety received the second highest number of requests); Vermont State Dataset 
2017, supra note 78 (the Department of Public Safety received more than half of all public records 
requests submitted that year, the highest of any state agency). 
 80 See, e.g., Massachusetts State Dataset 2017, supra note 78 (the Department of Public Health 
received the highest number of requests); Washington State Dataset 2017, supra note 32 (of the state 
agencies that reported data, the Department of Health received the second highest number of requests). 
 81 See, e.g., Texas State Dataset 2017, supra note 77 (the Department of Criminal Justice received 
the fourth highest number of requests); Vermont State Dataset 2017, supra note 78 (the Department of 
Corrections received the third highest number of requests). 
 82 Compare, e.g., Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, Jan. 1–Nov. 14, 2016 Public Records Log (on file with 
author) (the agency received 3,888 requests), with Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health and Env’t, Jan 1–Nov. 16, 
2016 Public Records Log (on file with author) (the agency received 687 public records requests).  
 83 For example, the cities of Pleasant Grove, Alabama and Emeryville, California both have 
populations of roughly 10,000, and yet Pleasant Grove has received just two public records requests in 
the past sixteen years, while Emeryville received sixty-six public records requests in 2016 alone. 
Telephone Interview, City Clerk, City of Pleasant Grove, Ala. (Sept. 17, 2018) (specifying that these 
were requests submitted through the Clerk’s office, and this does not include requests submitted 
through the police department); City of Emeryville, Cal., Feb. 2016–Jan. 2018 Public Records Logs (on 
file with author) [hereinafter Emeryville Public Records Log].  
 84 State Public Records Law Database (on file with author).  
 85 See, e.g., Massachusetts State Dataset 2017, supra note 78 (174 out of a total of 22,646 
requests—0.8%—submitted to state agencies in 2017 were appealed administratively).  
 86 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., STATE OF ILL., PUBLIC ACCESS COUNSELOR ANNUAL 
REPORT 2 (2018), https://foia.ilattorneygeneral.net/pdf/2018_PAC_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ULQ-
LTCV] (noting that 16% of administrative appeals originated from members of the media in 2017). 
 87 Few states keep track of public records lawsuits filed statewide. See, e.g., e-mail from Katie 
Conner, Spokesperson, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Ariz., to author (Feb. 20, 2019) (on file with author) 
(stating that the office does not track the number of statewide public records lawsuits); e-mail from 
Lauren Shipley, Constituent Servs., Office of the Att’y Gen. of Ark., to author (Mar. 5, 2019) (on file 
with author) (same); e-mail from Nicholas Weilhammer, Dir., Office of Pub. Records., Office of the 
Att’y Gen. of Fla., to author (Feb. 21, 2019) (on file with author) (same).  
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Connecticut,88 seven in Hawaii,89 and two against state agencies in 
Vermont.90 
III. TRANSPARENCY ECOSYSTEMS 
The state and local transparency regime is comprised of a complex 
web of statutory requirements and state constitutional provisions. Statutory 
requirements at the state and local level include public records laws, open 
meetings laws, laws governing budget disclosures, open data requirements, 
and laws governing transparency in campaign finance, among others.91 
State constitutional transparency provisions include, for example, those 
requiring public hearings prior to legislative reapportionment and 
mandating the publication of reports documenting the fiscal health of the 
state’s educational system.92 At least one state even provides an explicit 
constitutional right of access to government information.93 
These statutory and constitutional requirements combine with other 
features of a local transparency environment—such as local media outlets 
and civil society organizations—to form a broader transparency 
ecosystem.94 Some of these state and local requirements mirror federal law; 
 
 88 E-mail from Thomas A. Hennick, Pub. Educ. Officer, Conn. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, to author 
(Feb. 20, 2019) (on file with author). 
 89 OFFICE OF INFO. PRACTICES, STATE OF HAW., ANNUAL REPORT 2018, at 61 (2018), 
https://oip.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/ANNUAL-REPORT-2018-OIP.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KX6F-8XNS]. In contrast, according to a nonprofit research center at Syracuse 
University, 651 FOIA lawsuits were filed in 2017. FOIA Project Staff, FOIA Lawsuits Surge in Trump 
Administration’s First Year, FOIA PROJECT (Jan. 16, 2018), http://foiaproject.org/2018/01/16/lawsuits-
trump-first-year [https://perma.cc/BES6-XAU9]. 
 90 E-mail from Jessica Mishaan, Paralegal, Office of the Att’y Gen. of Vt., to author (Feb. 25, 2019) 
(on file with author).  
 91 See, e.g., Yue Qiu et al., How Does Your State Rank for Integrity?, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY 
(published Nov. 9, 2015; updated Feb. 2, 2018), https://publicintegrity.org/accountability/how-does-
your-state-rank-for-integrity/ [https://perma.cc/629S-BHHK] (ranking states on various accountability 
measures including public access to information, electoral oversight, lobbying disclosures, and state 
budget processes). 
 92 See, e.g., ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. III, § 1-A (requiring hearings prior to apportionment); OR. 
CONST. art. VIII, § 8 (requiring publication of fiscal health of state educational system). 
 93 See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 24. 
 94 The concept of a transparency ecosystem is borrowed from Professor Seth Kreimer, who has 
argued that at the federal level, FOIA plays a central role in a broader “ecology of transparency that 
includes the permanent infrastructure of federal civil servants with integrity, internal watchdogs, 
reasonably open opportunities to publish and share information, and a set of civil society actors capable 
of pursuing prolonged campaigns for disclosure.” Kreimer, supra note 16, at 1017. This concept also 
borrows from the idea of a “news ecosystem.” See PEN AM., LOSING THE NEWS: THE DECIMATION OF 
LOCAL JOURNALISM AND THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 7 (2019), https://pen.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/12/Losing-the-News-The-Decimation-of-Local-Journalism-and-the-Search-for-
Solutions-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9EH-MESK].  
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others are less robust. Yet all fifty states have enacted a public records 
statute. Just as FOIA operates as the “crown jewel” of the federal 
transparency regime, the most significant transparency mechanism in state 
and local government are these public records statutes. This Section 
explores the formation of these local transparency ecosystems by 
examining the value and efficacy of these state public records laws. 
A. Methodology  
The public records process at the state and local level is profoundly 
disaggregated. It is also vast: there are most likely hundreds of thousands of 
government entities—if not more—subject to these state public records 
statutes. Thousands of these requests are likely submitted each day to 
government entities around the country. This creates an enormous potential 
universe of public records data. At the same time, few governments keep 
track of these requests.  
As a consequence, I have allowed the availability of data—and 
specifically, the availability of government-generated datasets cataloguing 
these public records requests—to drive my research agenda. In September 
and October of 2018, I called every state attorney general’s office in the 
country to ask whether they collected data on all state and local public 
records requests. At the time, only two states aggregated and published 
information about individual requests—Massachusetts and Vermont—and 
they did so only for state-level government agencies.95 Vermont was the 
only state in the country to also publish the requesters’ identities—a crucial 
piece of information for understanding who submits requests to the 
government, and for what purpose.96  
A handful of other states tracked these requests in more limited form. 
Texas provided the total numbers of requests, fees recouped, and hours 
spent redacting records at the state level.97 Washington collected data for a 
small group of state and local government entities—around 8% of total 
agencies in the state.98 And Hawaii collected data for a subset of 
“nonroutine” requests, or those for which no fee schedule has been 
 
95 See generally Massachusetts State Dataset 2017, supra note 78; Vermont State Dataset 2017, 
supra note 78. 
96 Vermont State Dataset 2017, supra note 78. 
97 Texas State Dataset 2017, supra note 77. 
98 Washington State Dataset 2017, supra note 32. 
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established.99 The remaining states either did not track public records data 
or the attorney’s general offices failed to respond to my queries.100 No state 
gathered aggregate data on public records requests submitted to local 
governments.  
To supplement these statewide datasets, I submitted a handful of 
additional requests for public records logs that were especially relevant to 
my analysis.101 I also gathered every publicly available dataset that I could 
find. The richest source of these public records logs was MuckRock, a 
nonprofit organization that allows journalists and researchers to manage 
their public records requests and make their records available online.102 
Many of the datasets analyzed here were downloaded from that website.  
I concentrated my efforts on gathering public records logs that 
contained both the names and affiliations of requesters. I then coded these 
logs by type of requester: commercial, media, first-person, government, 
and so on. I occasionally subdivided these broad categories further—for 
example, by coding the number of commercial requests that were submitted 
by insurance companies, or the number of first-person requests submitted 
by inmates. When a requester provided only their name but not their 
institutional affiliation, I searched online to identify an organizational link. 
This effort was often only partially successful: for many logs, I was unable 
to code a substantial percentage of requests.103 
In some instances, I supplemented this quantitative material by 
speaking with individuals involved in the public records process—
including public records officers, journalists, media lawyers, and public 
defenders—to better understand the various dimensions of the public 
records process. Further, I relied on a variety of other primary and 
secondary sources, including the text of these public records statutes, case 
law interpreting these laws, newspaper articles, and government and 
nonprofit advocacy reports. I did not limit this search to any single subject 
or state, but I did make an effort to obtain publicly available materials in 
states that were otherwise underrepresented in my analysis. 
 
99 OFFICE OF INFO. PRACTICES, STATE OF HAW., OIP’S REPORT OF STATE AGENCIES’ UIPA 
RECORD REQUEST YEAR-END LOGS FOR FY 2018, at 2 (2018) [hereinafter HAWAII PUBLIC RECORDS 
REPORT 2018]. 
100 The attorney general’s office in twelve states failed to respond to my queries.  
101 For example, I obtained hundreds of public records logs from state and local agencies in Hawaii 
through a formal public records request. 
102 About Us, MUCKROCK, https://www.muckrock.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/A3MA-KL2E]. 
103 This research approach was both inspired by and modeled on Professor Kwoka’s analysis of 
FOIA logs. See Kwoka, First-Person FOIA, supra note 15, at 2221–23 (discussing the methodology 
used in an analogous study); Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 15, at 1379–80 (same).  
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The advantage of this research approach is that it allowed me to 
concentrate my research efforts where usable data already existed. The 
disadvantage is that my analysis is, by necessity, spotty and incomplete. 
The acute lack of data at the state and local level makes it nearly 
impossible to conduct comprehensive comparative surveys.104 This is true 
across the fifty states, and it is especially true across the hundreds of 
thousands of local government entities subject to state public records laws. 
Even so, the limited data that I have collected helps begin to shed light on 
an opaque and underexamined area of the law. 
B. The Benefits of State Public Records Laws 
Statutory transparency requirements, such as state public records laws, 
comprise an important part of the informational ecosystem that sustains a 
liberal democracy. Effective transparency measures allow citizens to hold 
elected officials accountable, make informed democratic decisions, and 
understand the limits and confines of the exercise of government power.105 
Many of the benefits that flow from these state public records statutes are 
distinct from those provided by federal law, and yet they have been largely 
ignored by scholars. This Section explores some examples. 
1. Informing the Public 
The primary goal of these public records laws is to enhance 
democratic governance. As the Supreme Court has said in the context of 
FOIA, the “basic purpose” of the law “is to ensure an informed citizenry, 
vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against 
corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.”106 Yet 
these statutes also perform an important secondary function in informing 
the public: they allow citizens to obtain records about themselves. This 
 
104 One scholar who attempted to compare public records logs of state environmental agencies 
received usable data from fewer than half of the states. See Fink, supra note 17, at 109–11. Further, 
states often define their public records datasets differently. Some states may exclude certain types of 
routine requests from their tally. See, e.g., HAWAII PUBLIC RECORDS REPORT 2018, supra note 99, at 2. 
Others may exclude requests submitted in certain forms. See, e.g., Interview with Chris Voss, Dir. of 
Admin. Servs. and Interim Records Access Officer, Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., in Boston, Mass. (Dec. 
19, 2018) (noting that walk-in requests for records are not always included in the public records 
database).  
 105 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010) (“[T]ransparency enables the electorate to 
make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.”); NLRB v. 
Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (“The basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an 
informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption 
and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.” (citations omitted)); see also Fenster, supra 
note 14, at 895–99 (describing the democratic benefits of transparency). 
106 Robbins Tire & Rubber, 437 U.S. at 242. 
114:1461 (2020) Transparency Deserts 
1483 
Section explores the ways that these two key categories of requests—media 
and first-person requests—facilitate the flow of information from the 
government to the public.  
a. Media Requests  
The media is arguably the public’s most important tool of government 
accountability, especially at the state and local level, where government 
checks and balances are weaker.107 When uncovering government 
malfeasance or misconduct, journalists generally have two options: 
convince someone with knowledge to come forward or obtain documents 
through public records requests. Often, these two paths are intertwined—a 
source will reveal government misconduct in an off-the-record interview 
and then direct the reporter to submit a public records request that 
substantiates the story.108 
This dual-track sourcing provides confidential sources an added layer 
of anonymity and protection. A common critique in the transparency 
literature is that the media relies on FOIA to “find[]” a government 
scandal.109 But the mechanics of this claim do not hold up: the statute is too 
unwieldy a tool to blindly search for government wrongdoing.110 In reality, 
journalists generally rely on the law to substantiate a story that has come to 
their attention in some other way. In this way, FOIA facilitates the media’s 
role as government watchdog. 
These state statutes serve as an equally important investigative tool at 
the state and local level. State public records requests have informed 
dozens of Pulitzer Prize-winning stories,111 including the Boston Globe’s 
 
 107 See discussion infra notes 452–467 and accompanying text. 
 108 See, e.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, WORKING WITH WHISTLEBLOWERS: A GUIDE FOR 
JOURNALISTS 22 (2019), http://wordpress-350926-1087337.cloudwaysapps.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2019/07/GovAcctProj_JournalistsWhistleblowing-Guide_2019_single-pages.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2FT8-JQ5B] (advising reporters that “[i]f your source has access to information that 
could show wrongdoing by the government, tutoring you for the right Freedom of Information Act 
requests can gain access to those materials”). 
 109 See, e.g., Fenster, supra note 14, at 926. 
110 See, e.g., Jake Lucas, How Times Reporters Use the Freedom of Information Act, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/21/insider/information-freedom-reporters-
pruitt.html [https://perma.cc/UW45-W34L] (quoting a reporter’s finding that reporters use FOIA to “fill 
in details that are hard to find other ways”). 
 111 See, e.g., The 2005 Pulitzer Prize Winner in Public Service: L.A. Times, PULITZER PRIZES, 
https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/los-angeles-times-3 [https://perma.cc/8Y45-UHMY] (relying on 
public records requests in One Doctor’s Long Trail of Dangerous Mistakes); The 2006 Pulitzer Prize 
Winner in Public Service: The Times-Picayune, New Orleans, PULITZER PRIZES 
https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/times-picayune [https://perma.cc/28WC-QTF2] (relying on public 
records in From Blue Tarps to Debris Removal, Many Layers of Contractors Drive Up the Cost of 
Recovery, Critics Say). 
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groundbreaking reporting on the sexual abuse crisis in the Catholic Church 
in 2004112 and the Editor of the Storm Lake Times’s 2017 editorial exposé 
of the role powerful agribusinesses have played in covering up river 
pollution in Iowa.113 One study of submissions to the Investigative 
Reporters and Editors annual prizes found that a quarter of the stories about 
government misconduct relied on a federal or state public records 
request.114 
Of course, not every request yields national awards for investigative 
reporting. These laws also support hundreds of more rote investigations 
across the country each day. Yet the benefits of these laws can be difficult 
to quantify. In the federal context, a familiar debate plays out among 
transparency advocates and opponents: advocates point to groundbreaking 
media reports that elicited broader government reform, while opponents 
point to the law’s rising toll and ask whether these scattered victories by the 
news media can really justify FOIA’s costs115—financial and otherwise.116 
This debate is not easily resolved. But it is worth emphasizing here that 
these state public records laws—like FOIA—play a critical role in allowing 
the media to report on government action and unearth government 
misconduct and abuse. 
Further, state public records laws offer media requesters specific 
advantages over FOIA. Most notably, state and local governments turn 
requests around more quickly than federal agencies. In 2016, the average 
processing time for FOIA requests was 28 days for simple requests and 128 
days for complex requests.117 In contrast, MuckRock tracked more than 
 
 112 The 2003 Pulitzer Prize Winner in Public Service: Bos. Globe, PULITZER PRIZES, 
https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/boston-globe-1 [https://perma.cc/J5MV-G8Y7] (relying on public 
records for Scores of Priests Involved in Sex Abuse Cases: Settlements Kept Scope of Issue Out of 
Public). 
 113 Kelly McGowan, Iowa Newspaper Editor Wins Pulitzer Prize, DES MOINES REG. (Apr. 10, 
2017), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2017/04/10/iowa-newspaper-editor-wins-
pulitzer/100299258/ [https://perma.cc/WP9E-AM7M]; see also The 2017 Pulitzer Prize Winner in 
Editorial Writing: Art Cullen of the Storm Lake Times, PULITZER PRIZES, 
https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/art-cullen [https://perma.cc/SA2J-8P7Y]. 
 114 JAMES T. HAMILTON, DEMOCRACY’S DETECTIVES 158 (2016). 
 115 See discussion supra note 16. 
 116 Some scholars have looked beyond the financial costs of the law. Professor Pozen, in particular, 
has focused on the democratic costs of the law—the ways that FOIA not only fails to advance but in 
fact actively impedes democratic governance. See, e.g., Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the 
Freedom of Information Act, supra note 15, at 1123–35 (describing the democratic costs of FOIA); 
Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, supra note 14, at 154–59 (same). 
117 OFFICE OF INFO. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS FOR 
FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 12–13 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/oip/reports/ 
fy_2016_annual_report_summary.pdf/download [https://perma.cc/LA2U-BLJ3]. 
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50,000 requests submitted through its streamlined requesting service and 
found that the federal government took longer to process requests on 
average than all fifty states and the District of Columbia.118 Data reported 
directly by the states shows even more rapid processing timelines. In 
Hawaii, for example, the average turnaround time for requests submitted to 
state agencies in 2018 was just 8.5 days.119  
From the outside, the timeframe within which requested records are 
provided may seem a minor point. But for many requesters—and especially 
for the media—these time barriers are the single most significant obstacle 
to the effective use of public records laws. Reporters often work on tight 
deadlines and cannot afford to engage in protracted negotiations with the 
government over the release of records.120 The shortened timeframe for 
state transparency requests substantially increases the practical utility of 
these statutes.121 
State laws also offer an expanded scope of coverage in comparison 
with FOIA. While federal transparency law is limited to federal agencies, 
many state laws cover a wider array of government offices, officials, and 
activity. Massachusetts is the only state that has curtailed its public records 
coverage to the boundaries of FOIA.122 Every other state extends public 
records coverage to a broader set of government officials. The majority of 
state public records laws apply to both the governor’s office and the 
legislative branch.123 And many state statutes also require at least some 
disclosure of judicial records.124 Moreover, these state laws apply not 
 
 118 How Open Is Your Government? Find Out, MUCKROCK, https://www.muckrock.com/place/ 
[https://perma.cc/89PV-CUMG]. On the low end, Rhode Island took an average of nineteen days to 
process MuckRock requests, and on the high end, New Mexico took 140 days to process requests. Id. 
 119 HAWAII PUBLIC RECORDS REPORT 2018, supra note 99, at 6. 
120 See, e.g., STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, supra note 51, at ii 
(“Members of the media described their complete abandonment of the FOIA request as a tool because 
delays and redactions made the request process wholly useless for reporting to the public.”). 
121 These state and local governments process requests more quickly even in the face of significant 
financial and other resource constraints. See discussion infra note 176 and accompanying text. It is 
unclear why this is so. It is possible that these requests are less complex than the average FOIA request, 
or that state and local governments are more likely to deny requests outright.  
 122 Todd Wallack, State Lawmakers Fail to Reach Consensus on Whether to Expand Public Record 
Law, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/01/10/state-lawmakers-
fail-reach-consensus-whether-expand-public-record-law/XvwfD04o2TtQ4HWqmxi0BO/story.html 
[https://perma.cc/974M-XQZF]. 
 123 State Public Records Law Database, supra note 84. 
 124 Id. Some of these states’ coverage is only partial, requiring administrative or financial court 
records to be made public but exempting substantive judicial documents from disclosure. See, e.g., 
38 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-2(4)(T) (2019) (“Judicial bodies are included . . . only in respect to their 
administrative function.”). 
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merely to general purpose governments, such as cities and towns, but to 
special purpose institutions as well, which often receive even less public 
scrutiny despite wielding significant authority and power.125 This expanded 
coverage allows the public to monitor a much broader range of government 
actors than FOIA allows. And it permits the media, especially, to 
investigate a broader swath of government activity.  
Finally, state and local government entities often possess overlapping 
records. Administrative law scholars have detailed the extent to which 
duplication among federal agencies can be advantageous, noting that 
redundancy can prevent agency capture, produce healthy competition, and 
reduce the chances of system failure.126 Given the fluid and overlapping 
nature of local government borders,127 neighboring governments or special 
purpose governments extending across multiple jurisdictions often possess 
the same or similar records. Such redundancy allows the media multiple 
opportunities to request records, increasing the chance that they will be 
able to secure access. It most likely has a deterrent effect as well. The risk 
that a separate government entity will release a duplicate copy of a 
requested record can discourage government officials from withholding 
records unlawfully in an effort to avoid unfavorable media coverage.128 In 
short, these state public records laws permit the media certain advantages 
when performing its watchdog role.  
b. First-Person Requests  
State public records laws also perform a secondary function in 
informing the public: they allow individuals to obtain records about 
themselves.129 Professor Kwoka has documented the scope and impact of 
 
 125 See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 34, at 603–04 (noting that special purpose districts often lack a 
direct electoral accountability mechanism); Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way 
Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 22 (2010) (noting that federalism scholars have tended to ignore special 
purpose institutions). 
 126 See, e.g., Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and 
Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655, 1676–78 (2006). 
127 Various general purpose and special purpose local governments often overlap. Counties may 
encompass cities and towns, and special purpose governments may be coterminous with city or town 
boundaries or may encircle multiple municipal or town units. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 
21, at 15. 
 128 See Albert Breton et al., Introduction, in THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSPARENCY IN POLITICS 1 
(Albert Breton et al. eds., 2007) (noting that it is “easier for an organization (or an individual) to 
obfuscate—to be less transparent—when it is the only agency in possession or in control of particular 
pieces of information”); O’Connell, supra note 126, at 1722 (noting that when multiple federal agencies 
possess information, “it may be more likely to come out through a” FOIA request or leak).  
129 First-person requests arguably fall somewhere in between the “benefits” and “costs” distinction 
that this Article draws. They are less aligned with the democracy-enhancing goals of the statutes’ 
 
114:1461 (2020) Transparency Deserts 
1487 
these first-person requests at the federal level, demonstrating that certain 
federal agencies receive up to 98% of their requests from individuals 
seeking copies of their own records.130 Yet scholars have not yet examined 
the extent to which first-person requests make up the public records logs of 
state and local governments.  
Lack of data at the state and local level, combined with the 
overwhelming number of state and local governments covered by the law, 
prevents any rigorous empirical analysis. Scattered empirical data, 
however, along with anecdotal evidence gleaned from interviews with 
public records officials, suggest that first-person requests comprise a 
significant percentage of requests to state and local agencies as well. State 
corrections departments, for example, seem to receive a large number of 
first-person requests from inmates.131 These requesters are often seeking 
sections of their prison file that contain disciplinary reports against them or 
complaints that they have lodged against specific corrections officers. Such 
records may be used to help substantiate a grievance or support a lawsuit 
that the inmate plans to file against the state or county.132 
State and local law enforcement agencies also seem to receive a 
substantial number of first-person requests. While insurance companies and 
commercial requesters generally dominate the public records dockets of 
 
drafters, so they are less publicly beneficial than, say, requests submitted by journalists. At the same 
time, they provide greater public benefit than commercial requests, which I have categorized as a “cost” 
of these laws. See discussion infra Section III.C.4. I ultimately included first-person requests here, in 
the “benefits” Section, because these requests arm citizens with the information they need to advance 
their interests before government entities (for example, by obtaining records for use in social security or 
disability proceedings) and because such requests often end up having broader spillover effects (for 
example, requests filed by inmates about their own disciplinary record may inform a lawsuit that 
remedies broader civil rights abuses). Even so, the proper placement of these first-person requests lays 
bare some of the complexities that arise from the dichotomous cost/benefit structure of this Article. 
These first-person requests do have costs: they require significant public resources to advance the 
interests of one individual rather than society as a whole. Cf. Kwoka, First-Person FOIA, supra note 15, 
at 2208 (noting that first-person FOIA requests, while “frequently vital to the requestor’s interests,” fail 
to “advance Congress’s primary goal in enacting FOIA: to promote public democratic oversight of 
government activities”). Similarly, commercial requests can have broader benefits. See infra note 204 
(discussing the benefits of commercial requests, in spite of their categorization as a “cost” of state 
public records laws). 
 130 Kwoka, First-Person FOIA, supra note 15, at 2225. 
 131 See, e.g., Penn. Dep’t of Corrections, 2016 Public Records Log (on file with author) (roughly 
three-quarters of requests appear to have originated from prisoners); State of Vt., Public Records 
Request Database 2013–2018 (downloaded Sept. 13, 2018) (on file with author) [hereinafter Vermont 
State Dataset 2013–2018] (roughly 35% of requests originated from current or former inmates). 
 132 Telephone Interview with David Turner, Dir. of Offender Due Process and Grievances & Pub. 
Records Officer, Vt. Dep’t of Corrections (Nov. 21, 2018). 
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these agencies,133 individuals will seek police or accident reports for a 
myriad of other, non-insurance-related reasons. They may need a police 
report to file a complaint with the landlord against a neighbor, to use as 
evidence in a custody dispute, or to obtain information about the death of a 
loved one.134 Lawyers representing criminal defendants also rely on public 
records requests to obtain law enforcement records that may not be 
available in discovery, such as documents demonstrating systemic issues 
within a particular department or information relating to a prosecution’s 
witness.135 Some states do not provide automatic discovery rights for those 
pursuing post-conviction relief, but instead require that the defendant seek 
permission from the court.136 When that request is denied, attorneys must 
rely exclusively on public records requests.137 
Individuals submit a wide variety of first-person requests to other state 
and local agencies as well.138 Parents submit requests for copies of their 
children’s individualized education plans to state and local educational 
agencies;139 family members submit requests to state treasury departments 
seeking records about the estate of a deceased relative;140 homeowners seek 
records showing any unpaid utility charges prior to purchasing or selling a 
property;141 and individuals engaged in genealogical research submit 
requests for family records to city clerks’ offices.142 
Professor Kwoka has raised concerns about such first-person use of 
public records laws in the federal context. She has argued that in some 
instances, FOIA has been converted into a rudimentary tool for discovery, 
 
 133 See discussion infra Section III.C.4. 
 134 See, e.g., Kings Cty. Sheriff’s Office, Wash., 2018 Public Records Log (on file with author).  
 135 See Ion Meyn, The Criminal Defense Attorney’s Burden, 31 AM. BAR ASS’N 36, 36, 38 (2014), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/publications/gp_solo/2014/september-
october/the_criminal_defense_attorneys_burden/ [https://perma.cc/86TF-K4ZL]. 
 136 See, e.g., MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30(c)(4). 
 137 See Telephone Interview with Ira Gant, Staff Counsel, Innocence Program, Mass. Comm. for 
Pub. Counsel Servs. (Apr. 3, 2019). 
 138 See, e.g., Penn. Dep’t of State, Sept.–Dec. 2016 Public Records Log (on file with author) 
(around 20% of requests originated from inmates and roughly 50% from lawyers, many of whom were 
seeking information about a specific client). 
 139 See, e.g., Wis. Dep’t for Pub. Instruction, 2015 Public Records Log, at 5 (on file with author) 
(requesting “[r]ecord of changes to son’s IEP”). 
 140 See, e.g., N.J. Dep’t of Treasury, 2013 Public Records Log, at 187 (on file with author). 
 141 See, e.g., S.F. Pub. Recs. Requests, Filtered by “Unpaid,” NextRequest 
https://sanfrancisco.nextrequest.com/requests?filter=unpaid [https://perma.cc/9Z6Z-N38F] (showing list 
of requests for unpaid utility bills). 
 142 See, e.g., City of L.A., Public Records Request #18–990 (May 2, 2018), 
https://recordsrequest.lacity.org/requests/18-990 [https://perma.cc/5KJR-ZB85] (showing requests 
seeking information regarding grandfather’s home ownership for family genealogy records). 
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and she has questioned whether such first-person use advances the 
underlying transparency goals of the statute.143 Similar concerns apply at 
the state and local level. These state and local requests do not always 
effectively serve first-person requesters’ needs. Some statutes exclude 
certain categories of individuals from accessing government records,144 and 
virtually every state statute is plagued by time delays and other procedural 
barriers to release. Such obstacles can make these requesting channels an 
ineffective method of information gathering.145  
Even so, these first-person requests have substantial value. They are 
often critical to advancing the requester’s interests. And actions taken 
against the government by individual requesters—for example, inmates 
suing for civil rights violations—can elicit more systemic reform as well as 
enhanced government oversight by the public at large. 
Further, such first-person requests may have broader democratic 
benefits, especially at the state and local level. It is generally easier to 
engage directly with a public records officer in state and local government, 
and smaller governments, in particular, are often more willing to negotiate 
with requesters.146 Records access officers often serve as the public face of 
state agencies or local governments, assisting citizens with their queries 
and pointing them in the right direction if their needs do not fit squarely 
within the scope of the law. In this way, such first-person requests can 
serve to strengthen democratic participation by allowing citizens a lower 
barrier of entry into the governmental process.147 
2. Informing the Government 
Public records laws are generally thought of as a tool for citizens to 
obtain information about their government. Information flow is 
traditionally conceived as unidirectional, held by the government and 
transmitted to the public.148 A review of public records logs at various 
government levels, however, reveals a critical yet overlooked function of 
these statutes: facilitating information exchange between governments. 
 
 143 Kwoka, First-Person FOIA, supra note 15, at 2244. 
144 For example, some states bar inmates from accessing public records at all, making it difficult for 
pro se inmates to take action against the government. See infra notes 281–284 and accompanying text. 
 145 See, e.g., Geraghty & Velez, supra note 17, at 458–63 (describing criminal justice institutions’ 
efforts to delay or block the release of public records about inmates); Kwoka, First-Person FOIA, supra 
note 15, at 2253. 
146 See, e.g., Interview with Steve Eder, supra note 28 (noting that there is often “more of a 
dialogue” with government officials in the context of state and local public requests). 
 147 See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 389–90 (1997) (arguing that a 
benefit of federalism is that more citizens can and do participate in smaller levels of government). 
 148 See Fenster, supra note 14, at 914. 
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This occurs at all levels. Foreign governments submit requests to state 
agencies; county officials submit requests to towns; and towns submit 
requests to the federal government. Different agencies within the same 
executive structure even submit public records requests to one another. 
These inter- and intragovernmental requests appeared in virtually 
every state and local public records log that I reviewed. Fee waivers for 
certain government entities are even written into the text of some state 
public records laws.149 And the proportion of these governmental requests 
can be substantial.150 The request log of the Vermont Department of 
Corrections offers a useful case study. Between January 2013 and July 
2018, the agency received around 170 requests from government entities, 
or roughly 10% of its total requests.151 Foreign consulates submitted fifty-
five of these requests,152 often asking for a list of inmates claiming to be 
citizens of their country.153 The agency also received more than three dozen 
requests from the federal government. The largest number of requests came 
from the Department of Veterans Affairs, generally for specific inmate 
records to establish benefits eligibility for individual veterans. But other 
federal agencies, including the Social Security Agency and the Department 
of Justice, submitted multiple requests as well.154 Requests also originated 
from federal legislators, often for statistics to be used as part of a 
nationwide legislative survey.155 And the agency received a number of 
intrastate requests from Vermont legislators, from other state agencies, and 
from local police departments, fire departments, and high schools.156 
By facilitating intergovernmental cooperation and information 
exchange, public records laws perform an important yet overlooked 
function. These requests offer officials at all levels of government a process 
by which to obtain and exchange a variety of information, ranging from 
prison population levels to environmental pollution data to budgetary 
 
 149 See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-212(d)(4)–(5) (2019). 
 150 See, e.g., Washington State Dataset 2017, supra note 32 (a selection of thirty-seven state 
agencies collectively received around 2,200 government-to-government requests in 2017); Brian 
Duggan, Reno Police Report Copies Used to Cost $9. Now They’re $45—The Most Expensive in 
Nevada, RENO GAZETTE J. (Sept. 10, 2018, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.rgj.com/story/news/2018/09/10/reno-expensive-police-report-cost/1058349002/ 
[https://perma.cc/R7PM-KHD2] (noting that roughly 25% of the 10,000 requests received in 2017 by 
the Reno City Police Department were from other police departments and law enforcement agencies). 
 151 Vermont State Dataset 2013–2018, supra note 131. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Telephone Interview with David Turner, supra note 132. 
 154 Vermont State Dataset 2013–2018, supra note 131. 
 155 Id.; Telephone Interview with David Turner, supra note 132. 
 156 Vermont State Dataset 2013–2018, supra note 131. 
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statistics. This horizontal information exchange also weakens a central 
argument of transparency critics: that statutory transparency requirements 
are unnecessary because sufficient transparency mechanisms are built into 
the structure of government itself.157 This widespread governmental 
reliance on state public records laws underscores the extent to which these 
laws can foster cooperation between and among different levels of 
government. 
Further, public records laws also allow information to flow in the 
reverse, from members of the public to the government. Again, this is not 
how we traditionally conceive of the movement of information in the 
public records context. But elected officials also rely on public records logs 
and individual public records requests to identify trouble spots and gain 
insight into the issues that preoccupy the public. The requests themselves—
not just the media stories or the public outcry that may follow their 
disclosure—can help alert government officials to governance problems.158 
This is particularly true at lower levels of government, where established 
feedback mechanisms that we take for granted at the federal level, such as 
periodic elections and sustained media coverage, are often lacking. In these 
instances, monitoring public records requests allows officials to better 
understand and respond to the public’s concerns. 
3. Innovation and Experimentation 
This profusion of state public records laws has allowed for state and 
local experimentation in the structure and management of the public 
records process. As local government scholar Nestor Davidson has noted: 
“If the fifty laboratories of democracy are beneficial in federalism, the 
argument goes, surely ninety thousand must provide even more fertile 
ground for variation, tinkering, and policy diffusion.”159 Examples of this 
variation and experimentation are plentiful. One fertile area of innovation 
has occurred in the administrative process for appealing public records 
denials. While FOIA requires that requesters appeal an adverse 
determination to the head of the agency prior to filing a lawsuit,160 states 
have experimented with a wide array of appellate administrative remedies. 
 
 157 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 16, at 19. 
 158 See, e.g., Interview with Chris Voss, supra note 104 (noting that “[t]here is benefit to seeing 
what people are asking in that particular types of records are sought after,” such as helping the agency 
determine which types of records to affirmatively post online). 
 159 Davidson, supra note 34, at 625. For a discussion of how entrenched flaws in these state public 
records laws undermine the concept of democratic laboratories more broadly, see infra notes 417–423 
and accompanying text. 
 160 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i)–(ii) (2012). 
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In Connecticut, for example, a centralized appellate commission is 
responsible for resolving administrative appeals for all state and local 
agencies across the state.161 While there are disadvantages to this structure, 
including lengthier response times,162 there are also benefits. This approach 
removes the decision on appeal from the agency that made the initial public 
records determination.163 To ensure political independence, appointment 
power is divided between the governor and the legislative branch,164 and no 
more than five of the nine commission members may belong to the same 
political party.165 Further, the commission is granted broad investigatory 
powers, including the authority to subpoena witnesses,166 and it serves as a 
transparency liaison for both government agencies and for the public. This 
administrative appeals system is often held up as a model of appellate 
enforcement of public records laws.167 
Another area in which states have widely experimented is the scope of 
public records laws’ coverage. This experimentation reaches beyond 
extending coverage to the legislative and judicial branches. For example, 
states have also taken widely divergent approaches to determining when 
private or semiprivate entities should be subject to open records laws. 
While FOIA generally does not extend coverage to private contractors,168 
states have pursued various ways of determining whether and when private 
entities performing traditional government functions should be subject to 
open records laws.169 Many of these more flexible approaches have yielded 
 
 161 See About Us, CONN. FREEDOM OF INFO. COMM’N, https://portal.ct.gov/FOI/Common-
Elements/Top-Menu/About-Us [https://perma.cc/8FML-66ZK]. 
 162 See infra note 289 and accompanying text. 
 163 Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6). 
 164 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-205 (2019). 
 165 Id.  
 166 Id.  
 167 See, e.g., Laura Danielson, Giving Teeth to the Watchdog: Optimizing Open Records Appeals 
Processes to Facilitate the Media’s Use of FOIA Laws, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 981, 1010 (describing 
Connecticut’s commission as “exemplary” in handling open records disputes); Robert G. Vaughn, 
Administrative Alternatives and the Federal Freedom of Information Act, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 185, 210 
(1984) (citing the Connecticut commission as an example of a successful alternative model to insure 
agency compliance). 
 168 See Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 178 (1980). 
 169 Some states consider whether the entity is performing a traditional government function. See, 
e.g., Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs., Inc., 87 S.W.3d 67, 78–79 (Tenn. 
2002) (extending public records coverage to private prison that served “as the functional equivalent of a 
government[] agency”). Others consider whether the nature of the records mandate public disclosure. 
See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 68 v. Denver Metro. Major League Baseball Stadium Dist., 
880 P.2d 160, 164 (Colo. App. 1994) (documents generated by private company qualified as public 
records because a government entity relied on them in the exercise of its official duties). These are not 
the only approaches for determining whether private information should be considered public. See 
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expanded coverage that reaches crucial private entities, such as private 
police and firefighters.170 Such varied approaches can serve as a model for 
neighboring states and local governments.171 
C. The Costs of State Public Records Laws to the Government 
Critics of the federal transparency regime often home in on the costs 
these statutes impose, arguing that the benefits these laws provide are 
outweighed by the burdens—both financial and otherwise—that they place 
on government. This is a well-worn debate in the federal context. Widening 
the scope of the inquiry to include state and local governments, however, 
breathes new life into this discussion and invites a reexamination of these 
laws’ comparative value. 
1. Financial Costs 
Information about the financial costs that public records laws impose 
upon state and local government is difficult to obtain. While the federal 
government tracks the costs of administering FOIA, the financial picture at 
the state level is far murkier. Many state and local agencies lack a 
dedicated public records employee, making it difficult to tally the salary 
costs incurred by public records laws. More importantly, the lack of public 
records data at the subfederal level makes it nearly impossible to determine 
the financial toll that public records laws impose across even a single 
state.172 As a consequence, states routinely enact and amend state public 
records laws in the dark, without any concrete understanding of the actual 
costs involved. 
The limited data that is collected by states often fails to provide 
meaningful insight into the financial burdens imposed by these laws.173 But 
scattered empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that these costs are 
 
generally Craig D. Feiser, Protecting the Public’s Right to Know: The Debate over Privatization and 
Access to Government Information Under State Law, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825, 836–60 (2000) 
(describing and categorizing the various approaches to determining when the records of private entities 
are subject to disclosure under public records laws).  
 170 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-1-102 (2019) (applying public records law to university 
police); State ex rel. Freedom Commc’ns, Inc. v. Elida Cmty. Fire Co., 697 N.E.2d 210, 212 (1998) 
(applying public records law to private firefighters). 
 171 See, e.g., WASH. STATE AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 76, at 28–30 (reviewing public records 
laws in other states for solutions to public records obstacles in Washington State). 
 172 See discussion supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 173 See, e.g., Massachusetts State Dataset 2017, supra note 78 (tally of employee hours spent 
responding to requests does not include labor costs of requests to local agencies). 
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substantial.174 Further, it suggests that local governments, in particular, may 
be disproportionately affected by these financial burdens.175 Given the 
personnel and budgetary restraints faced by many local governments,176 
these entities are especially vulnerable to sudden spikes in the number of 
requests—for example, repeat requests intended to harass government 
officials, or large numbers of requests submitted in the wake of a high-
profile event.177 One recent, infamous example is the town of Newtown, 
Connecticut, which has been flooded with public records requests 
submitted by employees of conspiracy theorist Alex Jones about the Sandy 
Hook massacre.178 But there are countless other such examples. A single or 
a handful of requesters can overwhelm a small government entity by 
submitting dozens or even hundreds of requests.179 
This financial burden on local governments is often compounded by a 
lack of state funding. Local governments are usually required to pay the 
costs associated with public records laws out of their general budget. Many 
local government officials oppose legislative efforts to improve the public’s 
access to government records on these grounds. They argue that public 
records laws essentially operate as an unfunded mandate, and that the costs 
of improving these laws for the public at large—by shortening response 
 
 174 For example, Texas received nearly 650,000 public records requests in 2017, see Texas State 
Dataset 2017, supra note 77, but recouped only around $800,000. Open Records Reports, 2017 Monies 
Collected, ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX., https://www2.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/pia/reports/ 
money_collected.php [https://perma.cc/7JNW-6ZK6]. 
 175 See, e.g., WASH. STATE AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 76, at 4 (stating that state agencies 
spent around $22 million responding to requests in 2015 while local governments spent roughly $37 
million); February 2018 Parish Attorney’s Office Public Records Request Hours Report, Parish County, 
LA (on file with author) (stating that in a single month, the Parish County Attorney’s Office spent 
nearly $12,000 on public records requests). 
 176 See State and Local Fiscal Facts: 2018, NAT’L GOVERNOR’S ASS’N (2018), 
https://www.nasra.org/files/Fiscal%20Facts%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/NJ84-QFSS]. 
 177 See, e.g., Kimball, supra note 17, at 343 (noting that an “inundation” of twenty requests in a 
single week was “overwhelming” to sheriff’s office). 
 178 See, e.g., Elizabeth Williamson, Sandy Hook Families Gain in Defamation Suits Against Alex 
Jones, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/07/us/politics/alex-jones-sandy-
hook.html [https://perma.cc/B37Y-8KYY] (describing a contributor to Alex Jones’s company who 
“deluged Newtown officials with open records requests”). 
 179 See, e.g., Susan Spencer, Freedom of Information vs. Harassment: Towns Fight ‘Excessive’ 
Requests, METROWEST DAILY NEWS (Oct. 29, 2017), 
https://www.metrowestdailynews.com/news/20171029/freedom-of-information-vs-harassment-towns-
fight-excessive-requests [https://perma.cc/V3HF-3ZFU] (a single, repeat requester in a small 
Massachusetts town submitted one-third of all requests that year, forcing the town to spend 50% more 
than it had budgeted that year for legal costs); Plattsburgh City Sch. Dist., N.Y., 2012–2014 Public 
Records Log (on file with author) (between March 2012 and August 2014, two requesters submitted 
roughly 90% of all requests to the school district). 
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times, for example—will be borne by local governments alone.180 These 
governments routinely report funding difficulties when faced with changes 
to these statutes, such as new reporting requirements or limitations on what 
costs may be passed on to the requester.181 
2. Opportunity Costs 
Last year, the federal government employed 4,500 FOIA officers who 
worked full-time responding to public records requests.182 In contrast, few 
state and local agencies can afford to employ a full-time agency employee 
dedicated to the public records process. And even when agencies are able 
to hire a dedicated public records employee, that individual’s salary often 
has a significant impact on the agency’s total budget.183 Many state and 
local government employees tasked with responding to public records 
requests are required to wear multiple hats: they must fulfill their regular 
agency duties while also overseeing and administering responses to public 
records requests.184 The opportunity costs of responding to these requests 
can be significant. To provide just one illustration, the state employee 
responsible for enforcing water safety requirements in Vermont spends 
months at a time responding to public records requests, leaving her unable 
to engage in oversight of water quality in the state during these periods.185 
 
 180 See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON LOCAL GOV’T CONSOLIDATION & UNFUNDED MANDATES, STATE OF 
ILL., DELIVERING EFFICIENT, EFFECTIVE, AND STREAMLINED GOVERNMENT TO ILLINOIS TAXPAYERS 
72, 74 (2015) (listing Freedom Information Act requirements among the burdensome unfunded 
mandates faced by local government) [hereinafter ILLINOIS TASK FORCE REPORT]; Legislature Plans 
Vote on Public Records Bill That Would Impose New Unfunded Mandates, MASS. MUN. ASS’N (July 
17, 2015), https://www.mma.org/legislature-plans-vote-on-public-records-bill-that-would-impose-new-
unfunded-mandates/ [https://perma.cc/XG53-XKFV] (noting proposed amendments would “tax 
municipal capacity to administer and manage daily municipal operations and impose new unfunded 
mandates”). 
 181 See, e.g., Public Records Bill Must Remain Balanced and Affordable, MASS. MUN. ASS’N (Dec. 
1, 2015), https://www.mma.org/advocacy/public-records-bill-must-remain-balanced-and-affordable/ 
[https://perma.cc/93GJ-RJ2U] (describing the financial burdens that proposed amendments to the public 
records law would impose on local governments). 
 182 SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS, supra note 45, at 20. 
 183 See, e.g., ILLINOIS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 180, at 244 (noting the high salary costs 
required to employ full-time public records officers). 
 184 See, e.g., WASH. STATE AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 76, at 20 (noting that “[i]t is not 
uncommon for small organizations to depend on the same employee for providing critical services 
while also handling public records requests,” especially at smaller agencies); Interview with Chris Voss, 
supra note 104 (noting that every records response coordinator in the state environmental agency must 
juggle public records responses with other duties). 
 185 Interview with Wendy Houston Anderson, Enf’t Coordinator, and Scott Waterman, Policy and 
Commc’n Dir., Water Quality Div., Vt. Agency of Agric., Food, and Mkts., in Montpelier, Vt. (Nov. 
20, 2018). 
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This diversion of state resources undermines the ability of state and local 
governments to focus on fulfilling their core government functions.186 
3. Chilling Effects 
Legislators, judges, and scholars have long expressed concern over the 
potential chilling effects of government transparency requirements.187 The 
deliberative process exemption found in FOIA and in virtually every state 
public records law embodies this fear: legislators reason that by protecting 
pre-decisional records from disclosure, policymakers will feel free to 
engage in free and open communications uninhibited by the threat of public 
disclosure of their deliberations.188 But the chilling effect of government 
legislation is notoriously difficult to measure.189 In the context of 
transparency legislation, it is impossible to prove that a particular policy 
debate would have been more robust had there not been a public records 
law in effect. Transparency scholarship often refers obliquely to the 
deliberative costs of transparency laws like FOIA, but scholars rarely 
attempt to identify concrete evidence of what these deliberative costs 
entail.190 
One recent exception is a study by Professor Claudia Polsky 
examining the ways that state public records laws can chill academic 
speech at public universities.191 While there are clear transparency benefits 
to extending coverage to universities,192 Professor Polsky demonstrates the 
 
 186 For a discussion of such costs in the federal context, see Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond 
the Freedom of Information Act, supra note 15, at 1124 (discussing the “diversion costs” that FOIA 
imposes upon federal agencies). 
 187 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (finding “[h]uman experience 
teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor . . . to the 
detriment of the decisionmaking process”); Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of 
Information Act, supra note 15, at 1126–27, 1126 n.170 (summarizing the literature on the potential 
deliberation costs of transparency requirements). 
 188 See, e.g., Greenberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 10 F. Supp. 2d 3, 16 n.19 (D.D.C. 1998) (noting 
that FOIA Exemption 5 is designed to prevent the chilling of agency deliberations). 
 189 See generally Brandice Canes-Wrone & Michael C. Dorf, Measuring the Chilling Effect, 
90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1095, 1097 (2015) (arguing that in order to measure the chilling effect of a particular 
government law on speech, researchers would have to measure the amount and quality of speech before 
and after the law took effect, and that “so far as we could ascertain, such data have not yet been 
collected and attempting to do so would raise difficult measurement questions”). 
 190 See, e.g., Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, supra note 
15, at 1126 (“To some unknown but seemingly nontrivial extent, the prospect of ‘being FOIA’d’ deters 
candor among executive branch officials and leads them to avoid recordkeeping in favor of oral 
exchanges and ‘sub rosa deals.’”). 
 191 Polsky, supra note 17, at 292. 
 192 See, e.g., Erica L. Green & Stephanie Saul, What Charles Koch and Other Donors to George 
Mason University Got for Their Money, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2018), 
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extent to which public records laws have been used by activists and critics 
to target and harass academics who work in politically contentious fields 
such as climate change or genetically modified organisms. She writes that 
in the most egregious cases, public records requests “have caused 
researchers to abandon politically sensitive lines of inquiry . . . , cease 
participation in public debate about such matters . . . , or defect from 
academia altogether.”193 Companies are also turning to state public records 
laws as a way to obtain information about their academic critics.194 
The application of public records laws to public university scholars 
has no equivalent in the federal context.195 The targeted use of public 
records laws to harass scholars and researchers at public universities offers 
a powerful illustration of the ways in which transparency scholarship’s 
myopic focus on FOIA fails to capture the full universe of transparency-
related issues at play. And to the extent that public records laws do chill 
government speech, those concerns are magnified by the extended scope of 
coverage of many state laws to reach not only state universities, but state 
legislators and judges as well. 
There are other chilling effects unique to the state or local context. 
While government officials have long complained about the intrusive and 
burdensome nature of FOIA requests, few have argued that potential 
candidates for federal employment will be deterred from applying or 
running for office because of these laws. The chilling effect on government 
participation, however, is a concern. Many local government officials serve 
as unpaid volunteers,196 and local administrative agencies often “resemble 
community meetings as much as they do public agencies, with the locus of 
gravity on locally appointed citizens or residents fulfilling a civic duty.”197 
 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/05/us/koch-donors-george-mason.html [https://perma.cc/SZ2T-
JUTA] (relying on public records requests to George Mason University to reveal the Koch brothers’ 
influence over academic appointments at the school). 
 193 Polsky, supra note 17, at 265–66. 
 194 See, e.g., Elizabeth Williamson, Industries Turn Freedom of Information Requests on Their 
Critics, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/us/politics/freedom-of-
information-requests.html [https://perma.cc/KG98-LBWQ] (finding public records are being 
increasingly used against academic researchers by lobbyists, interest groups, and corporations). 
 195 The Shelby Amendment allows requesters to access data produced by private entities that 
receive federal research grants, including universities, but this is a narrow exception. Omnibus 
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 
2681–495.  
 196 See Davidson, supra note 34, at 623; Alison Bosma, Public Record Requests, Associated Legal 
Fees Cost Ashland $127,000, WICKED LOC. ASHLAND (Nov. 2, 2017), 
https://ashland.wickedlocal.com/news/20171102/public-record-requests-associated-legal-fees-cost-
ashland-127000 [https://perma.cc/4EG3-3GAV] (noting most board members are volunteers). 
 197 Davidson, supra note 34, at 593. 
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Given the difficulty of recruiting individuals to donate their time in the first 
place, the burdens and privacy harms imposed by public records laws can 
have a chilling effect on government participation as well.198 
4. Commercial Requests 
Requests from commercial entities dominate the FOIA dockets of 
many federal agencies.199 Critics have long argued that such overwhelming 
commercial use of the statute drains public resources while providing little 
public benefit.200 At worst, they argue, the statute operates as a commercial 
subsidy, underwriting for-profit information gathering.201 Professor Kwoka, 
in particular, has chronicled the extent to which certain federal agencies are 
flooded with commercial requests, as well as the toll that these requests 
impose on these agencies’ limited financial and human resources.202 Yet 
little comparable effort has been made to determine the impact of 
commercial requests on state and local governments.203 
An investigation into the effect of corporate interests on state and 
local transparency warrants its own separate paper. But this Section offers a 
preliminary look at this issue. Specifically, it argues that the limited data 
that are available—namely, select public records datasets, as well as 
interviews with public records officers—suggest that state and local 
governments confront similarly high volumes of commercial requesters. 
And the same concern that animates commercial use of FOIA applies in the 
state and local context as well: corporate use of these state statutes drains 
government resources without increasing government accountability or 
oversight.204 A closer look at commercial use of these state laws, however, 
 
 198 See, e.g., Bosma, supra note 196 (reporting that the chairman of a town committee in Ashland, 
Massachusetts said that repetitive and offensive public records requests are “terrible on morale” and 
have made it difficult to recruit volunteers to serve on the committee). 
 199 See Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 15, at 1382, 1388, 1398, 1401 (showing that in 2013, 
commercial entities submitted 69% of SEC requests, 75% of FDA requests, 79% of EPA requests, and 
96% of Defense Logistics Agency requests). 
 200 See, e.g., COMPTROLLER GEN., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LCD-78-120, GOVERNMENT 
FIELD OFFICES SHOULD BETTER IMPLEMENT THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, at ii (1978) (finding 
that FOIA “is being used mostly by businesses and law firms—sometimes for purposes not 
contemplated by the Congress”). 
 201 See, e.g., Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 15, at 1421 (“Rather than subsidizing transparency, 
FOIA’s commercial subsidy has the effect of paying for corporate ‘secrets’ discovered using FOIA.”). 
202  See id. at 1427. 
 203 See Fink, supra note 17, at 109–11 (describing the limitations preventing a thorough analysis of 
commercial requests and their impact on state and local governments). 
204 There are benefits to commercial requests as well. See discussion supra note 129 and 
accompanying text. I have categorized these commercial requests as a “cost” because this class of 
requests is least closely aligned with the original, democracy-enhancing intent of these transparency 
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reveals that the scholarly and legislative approach to these issues in the 
context of FOIA does not always track cleanly onto the state and local 
context. 
Vermont is the only state in the country that both aggregates public 
records data for all state agencies and publishes the names and institutional 
affiliations of requesters.205 It therefore serves as a useful case study. Prior 
studies examining the role of commercial entities in the public records 
regime have focused on a select number of agencies, usually those most 
likely to receive large numbers of commercial requests.206 While this 
approach is effective in highlighting the severity of the problem at its most 
extreme, it sheds little light on the extent to which commercial use of 
public records laws affects the average government agency. Examining the 
complete public records logs across an entire state government, in contrast, 
allows for a more comprehensive look at public records use and its impact 
on government.207 
State agencies in Vermont received 4,226 public records requests in 
2017. Of these requests, roughly half originated from identifiable 
commercial requesters, including insurance companies, data brokers, law 
firms, and farmers.208 The actual percentage of commercial requests is most 
likely higher; roughly a third of these requesters provided no institutional 
affiliation and could not be coded, and 50% therefore represents the lowest 
possible percentage of requests originating from commercial entities.209 In 
contrast, requests from identifiable academic, media, and nonprofit 
 
statutes. Companies use these laws to generate profits, and these financial rewards, by their nature, 
accrue when the information is kept private. Cf. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 15, at 1421 (noting that 
in the FOIA context “[s]ubsidizing records to resellers validates a sort of buy-low, sell-high arbitrage in 
federal records at great profit to the reseller, but no public or collective benefit in increased access to 
information”). 
 205 For a discussion of the limited data available at the state level, see supra notes 95–96 and 
accompanying text. 
 206 See, e.g., COAL. OF JOURNALISTS FOR OPEN GOV’T, FREQUENT FILERS: BUSINESSES MAKE 
FOIA THEIR BUSINESS (2006), https://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/ai/rti/international/ 
laws_papers/intl/businesses_make_foia_their_business.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JWW-K4V7] (reviewing 
logs of seventeen federal agencies and finding that roughly two-thirds of requests originated from 
commercial requesters); Fink, supra note 17, at 100–03 (reviewing public records logs of state 
environmental agencies); Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 15, at 1379–80 (reviewing public records logs 
of six federal agencies). 
 207 There are also drawbacks to this approach. The insights derived from the public records logs of a 
sparsely populated New England state may not necessarily apply to states in which distinct cultural, 
economic, geographic, and social forces are at play. Even so, evaluating requests across one state serves 
as a useful starting point for analysis given the absence of alternative sources of data at the state level. 
 208 Vermont State Dataset 2017, supra note 78. 
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organizations collectively accounted for roughly 5% of total requests.210 
Within this category, around 3% of requests originated from the media, 
while academics and nonprofit agencies each submitted around 1% of total 
requests.211 
A handful of agencies in Vermont received a disproportionate share of 
requests. More than half of all requests in 2017 were submitted to the 
Department of Public Safety. Of these requests, nearly three-quarters 
originated from commercial requesters.212 Requests from or on behalf of 
insurance companies alone accounted for roughly 60% of all requests 
submitted to the public safety agency that year.213 These companies were 
generally looking to verify reports of burglaries, vandalism, and traffic and 
other accidents.214 And a single company—LexisNexis—accounted for 
more than half of those requests.215 Put another way, requests from this 
single company comprised roughly 30% of all public records requests 
received across the entire state of Vermont in 2017.216 
Other state agencies in Vermont are also deeply affected by 
commercial requesters. The Agency of Transportation, for example, 
receives large numbers of public records requests from construction, 
engineering, surveying, and insurance companies, as well as from law 
firms.217 The substance of these requests varies. Many are submitted by 
companies that lost a contracting bid and are looking for details about the 
winning bid. Surveying companies often seek the details of government 
land surveying projects to avoid repeating work that the government has 
already completed. And law firms often rely on public records requests as a 
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 214 Interview with Heidi Storm, Records and Alarm Adm’r, Vt. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, in Waterbury, 
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the records access officer must secure approval from the relevant police barracks and manually redact 
each report before it is released, both of which impose additional time and logistical costs. Interview 
with Heidi Storm, supra note 214. 
 216 Vermont State Dataset 2017, supra note 78. While LexisNexis is not necessarily the dominant 
requester in other states, insurance companies and data resellers tend to make up a significant 
proportion of requesters to state and local law enforcement agencies throughout the country. See, e.g., 
Massachusetts State Dataset 2017, supra note 78 (showing that roughly two-thirds of requests to the 
Massachusetts Department of State Police in 2017 were for police reports, police recordings, and arrest 
reports). 
 217 Vermont State Dataset 2017, supra note 78. 
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pre-discovery tool to help determine whether to bring a lawsuit against the 
state.218 
Such heavy commercial use of the state public records law is 
concerning. LexisNexis effectively operates as an information broker, with 
the government subsidizing its profit model by providing valuable 
information at a low price. Similarly, contractors’ reliance on the public 
records law to obtain information about its competitors does little to 
advance democratic accountability or the public interest. While these 
commercial requests undoubtedly have value—to the companies that profit 
from them and to the companies that benefit from the convenience of this 
information resale—they offer little benefit to the public at large.219 As 
Professor Kwoka has noted, these information sellers become “the true 
brokers of public information, thereby de facto taking over functions 
thought to be inherently governmental.”220 And while this present analysis 
is limited in scope, public records logs and interviews with public records 
officers in other states suggest that commercial interests play an equally if 
not more substantial role across the country.221 
The benefit of surveying request logs across an entire government, 
however, is that it provides insight into commercial requests across all 
agencies, not just those agencies most affected by commercial interests. 
And for some smaller agencies in Vermont, commercial requests are not 
nearly so prevalent, while requests from media and other public-facing 
entities consume more time and attention.222 The Agency of Agriculture, 
 
 218 Interview with Mark Giguere, Records Officer, Vt. Dep’t of Transp., in Montpelier, Vt. (Nov. 
20, 2018). 
219 For a discussion of the minimal public benefits that such commercial requests provide in the 
federal context, see Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 15, at 1420–22. 
 220 See id. at 1415. 
 221 See, e.g., WASH. STATE AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 76, at 21 (finding that 8% of state and 
local requests in 2015 were submitted by insurance agencies, and another 12% were submitted by law 
firms). As Professor Katherine Fink’s research suggests, state environmental agencies appear to receive 
among the highest number of commercial requests. Fink, supra note 17, at 110–11; see also Colo. Dep’t 
of Pub. Health and the Env’t, 2016 Public Records Log, supra note 82 (on file with author) (roughly 
90% of requests are commercial and fewer than 1%  are from the media); Iowa Dep’t of Nat. Res., 2015 
Public Records Log (on file with author) (roughly 80% of requests are commercial while just one 
request was received from the media); Interview with Chris Voss, supra note 104 (explaining that the 
agency receives high volumes of requests from third-party brokers who resell environmental 
information about specific properties, and commenting that these companies “make their money off 
this[,] and it’s an irritant to us”). State transportation departments also appear to receive a high number 
of commercial requests. See, e.g., Penn. Dep’t of Transp., 2016 Public Records Log (on file with 
author) (roughly 60% of requests are commercial and around 5% originated from members of the 
media). 
 222 See, e.g., Vt. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 2013–2015 Public Records Logs (on file with 
author) (roughly a quarter of requests from 2013–2015 originated from the media). 
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Food and Markets, for example, received more than half of its requests 
from journalists, academics, and nonprofit groups in 2017, but less than a 
quarter from commercial entities.223 This holds true for other state and local 
agencies across the country as well.224 Such discrepancies underscore the 
extent to which commercial requests vary substantially from one agency to 
another, suggesting that at least some public records activity is more 
closely aligned with the original intent of the statute. While this does not 
mitigate the problem of commercial dominance of the public records laws 
for other agencies, it does provide an important comparative perspective to 
counterbalance the data coming out of those government entities most 
affected by commercial interests. 
At the local level, requester information is even more difficult to come 
by. No state aggregates records request data at the local level. But again, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that certain local agencies must likewise 
contend with high numbers of commercial requests.225 Commercial requests 
are especially burdensome for local law enforcement agencies. Local police 
departments and sheriffs’ offices, like state law enforcement agencies, 
receive large numbers of requests for traffic accident, burglary, vandalism 
and other police reports.226 And many of the same commercial actors that 
operate at the state level are frequent requesters at the local level as well. 
Increasingly, local law enforcement agencies outsource the work of 
handling these types of routine police report requests to third-party 
 
 223 Vermont State Dataset 2017, supra note 78 (out of twenty-eight requests, fifteen were academic, 
media, or nonprofits, while only four were commercial). 
 224 See, e.g., Mass. Dep’t of State Police, Jan.–July 2018 Public Records Logs (on file with author) 
(more than 350 public records requests from media outlets, or roughly 35% of total requests); S.D. 
Dep’t of Educ., 2015 Public Records Log (on file with author) (roughly 40% of requests originated 
from the media); Nev. Governor’s Office of Econ. Dev., Sept. 2013–July 2015 Public Records Logs (on 
file with author) (of nineteen total requests, thirteen originated from either media organizations or think 
tanks, while just one request originated from a commercial requester); Vill. of Downers Grove, Ill., Jan. 
2015–July 2017 Public Records Logs (on file with author) (roughly 15% of total requests originated 
from commercial entities). 
 225 See, e.g., ILLINOIS TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 180, at 72, 133 (respondents to a survey on 
unfunded mandates listed “FOIA requests from large commercial companies” as among the most 
burdensome). 
 226 See, e.g., WASH. STATE AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 76, at 20 (noting that police and 
sheriff’s departments received twice the number of requests as other departments); Report from Miguel 
A. Santana, L.A. City Admin. Officer, to the Mayor and Council of L.A., at 1–2 (Sept. 24, 2015), 
https://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2015/15-1140_rpt_CAO_09-24-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/49FF-
V795] (noting that 85% of the 75,000 requests the Los Angeles Police Department receives annually 
are for traffic accident reports); Town of Framingham, Mass., Jan. 17–Feb. 17, 2017 Public Records 
Logs (on file with author) (roughly 55% of requests in one month were for police/fire department 
reports). 
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entities.227 One of the largest vendors of these request-processing services 
is—perhaps unsurprisingly—LexisNexis.228 The company allows law 
enforcement agencies to funnel police report requests directly to the 
company,229 and it provides access to its centralized police report database, 
allowing members to search the accident reports of 4,500 agencies across 
the country.230 Further, it provides software that allows the public to report 
harassment, lost property, vandalism, or other incidents directly to the 
company when police presence is not required on the scene.231 
There are undoubtedly benefits to this outsourcing of public records 
activity. From the law enforcement agency’s perspective, these third-party 
requesting services reduce the amount of time an agency spends responding 
to requests and allow police departments to concentrate attention on law 
enforcement-related activities. And for the public, submitting a request 
electronically through LexisNexis can reduce the time, effort, and cost 
spent obtaining a police report.232 But this privatization of the records 
request process also raises concerns. Rather than submitting huge volumes 
of requests to state and local agencies, LexisNexis cuts out the middleman 
and aggregates and processes requests for police reports directly. This 
effectively grants a private company a monopoly on public data and 
 
 227 Some state law enforcement agencies also rely on the company’s services as well. See, e.g., 
LexisNexis eCrash Continues to Improve Automated Crash Reporting Process for Law Enforcement 
and Help Agencies Reallocate Resources Through Acquisition of iyeTek, BUSINESSWIRE (May 22, 
2014) https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20140522006171/en/LexisNexis-eCrash-Continues-
Improve-Automated-Crash-Reporting [https://perma.cc/E52K-SRT6] (noting that New Mexico State 
Police rely on LexisNexis to automate their police report process). On the whole, however, state 
agencies generally appear to manage the reporting process internally. See, e.g., Colorado State Patrol – 
Central Records Unit, COLO. ST. PATROL, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/csp/colorado-state-patrol-
central-records-unit [https://perma.cc/EL82-Y4MF] (showing internal request management system); 
Public Records Unit, ARIZ. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, https://www.azdps.gov/ 
services/public/records/public [https://perma.cc/4Z7X-YJGE] (same); Crash Reports, ALA. L. 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, https://www.alabamainteractive.org/dps_crash_report/mainMenu.action; 
wsuid=94A00A187DEE3857CDD7D4F213324A2F [https://perma.cc/CWV8-XZBD] (same). 
 228 See Report from Miguel A. Santana, supra note 226, at 2 (noting that LexisNexis provides 
report distribution services “to over 100 California law enforcement agencies including the cities of San 
Francisco, San Diego[,] and Sacramento police departments”). 
 229 LEXISNEXIS, LEXISNEXIS POLICE REPORTS (2018), https://risk.lexisnexis.com/-
/media/files/government/police_reports%20solution%20sheet%20rev%20pdf.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9JX3-GTFK]. 
 230 Id. The company advertises a database of “173 million pieces of data, including 91 million 
person and 82 million accident records, more than 35,000 accident reports, and 62,000 VINs added 
daily.” Id.  
 231 Report from Miguel A. Santana, supra note 226, at 1. 
 232 In some cases, LexisNexis charges less for reports than the government previously charged. See, 
e.g., id. at 2–3. 
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consolidates police data in private hands.233 If we are concerned that 
information brokers at the federal level “de facto take[] over functions 
thought to be inherently governmental,”234 then the wholesale outsourcing 
of the records requesting process to a third party vests this power more 
fully in a commercial entity.235 
Of course, law enforcement agencies are not the only local 
government entities that handle high volumes of commercial requests. A 
variety of other commercial interests routinely target data specifically held 
by local governments as well. Loan companies submit requests to towns or 
cities for lists of residents with unpaid taxes or code violations to target 
those individuals for loans.236 Real estate companies request lists of 
homeowners near foreclosure and approach those homeowners with offers 
to purchase their property.237 Recovery companies obtain lists of uncashed 
checks issued by the city and then offer to assist individuals with securing a 
reissued check in exchange for a percentage of the cash.238 And school 
districts receive a large number of requests for purchase orders, contracts, 
payroll data, and bid submissions.239 For cash-strapped local agencies, the 
costs these commercial requests impose can be substantial. 
 
 233 Some cities and towns require police or crash reports to be obtained through LexisNexis. See, 
e.g., Accident Report Request, VILLAGE OF CHESANING, 
http://www.villageofchesaning.org/departments/village_administration/police_department/accident_rep
orts.php [https://perma.cc/63V6-NK4J]; Obtain a Police Report or Traffic Collision Report, FOUNTAIN 
VALLEY POLICE DEP’T, https://www.fountainvalley.org/700/Obtain-a-Police-or-Traffic-Collision-Rep 
[https://perma.cc/LGU4-RJZH]; Police Reports, HAWTHORNE POLICE, 
https://hawthornepolice.com/police-reports/ [https://perma.cc/FR5D-BTT3]. In an e-mail, the company 
emphasized that “[w]e keep and maintain reports in our website but it is still owned by police 
departments.” E-mail from Jessie, Police Reports Customer Support, LexisNexis, to author (Jan. 7, 
2020, 7:27 AM PST). 
 234 Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 15, at 1415. 
 235 There are potential economic drawbacks as well. In Los Angeles, for example, the department 
estimated the loss of police report revenue cost roughly $1.8 million. See Report from Miguel A. 
Santana, supra note 226, at 2, 3. 
 236 See, e.g., Shira Schoenberg, Here’s How Businesses Use Public Records to Drum Up Clients, 
MASSLIVE (Dec. 30, 2018, updated Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.masslive.com/politics/2018/12/ 
business_public_records_leads.html [https://perma.cc/E8RL-NXYQ] (describing how businesses use 
public records requests for commercial reasons); Request #19-417, in Public Record Requests, CITY OF 
MIAMI (Feb. 13, 2009), https://miami.nextrequest.com/requests/19-417 [https://perma.cc/3FHF-TVBX] 
(seeking “a list of people who have not paid their taxes in two years or more”). 
 237 See Schoenberg, supra note 236. 
 238 See, e.g., Emeryville Public Records Log, supra note 83 (showing five requests for lists of 
uncashed checks); Telephone Interview with Adam Loukx, Deputy Dir. of the Toledo Law Dep’t (Sept. 
12, 2018) (reporting that Toledo received two to three requests for uncashed checks per month). 
 239 See, e.g., Mechanicsburg, Penn. Area Sch. Dist., 2010–2016 Public Records Logs (on file with 
author) (roughly 45% of requests were for purchase orders, contracts, payroll data, and bid 
submissions); Buffalo, N.Y. City Sch. Dist., 2012–2014 Public Records Requests (on file with author) 
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D. Barriers to Disclosure at the State and Local Level 
Citizens are rarely, if ever, satisfied with public records laws at any 
level of government. Discontent with these laws is so widespread that 
trading public records horror stories—high price quotes for public records 
requests, years-long delays, or nonsensical government responses—has 
become a routine pastime among journalists, academics, and nonprofit 
advocates. There are Twitter threads dedicated to chronicling these 
stories,240 and news outlets publish lists of their reporters’ most frustrating 
public records experiences.241 The Electronic Frontier Foundation hands out 
yearly “Foilie” awards recognizing “the worst responses to records 
requests, outrageous efforts to stymie transparency and the most absurd 
redactions.”242 
The pitfalls associated with FOIA have been well documented in the 
legal literature.243 And many of the barriers to transparency that afflict 
FOIA impede transparency efforts at the state and local level as well. 
Excessive redactions, overreliance on certain exemptions, and failure to 
comply with statutory time limits: these are all overlapping features of both 
the federal and state public records landscape. But because these issues 
plague the federal public records law, they have been reviewed at length by 
scholars, advocates, and policymakers.  
Scholars have paid less attention, however, to the distinct transparency 
problems that arise at the state and local level. These problems include 
defects in the transparency laws themselves—both in their construction and 
in their application—as well as in the broader information systems that 
encompass and sustain state and local governments. As this Section will 
 
(roughly 40% of the requests submitted in 2013 were for purchase orders, contracts, payroll data, and 
bid submissions); Rochester, N.Y. City Sch. Dist., 2014 Public Records Log (on file with author) 
(showing requests for food service bid documents from multinational companies like Aramark). 
 240 See, e.g., Justin Elliott (@JustinElliott), TWITTER (Mar. 8, 2016, 2:38 PM), 
https://twitter.com/JustinElliott/status/707334676130746368 [https://perma.cc/ZO3K-JUKW] 
(“REPORTERS: have recent horror stories trying to use FOIA? I want to hear what happened. Please @ 
me or e-mail justin-at-propublica.org #WTFoia[.]”). 
 241 See, e.g., Cost-Related Access Challenges, Solutions in 18 States, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 13, 
2015), https://www.ap.org/ap-in-the-news/2015/cost-related-access-challenges-solutions-in-18-states 
[https://perma.cc/5WWH-F75Y] (discussing various states’ impediments to accessing information); 
Delayed, Denied, Dismissed: Failures on the FOIA Front, PROPUBLICA (July 21, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/delayed-denied-dismissed-failures-on-the-foia-front 
[https://perma.cc/2BK7-9385] (describing the organization’s “reporters’ most frustrating public record 
failures”). 
 242 Dave Maass et al., The Foilies 2018, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 11, 2018), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/03/foilies-2018 [https://perma.cc/V76L-3ZGQ]. 
 243 See discussion supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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explore, these barriers to disclosure both interact with and reinforce one 
another, leading to breakdowns in these broader state and local 
transparency ecosystems. 
1. Statutory Barriers to Disclosure 
While many state public records statutes have adopted certain parts or 
features of FOIA,244 each state law is unique, and each introduces distinct 
barriers to disclosure. This Section explores some of the textual distinctions 
across state public records laws. Some of these issues do not exist at all at 
the federal level. In other cases, the barriers to disclosure are more 
formidable at the state and local level than they are in the federal context.  
a. Excessive Exemptions  
Requesters at the state and local level must contend with large 
numbers of exemptions, many of which are vaguely written and reflect the 
narrow goals of special interest groups. In contrast to FOIA’s nine 
enumerated categories of records protected from public disclosure,245 these 
state laws can contain hundreds of enumerated exemptions, either within 
the public records statute itself246 or scattered throughout the state code.247 
Critics have claimed that FOIA’s exemptions sweep too broadly, placing 
large swaths of public records beyond reach.248 But few have argued that 
FOIA has too many exemptions.  
This is not the case at the state level. Florida law, for example, 
contains 1,000 exemptions to public disclosure.249 Twelve percent of all 
Florida statutes enacted in 2017 were new exemptions to the public records 
law.250 In Tennessee, there were 2 statutory exemptions when the law was 
enacted in 1957; 89 exemptions in 1988; and 538 exemptions by 2018.251 
 
 244 See sources cited supra note 69. 
 245 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012). There are other protections from disclosure contained throughout the 
federal code and incorporated into FOIA through Exemption 3. 
 246 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 239.010 (listing 431 exemptions). 
 247 See, e.g., OR. PUB. RECORDS ADVISORY COUNCIL, BIENNIAL REPORT 10 (2018), 
https://digital.osl.state.or.us/islandora/object/osl:579069 [https://perma.cc/7667-9LC9] [hereinafter 
BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ADVISORY COUNCIL] (noting that there are at least 550 
exemptions to the public records law contained in the Oregon state code). 
 248 See, e.g., McCraw, supra note 15, at 234, 238 (describing the dramatic expansion of FOIA’s 
exemptions). 
 249 Elizabeth Koh & Emily L. Mahoney, Legislature Adds to the More than 1,000 Exceptions to 
Florida’s Public Records Law, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 11, 2018), 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article204472014.html 
[https://perma.cc/3DQW-YJLL]. 
 250 Jarrod Holbrook, Public Records Advocate Opposes Public Records Exemptions Passed by 
Legislature, ABC NEWS (May 19, 2017), https://www.abcactionnews.com/news/local-news/i-team-
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This explosion in public records exemptions can be traced in part to 
the successful lobbying efforts of special interest groups.252 Lobbying by 
the National Rifle Association (NRA), for example, has led to the 
enactment of public records exemptions for firearm permits and 
registrations around the country. In 2011, an NRA affiliate in Illinois 
backed a new public records exemption that protects the identities of gun 
owners in the state.253 And in 2018, NRA lobbying led to the enactment of 
an exemption to the Nebraska public records law for information contained 
in government firearm permits and licenses.254 After the law went into 
effect, the NRA praised the Nebraska legislature for preventing 
“unscrupulous media outlets and others access to” these firearms records.255 
These special interest exemptions are often enacted quietly, without 
much publicity or public oversight.256 Even so, the plain language of these 
provisions frequently reveals the special interests involved. Georgia’s state 
legislature, for example, enacted a new exemption in 2006 protecting “all 
reports, files, records, and papers of whatever kind relative to the 
supervision of probationers by a private corporation”—all but ensuring that 
the activities of private probation companies would be shielded from public 




 251 TENN. COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY, STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS TO THE TENNESSEE PUBLIC 
RECORDS ACT (2018), https://comptroller.tn.gov/content/dam/cot/orc/documents/oorc/2018-01-
19_ExceptionstotheTennesseePublicRecordsActFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/NF3K-6Z4Y]. 
 252 See, e.g., Andrew Geronimo & David Marburger, Ohio Open Government Guide, Exemptions in 
the Open Records Statute, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/open-
government-guide/ohio/#a-exemptions-in-the-open-records-statute [https://perma.cc/J63F-5SAR] 
(noting there are more than 400 statutory provisions of the Ohio public records law, many of them 
exemptions); Telephone Interview with Fritz Byers, Att’y, Former Gen. Counsel for the Toledo Blade 
and the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Sept. 10, 2018) (stating that in recent years the Ohio legislature began 
to take “a balkanized approach” to the law by enacting “all these special interest amendments”).  
 253 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7.5(v) (2011). 
 254 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 84-712.05(23) (West 2019). 
 255 Chris Dunker, NRA Praises New Nebraska Law Exempting Gun Records from Disclosure, 
LINCOLN J. STAR (Apr. 17, 2018), https://journalstar.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/nra-praises-new-
nebraska-law-exempting-gun-records-from-disclosure/article_f8a3c08e-681f-57f8-a16e-
d4700440a80f.html [https://perma.cc/EJ2F-HRRZ]. 
 256 See, e.g., BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 247, at 
10 (“New exemptions are being generated each legislative session, presently without a mechanism in 
place to directly inform the public and requester community that new exemptions are pending and to 
allow for meaningful commentary during the legislative process.”). 
 257 GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-109.2 (West 2017); Geraghty & Velez, supra note 17, at 476 (describing 
the nexus between Georgia’s legislature and the lucrative private probation industry). 
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products” are exempt.258 And in Tennessee, data regarding nursing home 
morbidity and mortality are protected.259 
Exemptions are even passed directly in response to reports of 
government misconduct. In 2010, for example, reports that Kentucky led 
the nation in child deaths due to abuse and neglect prompted local reporters 
to submit public records requests to the state child services agency.260 The 
legislature responded by enacting “emergency” amendments that would 
exempt child abuse and neglect records from disclosure, which the agency 
then relied on to deny the public records request.261 The reporters 
challenged the denial, and a state appeals court ultimately chastised the 
agency for “egregious” conduct in withholding the records, as well as a 
broader “culture of secrecy” within the department.262 
This large and growing body of public records exemptions imposes 
both ex ante and ex post costs upon requesters. Ex ante, it can be difficult if 
not impossible for a requester to identify applicable exemptions and tailor a 
request accordingly. And ex post, these hundreds of exemptions provide 
government agencies with ample ammunition to withhold embarrassing 
information or records revealing government misconduct. Moreover, the 
growing number of exemptions that reflect powerful special interests raise 
questions about the public’s ability to rely on these state public records 
laws as a tool for accountability. 
b. Requester Fees  
Many states have failed to enact meaningful statutory limits on the 
amount of money that may be recouped from requesters, requiring only that 
the costs imposed are “reasonable.” This grants agencies wide discretion in 
determining the fees charged to requesters.263 Such malleable fee 
requirements can be difficult for requesters to challenge as excessive, and 
they often yield inconsistent charges even within the same state.264 
 
 258 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 484 (West 2019). 
 259 TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-909 (West 2019). 
 260 See Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. Courier-Journal, Inc., 493 S.W.3d 375, 378 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 2016) (explaining the litigation was spurred by denials by the state agency of newspapers’ open 
records requests of “child fatalities or near fatalities”). 
 261 Id. at 379. 
 262 Id. at 389. 
 263 Many states limit charges to the “actual cost” of completing the request. See State Public 
Records Law Database, supra note 84. But these provisions are often permissive rather than mandatory 
and still allow agencies wide discretion in determining which fees to impose. A number of other states 
require only that the charges are “reasonable.” Id. 
 264 See, e.g., Anna Clark, How ‘The Public Is Priced Out of Public Records’ by Michigan 
Universities, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.cjr.org/united_states_project/ 
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Moreover, while FOIA directs agencies to reduce or waive requester fees 
when disclosure “is in the public interest,”265 few states provide public 
interest fee reductions or waivers.266 
Many states also permit government officials to recover the labor 
costs of time spent searching for a request and redacting records.267 These 
fees can add up quickly, particularly when agencies charge higher hourly 
amounts for redaction and review by lawyers or technical specialists.268 
When challenged by requesters, excessive fees are often reduced or 
eliminated by the courts.269 But because litigating a public records request 
requires an enormous investment of time, money, and expertise, most 
requesters who receive these excessive bills either narrow their request or 
abandon their efforts.270 And even when requesters do prevail in these 
actions, offending agencies often continue to charge excessive fees to 
future requesters.271 
High public records fees are especially concerning when it comes to 
media requesters. These charges are more likely to impede the public’s 
ability to engage in effective oversight, and they may give the impression 
that the government is intentionally shielding itself from scrutiny. They can 
also have a significant impact on the media’s ability to investigate and 
 
how_the_public_is_priced_out_of_public_records_by_michigan_universities.php 
[https://perma.cc/7KWC-U4KV] (noting that three Michigan public universities provided president and 
governing board expense records at no cost while the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor charged 
$2,774 for the president’s expense records alone). 
 265 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii) (2012). 
 266 See State Public Records Law Database, supra note 84. Even in states that permit fee waivers, 
these waivers are often discretionary rather than mandatory. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-
105(d)(3)(A)(iv) (West 2019) (stating records “may be furnished without charge or at a reduced charge” 
if “in the public interest”); 65 PA. STAT. ANN. § 67.1307(f) (West 2019) (stating “[a]n agency may 
waive the fees” if it is deemed to be “in the public interest” or “the requester duplicates the record”). 
 267 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 610.026 (West 2019) (permitting costs for research time required); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-503 (West 2018) (imposing reasonable costs and allowing records custodians 
to set those costs); METRO. GOV’T OF NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON CTY., PUBLIC RECORDS POLICIES AND 
PROCEDURES 2, 7 (2017) (authorizing agencies to charge for labor costs). 
 268 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 72694 (West 2012) (public records request requiring “data 
compilation, extraction, or programming” will require the requester to pay “the cost to construct a 
record, and the cost of programming and computer services necessary to produce a copy of the record”). 
 269 See, e.g., Trammell v. Martin, 408 S.E.2d 477, 478–79 (Ga. App. 1991) (requester should not be 
billed for legal review and copies must be charged at the rate most economical for copying); Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel v. City of Milwaukee, 815 N.W.2d 367, 369 (Wis. 2012) (public records laws cannot 
be construed to permit charges for time spent redacting records). 
 270 See, e.g., infra note 362 and accompanying text. 
 271 See, e.g., John Browning, Op. Att’y Gen. of Ky., No. 94-ORD-77 (June 9, 1994) (chastising an 
agency for repeatedly ignoring limits on copying charges). 
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report stories.272 While exceptionally high cost estimates are not necessarily 
made in bad faith, media and advocacy organizations often claim that 
governments use requester fees to silence dissent and prevent meaningful 
oversight.273 
To provide just one example, in the wake of the shooting of Michael 
Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, the city contracted with a private company to 
handle its public records requests. The company charged reporters a base 
fee of $500 and a labor fee of $135 per hour to search city employees’ e-
mails274—nearly ten times the $13.90 hourly salary of an entry-level 
position in the clerk’s office.275 Media organizations like the Associated 
Press and St. Louis Public Radio were required to deposit $2,000 before 
the requests would be processed,276 and the city charged Vice News $1,200 
for a five-hour e-mail search that turned up just seven responsive records.277 
News organizations widely viewed these charges as an effort to impede 
their reporting efforts and prevent public oversight of the city’s police 
department.278 
 
 272 In a 2015 survey of reporters and lawyers who represent media organizations, 58% of 
respondents reported “unreasonable fees” among the tactics that government officials used to deny 
access to information. Q4 2015 NFOIC/MLRC/IRE OPEN GOVERNMENT SURVEY, NAT’L FREEDOM OF 
INFO. COAL. 10 (2016), https://www.nfoic.org/sites/default/files/pages/2017-
11/2015_NFOICMLRC_Survey_Resp.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZGV-JHR8]; see also Paying for Public 
Access, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/journals/news-media-
and-law-spring-2014/paying-public-access/ [https://perma.cc/L52H-P73H] (noting that “even a bill for 
several hundreds of dollars can be the equivalent of a denial for a freelancer or someone at a small 
publication”). 
 273 See, e.g., Geraghty & Velez, supra note 17, at 470 (asserting that governments in the south use 
excessive fees as a “strategy” to prevent public disclosure); Editorial, State Legal Costs Impede KORA, 
TOPEKA CAP.-J. (Dec. 22, 2015), http://kssunshine.us/files/2017/04/cj-editorial-dcf-costs-122215.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W8HJ-9YUZ] (noting a “trend by government insiders to thwart public inquiry and 
minimize disclosure of potentially embarrassing information” by “padding” fee estimates with costly 
attorney fees). 
 274 Chris McDaniel, How Ferguson Contracted a High-Priced Company to Search Its E-mails, ST. 
LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Oct. 9, 2014), https://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/ferguson-charging-thousands-
public-records-st-louis-public-radio-files-complaint [https://perma.cc/6XFS-6PJN]. 
 275 Jack Gillum, Ferguson Demands High Fees to Turn Over City Files, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 
29, 2014), https://apnews.com/ea801dccbeca4d42a06d4477fdb982a0 [https://perma.cc/4XC4-73H7]. 
 276 Chris McDaniel, Ferguson Charging Thousands for Public Records, St. Louis Public Radio 
Files Complaint, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Oct. 7, 2014), https://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/ferguson-
charging-thousands-public-records-st-louis-public-radio-files-complaint [https://perma.cc/6XFS-6PJN]. 
 277 Jason Leopold, Ferguson Police E-mails Reveal ‘Life is Very Rough’ for Officers, VICE NEWS 
(Nov. 4, 2014), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/pa845k/ferguson-police-e-mails-reveal-life-is-very-
rough-for-officers [https://perma.cc/B75H-3V84]. 
 278 See RTDNA Urges Missouri AG to Enforce Open Records Laws, RADIO TELEVISION DIGITAL 
NEWS ASS’N (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.rtdna.org/article/rtdna_urges_missouri_ag_to_ 
enforce_open_records_laws [https://perma.cc/5BMJ-7XR3] (describing complaint submitted by a news 
advocacy group to the Missouri Attorney General asserting that the charges to media organizations 
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c. Requester Restrictions  
Under federal law, any person may submit a public records request, 
regardless of citizenship, and agencies may not deny a request based on the 
requester’s motivation or purpose.279 State law, in contrast, imposes a 
variety of additional restrictions on who may submit a public records 
request, and for what reason. A number of states, for example, limit public 
records access to state residents—a restriction that the Supreme Court 
upheld as constitutional in 2013.280 
A handful of states also prohibit or curtail the rights of prisoners to 
submit public records requests. In Arkansas, incarcerated felons are barred 
from accessing any public records.281 In Louisiana, a convicted felon who 
has exhausted his or her appellate remedies may only request public 
records related to the grounds upon which the inmate could obtain post-
conviction relief.282 And Michigan’s law goes even further, wholly 
excluding public records access to individuals incarcerated in county, state, 
or federal correctional facilities.283 Such restrictions are concerning. Pro se 
inmates who wish to file a complaint or lawsuit over prison conditions, for 
example, may be unable to obtain the records needed to substantiate their 
claims, leaving them unable to enforce their constitutional rights.284 
 
were “an effort by city officials to discourage or even eliminate efforts by the media to continue its 
investigation into this incident”). 
 279 Frequently Asked Questions, FOIA.GOV, https://www.foia.gov/faq.html [https://perma.cc/ 
MM6Z-25UG] (FOIA provides for a presumption of openness whereby agencies should only withhold 
information “if they reasonably foresee that disclosure would harm an interest protected by an 
exemption, or if disclosure is prohibited by law”). 
 280 McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 232 (2013) (“This Court has repeatedly made clear that 
there is no constitutional right to obtain all the information provided by FOIA laws.”). 
 281 ARK. REV. STAT. § 25-19-105(a)(1)(B) (2019); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.025 (2019) 
(prohibiting inmate access to correctional department records except those that mention the specific 
inmate by name).  
 282 LA. STAT. ANN. § 44:31.1 (2018). 
 283 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.232 (2019). In 2001, a Michigan appeals court upheld the 
constitutionality of this provision, reasoning that the exclusion of prisoners “rationally relate[s] to the 
Legislature’s legitimate interest in conserving the scarce governmental resources squandered 
responding to frivolous FOIA requests by incarcerated prisoners.” Proctor v. White Lake Twp. Police 
Dep’t, 639 N.W.2d 332, 340 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001). 
 284 See OHIO REV. CODE § 149.43(B)(8) (2019) (sentencing judge or their successor must consent 
to incarcerated individual’s request for records); State ex rel. Wyant v. Brotherton, 589 S.E.2d 812, 818 
(W. Va. 2003) (restricting inmates from filing requests for the “purpose of filing a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus”). 
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d. Lack of Administrative Appeal  
Only eighteen states offer requesters the option of appealing 
administratively.285 And because litigation is not a viable option for the vast 
majority of citizens, requesters in most states are left without a practical 
remedy for challenging an agency decision.286 At the federal level, in 
contrast, FOIA has a robust administrative appeals process: every federal 
requester has the option of appealing an agency’s denial by submitting a 
letter to the agency head explaining why the decision was flawed.287  
Even in those states that do provide for administrative appeals, flawed 
appeals processes can introduce separate barriers to disclosure. In some 
states, the decision-maker on appeal may be the same individual who 
denied the request in the first place.288 And other states either fail to provide 
a time limit within which an appeal must be decided or stipulate a very 
lengthy appeals deadline.289 These problems with the administrative appeals 
process, as well as the broader unavailability of administrative appeals, 
make it difficult for requesters to challenge an agency’s response and 
vindicate their right to access public records in many states. 
e. Private Contractors and Quasi-Public–Private Governments  
 Privatization at all levels of government impedes transparency efforts. 
At the federal level, FOIA does not extend to private contractors,290 and 
transparency advocates have tracked the ways in which this carve-out 
prevents meaningful public oversight in areas ranging from the operation of 
 
 285 State Public Records Law Database, supra note 84. 
 286 See Interview with Ellen Gabler, Reporter, The N.Y. Times Co., in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Aug. 31, 
2018) (noting that the lack of a viable enforcement remedy other than suing is the most difficult 
obstacle to using state public records laws effectively). 
 287 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A) (2012). 
 288 D. John McKay, Alaska Open Government Guide, To Whom Is an Appeal Directed, REPORTERS 
COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/open-government-guide/alaska/ 
[https://perma.cc/VX35-NAP7] (noting that in Alaska, “[t]he appeal of a denial of a request for state 
agency records must be directed to the head of the agency from which you are requesting the 
records . . . . regardless of whether the agency head or subordinate was the one who initially denied 
your request”). 
 289 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-206(b) (2019) (granting appellate body a year to issue a 
decision). 
 290 See Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 180 (1980) (requiring substantial control by the 
government to be considered a government agency); Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Dep’t of 
Health, Educ. & Welfare, 668 F.2d 537, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (concluding that a medical foundation 
contracting with an agency to conduct a professional-standards review for Medicare and Medicaid was 
not subject to FOIA). 
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the military291 to the management of federal prisons.292 Privatization at the 
state and local level, however, raises unique transparency concerns.  
 First, in contrast to the federal government, some state and local 
governments outsource the very process of managing public records. Local 
agencies have hired private companies to both collect government 
information and disperse entire databases of police records.293 Some local 
governments have also contracted out the management of court records, 
with companies exercising exclusive control over the records for a period 
of time before releasing them to the public.294 This type of privatization 
permits the consolidation of public information in private hands.295 
Second, the effects of privatization are often magnified at local levels 
of government. This is in part due to the distinct origins and nature of 
government at these lower levels. Many local governments originated as 
private corporations that blurred the public–private divide,296 and in early 
America, mercantile corporations wielded the power and authority we now 
 
 291 See, e.g., Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: Privatizing Military Efforts and the Risks to 
Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT 120–21 (Jody 
Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (noting that FOIA’s exclusion of private contractors makes it 
difficult to hold private military contractors accountable). 
 292 See, e.g., Nicole B. Cásarez, Furthering the Accountability Principle in Privatized Federal 
Corrections: The Need for Access to Private Prison Records, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249, 303 (1995) 
(arguing that private prisons should be subject to public records requirements to protect the safety of 
prisoners and preserve the proper expenditure of public funds); see also PAUL R. VERKUIL, 
OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY 12 (2007) (“[The government’s] desire for secrecy encourages the use of 
private contractors, who can do jobs for the federal government exempt from FOIA and FACA 
disclosures.”). Scholars have also tracked the ways that such privatization can enhance federal 
executive power more broadly. See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 717, 719 (2010) (arguing that privatization allows the Executive Branch to exercise greater 
discretion to achieve policy goals with reduced interference from the other branches, the public, and 
successor administrations). 
 293 See discussion supra notes 228–231 and accompanying text. 
 294 See Feiser, supra note 169, at 830 (discussing Illinois press members’ worries about a private 
company having exclusive control of court records for its first seventy hours of existence). 
 295 See supra notes 228–231 and accompanying text. The private companies that hold these records 
will often sell them back to the public—or even back to the government that entered into the contract in 
the first place—for a fee. See, e.g., Assessment Techs. of Wis., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 
642–43 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting private contractor’s argument that raw data collected by government 
tax assessors were protected by copyright); see also RANI GUPTA, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF 
THE PRESS, PRIVATIZATION V. THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO KNOW 8–11 (2007), https://www.rcfp.org/wp-
content/uploads/imported/PRIVATIZATION.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7N9-EHHC] (describing the access 
issues that arise when governments privatize the recordkeeping process). 
 296 See GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING 38–45 (1999); HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND 
PRIVATE POWER 14 (1983) (recounting how New York City is regarded today as a typical public 
government, but that “an eighteenth-century judge, by contrast, could have looked only to the chartered 
foundations of a propertied corporation”). 
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associate exclusively with governments, such as eminent domain.297 
Moreover, smaller governments confront efficiency and resource concerns 
when providing services. And in the wake of the New Federalism policies 
of the 1980s, which reduced federal government funding in favor of locally 
funded services, local governments engaged in widespread privatization of 
their services.298 
As a result, large sections of what we normally consider core 
government functions are now routinely operated by private or semiprivate 
actors at the local level.299 In some small cities and towns, core government 
functions like policing and firefighting have been wholly privatized.300 In 
others, private forces supplement the public police force by providing 
security or other services in certain regions or specified areas.301 And in a 
handful of states, certain categories of privatized police—even those vested 
with general police powers—are not consistently subject to public records 
laws.302 
Further, even when there are overlaps between the types of 
privatization occurring at the federal and subfederal levels, there are still 
important distinctions in scale. Governments at all levels have increasingly 
turned to private actors to operate prisons. These private prisons are not 
subject to FOIA, nor are they subject to many state public records laws.303 
But the number of individuals affected is much larger at the state and local 
level. In 2017, there were over three times as many state prisoners as 
 
 297 See FRUG, supra note 296, at 40–41 (pointing out that mercantile corporations had the power of 
eminent domain). 
 298 Richard W. Pouder, Privatizing Services in Local Government: An Empirical Assessment of 
Efficiency and Institutional Explanations, 20 PUB. ADMIN. Q. 103, 103–04 (1996). 
 299 See Davidson, supra note 34, at 608. 
 300 Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 573, 613–15; Pace 
William Rawlins & Sung-Wook Kwon, Walking the Line on Police Privatization: Efficiency, 
Accountability, and Court Decisions, 82 INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 580, 581, 583–84 (2016). 
 301 See Rawlins & Kwon, supra note 300, at 585 (discussing Fresno, California’s use of private 
security guards for malls, apartments, sporting events, and concerts). 
 302 See, e.g., ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1197 (Ind. 2016) 
(finding that Notre Dame police officers are not covered by the state public records laws even though 
they are vested with general police powers); Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard 
Coll., 840 N.E.2d 518, 521 (Mass. 2006) (declining to apply the public records law to Harvard 
University police officers). Other privatized services, such as private property assessors, are also 
beyond the reach of public records laws in some states. See, e.g., WIREdata, Inc. v. Vill. of Sussex, 
751 N.W.2d 736, 755 (Wis. 2008) (finding that village property assessments used to determine 
residents’ property tax bills are not subject to disclosure when conducted by a private company). 
 303 See Beryl Lipton, Your Annual Reminder: FOIA Still Doesn’t Apply to Private Prisons, 
MUCKROCK (July 24, 2017), https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2017/jul/24/foia-still-doesnt-
apply-private-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/F2HF-8XYL]. 
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federal prisoners being held in private prisons.304 And some states have 
privatized large swaths of their prison operations. In New Mexico, for 
example, half of state prisoners are held in private facilities.305 
The transparency perils of these privatized services are clear. Public 
oversight of core government functions, such as policing, is critical to 
preventing corruption, mismanagement, and abuse.306 Placing these 
government functions beyond the reach of public records laws shields 
critical government activity from public view. This is not to say that state 
legislators and judges have wholly ignored these aspects of local 
government: some states have adopted more flexible tests for determining 
when and where to extend public records coverage.307 But not all states 
have pursued this approach. As a consequence, certain private entities that 
wield enormous state-backed power, and that have a significant impact on 
the lives of citizens, remain insulated from public oversight. 
2. Implementation Barriers to Disclosure 
A host of separate transparency barriers arise not from the text and 
structure of state public records laws, but from defects in their application. 
Hostile government actors can subvert the intent of the statute by delaying 
the public records process and refusing to release records. Budgetary 
constraints may curtail the ability of state and local agents to act quickly 
and effectively to comply with requests. And a variety of judicial 
barriers—including a lack of meaningful judicial appeal—can prevent the 
judicial branch from serving as an effective check on state and local 
government discretion. 
a. Hostile Government Actors  
Government hostility toward public records requirements serves as an 
additional barrier to disclosure. In the state and local context—as in the 
 
 304 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES (2019), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Private-Prisons-in-the-United-
States.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZAZ-TDRS]. 
 305 Id. While New Mexico applies a totality-of-the-circumstances approach to whether public 
records coverage extends to private companies, see Pacheco v. Hudson, 415 P.3d 505, 511 (N.M. 2018), 
the courts do not appear to have resolved whether this coverage extends to private prisons. 
306 See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (noting that FOIA was 
intended to serve as a “check against corruption”); Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic 
Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1848–49 (2015) (describing harms of excessive secrecy in policing). 
 307 See, e.g., State ex rel. Freedom Commc’ns, Inc. v. Elida Cmty. Fire Co., 697 N.E.2d 210, 213 
(1998) (holding that private firefighters are subject to public records law); Whether a Volunteer Fire 
Dep’t is Subject to the Open Records Act, Op. Att’y Gen. of Tex., No. JM-821 (Nov. 17, 1987) 
(announcing that a volunteer fire department—a nonprofit corporation—is a “governmental body” 
subject to the Texas Open Records Act). 
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federal context—there are often large discrepancies in how government 
actors implement transparency laws. The willingness of agency officials to 
comply with transparency requirements can have a significant impact on 
the transparency effects of state public records laws, particularly requests 
from media or advocacy organizations.308  
While this is true at all levels of government, such willful 
noncompliance with public records statutes often has an outsized effect at 
the state and local level, where barriers to enforcement of state public 
records laws often leave requesters with even fewer options for challenging 
an unreasonable denial or excessive fee determination. As a consequence, 
individual public records officers wield significant power and discretion 
over the practical availability of public information. In this way, they 
resemble the traditional “street-level bureaucrat” in that they operate 
relatively autonomously and the bureaucratic decisions they make can 
prove sticky and difficult to overturn.309 
The attitude of individual government officials toward transparency 
laws is often influenced by the broader culture within a particular 
government unit. Many agencies, of course, take pride in their public 
records work and view their compliance with the law as a critical part of 
the democratic process.310 But others foster a culture of secrecy and 
noncompliance.311 The New York City Police Department, for one, has 
long been accused of permitting an entrenched culture of secrecy and 
willful disregard for state public records law to flourish.312 Similarly, judges 
in some states have likewise proven hostile to transparency laws, imposing 
a cramped and narrow view of what these laws require.313 These judicial 
 
 308 One study of law enforcement agencies’ compliance with public records requests in Florida 
found that if records “custodians felt some kind of sympathy or affinity for either the requesters or the 
people named in the documents, they would grant preferential treatment to the person for whom they 
sympathized.” Kimball, supra note 17, at 342. 
 309 MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY 13, 16–18 (2010). 
310 See, e.g., CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T, MAKING THE GRADE 2 (2015) (describing the federal 
Department of Agriculture’s “exceptional performance in processing” and strong disclosure rules). 
 311 See, e.g., Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. Courier-Journal, Inc., 493 S.W.3d 375, 389 (Ky. 
Ct. App. 2016) (chastising a state agency for its “culture of secrecy”); Geraghty & Velez, supra note 17, 
at 458–62 (describing the “culture of secrecy” that exists at the Alabama Department of Corrections). 
 312 See, e.g., Bronx Defenders v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, No. 156520/2016 (May 19, 2017) (order 
denying cross-motion to dismiss) (chastising the police department for engaging in “‘gotcha’ litigation 
tactic[s]”); OFFICE OF BILL DE BLASIO, OFFICE OF PUB. ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF N.Y., BREAKING 
THROUGH BUREAUCRACY 13 (2013) (giving NYPD an “F” transparency grade for failing to respond to 
31% of FOIL requests). 
 313 See, e.g., Christian Sheckler & Ken Armstrong, When Public Records Aren’t Public, 
PROPUBLICA (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/elkhart-indiana-when-public-records-
arent-public [https://perma.cc/QXA4-VCAW] (describing an Elkhart, Indiana judge’s repeated denial of 
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attitudes toward transparency statutes may fluctuate drastically as even a 
single member joins or leaves the bench.314 The behavior of these 
individual government officials empowered to act on transparency issues—
as well as the broader cultural attitudes toward transparency requirements 
that these government entities foster—can have a significant impact on the 
broader transparency ecosystem. 
b. Reduced Resources and Expertise 
 State and local governments often lack sufficient resources to manage 
and respond to public records requests,315 particularly at the local level, 
where many town and municipal governments operate on tight budgets.316 
The requirements imposed by public records laws must be balanced against 
a multitude of other competing demands, such as funding schools, fixing 
roads, and providing adequate police and firefighting services.317 These 
financial pressures can hinder the public records process at the state and 
local level, leading to delayed responses or efforts by government officials 
to skirt the boundaries of the law in order to conserve government 
resources. 
These budgetary constraints can also have further effect. Professor 
Pozen has argued that the burdens FOIA imposes—financial and 
otherwise318—appear “less sensible . . . when the relevant bureaucracies are 
already highly regulated and professionalized.”319 Many local agencies, in 
contrast, are situated at the border between government action and 
community engagement. They operate more informally than federal or state 
agencies, and the procedural requirements binding these local agencies are 
 
public records requests for even routine court documents such as briefs filed with the court); see also 
Margaret B. Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, 54 B.C. L. REV. 185, 199–200, 204–11 (2013) (describing 
the federal judiciary’s tendency to ignore de novo review requirement of FOIA claims despite 
Congress’s decision to override a presidential veto to require de novo review). 
 314 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Fritz Byers, supra note 252 (explaining that the loss of a 
single pro-transparency justice in 2002 significantly shifted the Ohio Supreme Court’s treatment of state 
public records law). 
 315 See William Funk, Rationality Review of State Administrative Rulemaking, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 
147, 172–73 (1991) (describing the funding difficulties confronted by many state agencies); State and 
Local Fiscal Facts: 2018, supra note 176 (noting that the state “budget environment remains tight” and 
counties “face a constraining fiscal environment”); see also Interview with Chris Voss, supra note 104 
(noting that the state environmental agency budget had been cut in half since 2000 and the staff now 
struggles to complete public records requests within the statutory timeframe). 
 316 See discussion supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
317 In contrast, FOIA administrative costs represented 0.011% of federal agencies’ total department 
budgets between 1975 and 2015. See A.J. Wagner, Essential or Extravagant: Considering FOIA 
Budgets, Costs and Fees, 34 GOV’T INFO. Q. 388, 392 (2017).  
 318 See discussion supra note 116. 
 319 Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, supra note 15, at 1130. 
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often unclear.320 Many local government officials serve in an unpaid, 
volunteer capacity,321 and concerns about a lack of professionalization at 
the local level have led courts to refrain from extending deference to local 
agencies and to invalidate local agency action based on nondelegation 
principles.322 If we accept the inverse of Professor Pozen’s point—that with 
less professionalized bureaucracies, enhanced public oversight becomes 
more valuable—then public records laws would seem to be more prudent in 
the context of local administration. 
Turning to the specific context of public records laws, state and local 
government officials sometimes lack sufficient expertise regarding the 
requirements of the law. Few agencies can afford dedicated public records 
officers, even when the public records caseload would support it.323 As a 
result, government officials responding to requests often lack an underlying 
familiarity with the law itself, and they issue responses that either 
misconstrue or outright ignore the requirements of the statute.324 One 
journalist at a national news outlet characterized this knowledge deficit as 
the single most significant impediment to disclosure at the state and local 
level.325 
Some government officials responding to public records requests at 
the state and local level also lack the technical expertise required to 
respond to requests requiring electronic searches.326 While federal agencies 
 
 320 Davidson, supra note 34, at 572. 
 321 Id. at 623. 
 322 See, e.g., Marta v. Sullivan, 248 A.2d 608, 610 & n.3 (Del. 1968) (invalidating a local ordinance 
in part over concerns that the ordinance would delegate authority to “neighboring residents,” which 
would include “transients, boarders, visitors, and summer-time tenants”); see also Davidson, supra note 
34, at 623–24 (noting that the continued “vibran[cy]” of the nondelegation doctrine at the local level 
could be attributed to the “relative informality of local boards,” and arguing that “[l]egislative standards 
that might be acceptable when given to a deeply resourced, professionally staffed traditional agency 
may become more troubling when community members are tasked with the decision making”). 
 323 See, e.g., Interview with Wendy Houston Anderson, supra note 185 (Vermont state agency 
employee describing the extent to which employees must divert time from primary duties to respond to 
public records requests); see also Miriam Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, 131 HARV. L. REV. 
483, 521–22 (2017) [hereinafter Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration] (noting that “resource-strapped, 
under-staffed agencies may lack sufficient numbers of employees with appropriate qualifications”). 
 324 See, e.g., Kimball, supra note 17, at 331 (finding that among the records custodians surveyed 
“[v]ery few had any structured training in the public records law” and “almost all of them said they 
needed help understanding Florida’s Public Records Law”); FOI Audits, Alabama, NAT’L FREEDOM OF 
INFO. COAL., https://www.nfoic.org/foi-audits#ALABAMA [https://perma.cc/772L-EZZF] (finding that 
52% of sheriffs’ offices in Alabama surveyed rejected public records requests, often in violation of state 
law, and attributed this noncompliance in part to a lack of understanding of the law’s requirements). 
 325 Interview with Steve Eder, supra note 28. 
 326 See, e.g., WASH. STATE AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 76, at 5 (“Maintaining records today 
requires investments in information technology to organize, store, secure, search and inventory records, 
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are often able to adopt technical solutions that allow for increasingly 
complex digital searches,327 many government entities at the state and local 
level struggle with even straightforward requests for electronic records 
such as e-mails or text messages.328 In 2018, for example, when an activist 
submitted a public records request to the Seattle mayor’s office requesting 
a search of the mayor and his aides’ text messages, staff members placed 
their phones on copy machines and produced photocopied images of 
responsive messages.329 This combination of reduced resources and 
expertise serves as a functional barrier to disclosure at the state and local 
level. 
c. Lack of Meaningful Judicial Appeal  
 Litigating a public records request is expensive and time-consuming. 
This is as true for FOIA as it is for state transparency statutes. But while 
the average requester at any level of government has neither the skills nor 
the resources necessary to file a lawsuit in court, repeat FOIA requesters 
operating on a national scale are able to file a federal lawsuit relatively 
quickly, efficiently, and inexpensively. Increasingly, a handful of lawyers 
working on behalf of media and advocacy organizations are taking the lead 
in enforcing the provisions of FOIA that are most relevant to the public.330 
Fifty-six percent of all FOIA lawsuits filed in 2018 were filed by nonprofit 
 
and trained employees to manage them. Many governments told us they do not have sufficient 
resources to conduct these activities.”). 
 327 See, e.g., Identifying Efficiencies when Leveraging Digital Tools for FOIA Processing, OFFICE 
OF INFO. POL’Y, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 14, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/oip/blog/identifying-
efficiencies-when-leveraging-digital-tools-foia-processing [https://perma.cc/HSB6-9XSX] (describing 
pilot program by the DOJ using new technology to improve FOIA search and response time). 
 328 See, e.g., Public Records Bill Must Remain Balanced and Affordable, supra note 181 (objecting 
to broader affirmative disclosure requirements on the grounds that some local governments lack 
broadband service); Interview with Wendy Houston Anderson, supra note 185 (explaining the time and 
effort involved with learning to use software to conduct e-mail searches and redact records). A related 
problem is that some state and local governments maintain records in hard-to-search forms. The North 
Dakota state environmental agency, for example, maintains its public records request log by hand. See 
Fink, supra note 17, at 102. 
 329 Maass et al., supra note 242. 
 330 See Christine Mehta, Annual Report: FOIA Lawsuits Reach Record Highs in FY 2018, FOIA 
PROJECT (Nov. 12, 2018), http://foiaproject.org/2018/11/12/annual-report-foia-lawsuits-reach-record-
highs-in-fy-2018/ [https://perma.cc/UF8K-B7H3]. 
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advocacy groups.331 And the New York Times alone filed seventeen FOIA 
lawsuits in the first eighteen months of the Trump Administration.332 
These decisions often have far-reaching effects. They set important 
judicial precedents interpreting the scope and application of the law, and 
they help enforce the law’s mandate across the federal government.333 
Negotiated settlements of public records lawsuits also play a critical role in 
holding agencies to account. This is especially true in the context of media 
requests. At the federal level, reporters routinely agree to dismiss their 
FOIA lawsuit in exchange for the records they requested.334 Such litigation 
allows the media to use the courts as a forcing mechanism to compel the 
agency to respond, allowing reporters to cut the lengthy FOIA line. This is 
not the most efficient way to ensure media access to records. But it does 
ensure a timely response and make the prospect of judicial enforcement 
real.335 
These national media outlets and advocacy organizations face higher 
barriers to entry when litigating at the state level. Even an experienced 
FOIA litigator will not have the requisite bar qualifications or the 
knowledge of state law and practice required to litigate in most state courts. 
And hiring local counsel to litigate usually costs between $20,000 and 
$30,000 but can often cost far more.336 As a result, national media outlets 
 
 331 FOIA Project Staff, FOIA Suits Filed by Nonprofit/Advocacy Groups Have Doubled Under 
Trump, FOIA PROJECT (Oct. 18, 2018), http://foiaproject.org/2018/10/18/nonprofit-advocacy-groups-
foia-suits-double-under-trump/ [https://perma.cc/NM4L-L6ZY]. 
 332 FOIA Project Staff, Media Lawsuits Seeking Government Records Jump Under Trump, FOIA 
PROJECT (Aug. 2, 2018), http://foiaproject.org/2018/08/02/media-foia-lawsuits-jump-under-trump/ 
[https://perma.cc/6JEQ-UPDB]. 
 333 See, e.g., David McCraw, Think FOIA Is a Paper Tiger? The New York Times Gives It Some 
Bite, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/insider/foia-freedom-of-
information-act-new-york-times.html [https://perma.cc/6V3H-42AA] (“By suing regularly, [the New 
York Times] hope[s] to achieve two things. We put agencies on notice that we will take them to court if 
our requests are not handled properly, and it gives us a shot at shaping the law through court 
decisions.”). 
334 See, e.g., Stipulation & Order of Settlement & Dismissal at 1, N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, No. 18-cv-2054 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2018), ECF No. 16 (agreeing to a voluntary dismissal of a 
FOIA complaint in exchange for the production of records); Stipulation & Order of Voluntary 
Dismissal Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) at 2, N.Y. Times Co. v. Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, No. 17-cv-2144 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2018), ECF No. 35 (same). The 
author assisted with both of these cases while working as an attorney for the New York Times.  
 335 Scholars have previously characterized negotiated FOIA settlements without attorneys’ fees as a 
loss to the requester—an indication that the lawsuit never had merit in the first place. See Paul R. 
Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 679, 713 n.152 
(2002). To the contrary, such lawsuits can serve as an important transparency tool, particularly for 
journalists. See sources cited supra note 334. 
 336 See E-mail from David McCraw, supra note 12. 
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and other advocacy organizations rarely litigate state public records 
requests. The organizations that lead the way in enforcing FOIA are 
relatively powerless when it comes to state public records laws.337 
In theory, local media outlets could adopt a similar model. Larger 
media and nonprofit organizations operating on a national scale could serve 
as the public’s enforcer of the federal public records law, while local media 
and advocacy organizations could enforce various state public records 
laws. But the financial costs involved are often prohibitive for these local 
organizations. Many outlets do not employ an in-house lawyer, but instead 
rely on outside counsel to meet their legal needs.338 For these organizations, 
public records lawsuits—which are expensive, time consuming, and 
difficult to win—will rarely justify the costs required to fight.339 
The consequences can be far-reaching. Most immediately, media and 
advocacy organizations are unable to obtain the records required to report 
on the government. But the absence of public records litigation also leads 
to broader ambiguity in the law. Many state laws contain expansive or 
vague provisions,340 and without plaintiffs challenging government records 
responses, large swaths of the public records laws are left undefined by the 
courts. This makes it more difficult for requesters and government officials 
alike to determine the scope and meaning of the law. This problem is 
particularly acute when it comes to public records exemptions. In West 
Virginia, for example, nearly half of the exemptions contained in the public 
records act have never been interpreted by a state judge.341 In contrast, there 
are hundreds of federal court decisions addressing the meaning and scope 
 
 337 For a discussion of the structural barriers to civil society monitoring of state agencies generally, 
see Seifter, Further from the People?, supra note 34, at 109–10. 
 338 KNIGHT FOUND., IN DEFENSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 26 (2016), 
https://knightfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/KF-editors-survey-final_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PWC3-9CP2] (survey on file with the Knight Foundation) (in a survey of newspaper 
editors, 80% of respondents reported relying on outside counsel). 
 339 See id. at 9, 13 (65% of respondents believe that the news industry is less able today than it was 
ten years ago to pursue legal action involving free expression; of that 65%, 89% attribute the decline to 
financial restraints). 
340 See discussion supra notes 263–264 (describing the vague language used in many public records 
laws’ fee requirements). 
 341 Patrick C. McGinley & Suzanne M. Weise, West Virginia Open Government Guide, REPORTERS 
COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/open-government-guide/west-virginia 
[https://perma.cc/H46K-EFZ9]. The large numbers of exemptions in some states, as well as the 
frequency with which new exemptions are added, strongly suggests that this is an issue that plagues 
other states’ public records laws as well. See, e.g., supra notes 249–250 (describing the large number of 
exemptions in Florida, as well as the frequent enactment of new exemptions). 
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of each FOIA exemption.342 And without clear guidance from the courts, 
state and local governments have latitude to impose very broad or contorted 
definitions upon textually narrow exemptions. 
The paucity of public records lawsuits at the state and local level may 
also reduce agencies’ incentive to comply with the law. The chance that an 
agency’s intransigence or delay will have real consequence is low, and 
overworked state and local government employees likely have little 
incentive to focus on public records compliance when they are faced with 
other pressing concerns. This makes it more difficult for all requesters—not 
just nonprofit and media requesters—to obtain public records. The absence 
of a viable judicial remedy has the potential to render public records laws 
ineffective.343 As one media editor noted, “Government agencies are well 
aware that we do not have the money to fight. More and more, their first 
response to our records request is ‘Sue us if you want to get the 
records.’”344 
3. External Barriers to Disclosure 
Pervasive weaknesses in public oversight operate as a third barrier to 
public disclosure. The absence of a robust media and civil society at the 
subfederal level leaves the public without access to the information 
necessary to hold the government to account. These external factors form 
the third category of obstacles to effective transparency mechanisms in 
state and local government. 
a. Decline of Local Media  
Local media—especially local print media—has experienced a 
precipitous decline over the past decade.345 Between 2004 and 2018, 
roughly one in five local newspapers in the United States closed.346 Today, 
half of the counties in the United States have only one newspaper—
 
 342 Court Decisions Overview, OFFICE OF INFO. POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/oip/court-decisions-overview [https://perma.cc/4X2D-K4V8] (“Each year the 
federal courts issue hundreds of decisions in FOIA cases, addressing all aspects of the law.”). 
 343 See, e.g., Geraghty & Velez, supra note 17, at 461–62 (stating that the Alabama Department of 
Corrections “ignores Open Records Act requests for months, producing public documents only after 
repeated threats of litigation”). 
 344 KNIGHT FOUND., supra note 338, at 27; see also Timothy B. Wheeler, Hogan ‘Executive 
Privilege’ Email Troubles Open-Government Advocates, BALT. SUN (Feb. 20, 2015), 
https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-hogan-executive-privilege-20150220-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q8HL-28QN] (Director of Maryland Press Association noted that after receiving a 
public records denial, “[u]nless you’re willing to go to court, you’re over a barrel”). 
345 This decline is generally attributed to the significant drop in advertising revenue as advertising 
activity increasingly moves online. See PEN AM., supra note 94, at 24–31. 
 346 ABERNATHY, supra note 20, at 8. 
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typically a small weekly—and around 200 counties have no newspaper at 
all.347 Moreover, the local newspapers that still exist have seen their 
advertising and subscription revenue models collapse. Over the same 
fifteen years, weekday print circulation has declined 40%, leading to 
widespread layoffs and reduced local coverage.348 These reductions have 
curtailed newspapers’ ability to oversee state and local government. The 
number of statehouse reporters alone fell 35% between 2003 and 2014.349 
This decline has had a substantial effect on local governance. One 
study found that in the wake of a local newspaper closure, the number of 
government employees, tax revenue per capita, and cost of municipal 
borrowing all increased.350 The government wage ratio—or the ratio 
between salaries at the top and bottom of an organization—also rose. The 
authors concluded that local newspapers are especially critical in localities 
that already suffer from “low quality governance.”351 Other studies have 
demonstrated that reduced local media coverage corresponds with less 
informed voters, lower voter turnout, and reduced incentives for local 
politicians to serve as effective advocates for their constituents.352 
The decline of local media has had an impact on the enforcement of 
local transparency laws as well. Reporters rely heavily on public records 
requests to inform their investigative reporting. The media’s use of these 
statutes, in turn, improves the functioning of these public records laws. By 
submitting requests, engaging in administrative-level conversations and 
negotiations to expedite the requesting process, and challenging public 
records delays and denials in court, journalists play an outsized role in 
enforcing these transparency statutes. And the loss of local media 
participation in the public records process—either because the outlet itself 
 
 347 Id. 
 348 Id. at 14. 
 349 Katerina Eva Matsa & Jan Lauren Boyles, America’s Shifting Statehouse Press, PEW RES. CTR. 
(July 10, 2014), https://www.journalism.org/2014/07/10/americas-shifting-statehouse-press/ 
[https://perma.cc/E38G-8WB4]. 
 350 Pengjie Gao et al., Financing Dies in Darkness? The Impact of Newspaper Closures on Public 
Finance 4–5 (Hutchins Ctr., Working Paper No. 44, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/WP44.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GLK-SH4C]. 
 351 Id. at 4. 
 352 Id. at 2. These governance benefits must be considered, however, against the backdrop of a more 
general decline in the public’s confidence in the media. See, e.g., GALLUP/KNIGHT FOUND., 
INDICATORS OF NEWS MEDIA TRUST 3 (2018) (69% of adults surveyed stated that their trust in the 
media has declined in the past decade); Sabrina Tavernise & Aidan Gardiner, ‘No One Believes 
Anything’: Voters Worn Out by a Fog of Political News, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/18/us/polls-media-fake-news.html [https://perma.cc/2ZJJ-W8HZ] 
(describing the public’s loss of faith in the media). Put another way, even the highest quality reporting 
utilizing the most well-crafted transparency laws will be ineffective if the public has stopped listening. 
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has folded or because it no longer has the resources to engage in 
investigative reporting and mount legal challenges—reduces the quality of 
compliance with transparency requirements more broadly. 
Denver offers a useful case study. For more than a century, the city 
was home to two competing daily newspapers: the Rocky Mountain News 
and the Denver Post.353 For decades, the two newspapers litigated landmark 
public records lawsuits that ultimately helped define the scope of the state’s 
public records law. Lawsuits filed by the two newspapers established 
whether private companies are subject to the open records laws,354 when e-
mails sent by public officials are subject to disclosure,355 and whether the 
law requires a showing of special interest to access records.356 But the 
Rocky Mountain News closed in 2009 in the wake of declining revenue and 
corporate mismanagement.357 And in 2010, a hedge fund company assumed 
control of the Denver Post’s management and operations.358 The company 
made drastic cuts to newsroom staff, reducing the number of employees 
from a peak of 300 down to around 70.359 Unsurprisingly, the paper has 
also stopped investing in access litigation. According to a search of 
Westlaw and Lexis, neither publication has filed a public records lawsuit 
for nearly a decade.360 
The trend in Denver is emblematic of the state of local media in many 
other towns and cities across the country. The company that owns the 
Denver Post owns more than fifty other newspapers in the United States, 
 
 353 See Statement from the Companies, DENVER POST (May 11, 2000), 
https://extras.denverpost.com/business/statement0511.htm [https://perma.cc/7U39-CXNR]. 
354 See, e.g., Denver Post Corp. v. Stapleton Dev. Corp., 19 P.3d 36, 41 (Colo. App. 2000). 
355 See, e.g., Denver Publ’g Co. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Cty. of Arapahoe, 121 P.3d 190, 203 
(Colo. 2005). 
 356 See, e.g., Denver Publ’g Co. v. Dreyfus, 520 P.2d 104 (Colo. 1974). 
 357 See Bob Diddlebock, Who Really Killed the Rocky Mountain News?, TIME (Mar. 6, 2009), 
http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1883345,00.html [https://perma.cc/7G8N-UY5F]. 
 358 Pete Vernon, The Media Today: Denver Post Cuts Fit a Disturbing Pattern at Hedge-Fund 
Owned Papers, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Mar. 16, 2018), 
https://www.cjr.org/the_media_today/denver-post-cuts-digital-first.php [https://perma.cc/PVW2-2Y4J]; 
Laurel Wamsley, ‘Denver Post’ Calls Out Its ‘Vulture’ Hedge Fund Owners in Searing Editorial, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2018/04/09/600831352/denver-post-calls-out-its-vulture-hedge-fund-owners-in-searing-editorials 
[https://perma.cc/WX36-A6ZQ]. 
 359 See Vernon, supra note 358. 
 360 The most recent lawsuit available on Westlaw or Lexis is Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter, 255 P.3d 
1083 (Colo. 2011). It is possible that the Denver Post filed a lawsuit since then that settled without a 
published decision. 
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and it has made similar cuts to papers throughout the country.361 But even 
for newspapers that remain independently owned, the financial pressures 
are intense. Many no longer have the luxury of engaging in access 
litigation. In a Knight Foundation survey of media editors, 65% of 
respondents believed that the industry is less able to pursue legal action 
around First Amendment-related issues than it was ten years ago.362 
Local media plays a critical role in the transparency ecosystem 
through the aggressive use and enforcement of state public records laws. 
The collapse of local media has led to fewer investigative resources 
devoted to covering state and local government, fewer public records 
requests submitted from the media, and fewer public records challenges 
pursued in court. While some major media and advocacy organizations are 
still devoting resources to access litigation, those national organizations 
face both financial and logistical barriers to litigating in state court. In this 
way, the decline of the media as the public enforcer of public records laws 
has had a significant negative impact on the broader local transparency 
ecosystem. 
b. Weaknesses in Civil Society  
Civil society actors have long played a crucial role in government 
oversight. This is particularly true for civil society groups that “pursu[e] the 
interests of a diffuse public.”363 These organizations are often focused on a 
particular subset of government action or on trans-substantive government 
issues, such as prison reform or enhanced protection for civil liberties.364 At 
the federal level, civil society oversight of the federal government 
expanded dramatically between the 1950s and ’70s with the enactment of a 
range of federal transparency laws and the rise of “monitory democracy,” 
as well as with the increased power and influence of civil rights, antiwar, 
and other activist and public interest groups.365 Yet the largest and most 
 
 361 See Jack Shafer, This Is How a Newspaper Dies, POLITICO (May 13, 2018), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/05/13/denver-post-profits-newspaper-industry-218360 
[https://perma.cc/C5UY-A3PL]; Wamsley, supra note 358. 
 362 KNIGHT FOUND., supra note 338, at 1; see also Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, supra 
note 323, at 525 (“The media cannot report on what it cannot see, and state media groups may not have 
sufficient resources or incentives to conduct extensive records requests.”). 
 363 Seifter, Further from the People?, supra note 34, at 135. 
 364 See Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 
547–51 (2015). 
 365 MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE RISE OF THE RIGHT TO KNOW 233–37, 249–51 (2015). Many have 
argued that civil society across the country is now on the decline. Scholars and journalists have ascribed 
this decline to a variety of factors. See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE 
AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 235–36 (2000) (arguing that the rise of television strongly 
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prominent civil society organizations have historically paid less attention to 
state and local government, even as the size and power of these lower 
levels of government have expanded in recent decades.366 
Smaller, more locally focused civil society actors have only partially 
filled this gap. To be sure, there are countless organizations—ranging in 
size and scope from state chapters of nationally recognized advocacy 
groups to small neighborhood organizations—monitoring state and local 
government and advocating for policy change.367 But these state and local 
public interest groups often operate at a significant financial disadvantage. 
At the state level, lobbying activities are largely dominated by private 
sector interests, even more so than at the federal level. Public interest 
groups represented only 12.4% of lobbying activity at the state level in 
2007, and 86% of state lobbying expenditures that year were incurred by 
corporations and trade associations.368  
State-level public interest groups also have fewer resources than 
similar organizations advocating on a national level, placing these state-
level public interest groups at a greater financial disadvantage in 
comparison with the private interest groups lobbying against them.369 This 
imbalance makes it more difficult for state and local public interest groups 
to engage in sustained government oversight.370 A comparison of public 
records lawsuits filed at the federal versus the state and local level 
illustrates this dynamic. Lawsuits filed by national nonprofit organizations 
like the ACLU comprised more than half of all FOIA lawsuits in 2018—
roughly 500 lawsuits in total.371 While comparative litigation data are not 
 
contributed to a decline in civil society activities); Emma Green, What America Lost as Women Entered 
the Workforce, ATLANTIC (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ 
archive/2016/09/what-women-lost/500537/ [https://perma.cc/FX2S-GSVK] (arguing that a partial 
explanation for why civil society activity has declined is that women moved into the workforce and 
replaced unpaid activism and volunteerism with paid work). 
 366 Seifter, Further from the People?, supra note 34, at 130. 
 367 See, e.g., Christopher A. Cooper et al., Perceptions of Power: Interest Groups in Local Politics, 
37 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 206 (2005). 
 368 Seifter, Further from the People?, supra note 34, at 137–38. At the federal level, in contrast, 
“business-oriented” lobbyists constituted an estimated 51.5% of all lobbyists in 2006. Id. 
 369 Id. at 138–39 (“In addition to being outnumbered and outspent on lobbying, public interest-
oriented groups in the states are also likely to be comparatively resource poor.”); see also Seifter, 
Gubernatorial Administration, supra note 323, at 524 (noting a “probusiness skew among state 
lobbyists”). 
 370 See Jiahuan Lu, Organizational Antecedents of Nonprofit Engagement in Policy Advocacy: A 
Meta-Analytical Review, 47 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 177S, 186S–87S (noting that larger, 
more professionalized, and better funded nonprofits are more likely to engage in policy advocacy 
work). 
 371 FOIA Project Staff, supra note 331. 
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collected at the state level, the dearth of state-level public records lawsuits 
overall suggests that state and local public interest groups are not using the 
courts to compel public records at these lower levels of government.372 
Moreover, while there is limited data on the percentage of state and local 
public records requests submitted by nonprofit organizations, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that interest groups submit fewer state and local public 
records requests than they do FOIA requests.373 This combination of 
reduced media and civil society activity leaves large gaps in public 
oversight in comparison with the federal transparency regime. 
IV. TRANSPARENCY DESERTS 
The example of state public records laws helps illuminate the various 
factors that either advance or impede transparency efforts. Through this 
analysis, three central features of a local transparency ecosystem emerge: 
(1) the substance of transparency requirements binding the government; (2) 
the resources, expertise, and attitudes of state and local government actors 
tasked with implementing these laws; and (3) the robustness and health of 
local media and civil society organizations. This Part examines localities in 
which poor performance on all three factors have combined to create a 
downward spiral of reduced disclosure and public oversight—what I refer 
to as a transparency desert.374 
A. The Case of Kansas 
Elucidating the concept of local transparency deserts presents 
something of a paradox: a true transparency desert, by definition, will be 
invisible. In localities that fail all three prongs of the transparency 
ecosystem, there will be no journalists documenting the ways that 
government officials have subverted transparency laws to hide government 
malfeasance. Government attitudes towards transparency will be obscured 
if there is no one to request information. A perfect transparency desert will 
hide both the government’s failure to comply with transparency obligations 
and any underlying corruption or wrongdoing.  
 
 372 See discussion supra note 88–90 and accompanying text. 
 373 Compare 2017 Vermont State Dataset, supra note 78 (roughly 1% of requests submitted to state 
agencies were from identifiable nonprofit organizations), with Max Galka, Who Uses FOIA? – An 
Analysis of 229,000 Requests to 85 Government Agencies, FOIA MAPPER (Mar. 13, 2017), 
https://foiamapper.com/who-uses-foia/ [https://perma.cc/3R3A-5TR6] (analysis of 229,000 FOIA 
requests submitted to eighty-five federal agencies found that roughly 7.5% of requests originated from 
nonprofit entities). 
 374 This term borrows from the idea of a “news desert.” See discussion supra note 20. 
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In light of these obstacles, this Section explores a somewhat imperfect 
illustration of a transparency desert: the case of Kansas.375 To begin, the 
transparency regime binding state and local government in Kansas is 
relatively ineffective. The state has a weak public records law. The statute 
itself contains fifty-five exemptions, including a broad exemption for 
nearly all “[c]orrespondence between a public agency and a private 
individual,”376 and there are 250 or so additional exemptions from 
disclosure scattered throughout the state code.377 The law does not contain a 
fee waiver for requests submitted in the public interest, nor are there 
meaningful limits on the amount that government entities may charge 
requesters: they are free to impose a “‘reasonable’ fee,” which may include 
the cost of time spent responding to the request.378 Further, the law contains 
no provisions providing a route for administrative appeal.379 And while 
legislative bodies are covered by the law, the records of individual 
legislators are exempt, even those maintained in performance of their 
official duties.380 
Although this Article focuses attention on a single category of 
transparency statutes, the substance of other statutory transparency 
requirements in the state affect the broader transparency ecosystem as well. 
And in Kansas, these other transparency requirements are similarly flawed. 
It is one of the few states that permits anonymous authors to sponsor 
legislation, and in 2017, 94% of all laws enacted that year were sponsored 
anonymously.381 Kansas was the last state in the nation to permit the 
 
 375 I refer to this as an “imperfect” example because local news outlets have exposed governmental 
deficiencies in the state. See infra note 399. 
 376 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-215 to -250 (2019). 
 377 Government Records, KAN. OPEN GOV’T, http://medialaw.ku.edu/opengovt/kansasstatutes.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/RE84-W6U7]. 
 378 Joe Stumpe, Kansas Gets F Grade in 2015 State Integrity Investigation, CTR. FOR PUB. 
INTEGRITY (Nov. 9, 2015, updated Nov. 12, 2015), https://publicintegrity.org/accountability/kansas-
gets-f-grade-in-2015-state-integrity-investigation/ [https://perma.cc/JH5L-UGJY]. 
 379 The attorney general’s office can receive complaints from the public about an agency’s failure to 
comply with an open records request, but it does not operate as a formal and binding appeals body. 
Koma-Kora Complaint Form, KAN. ATT’Y GEN., https://ag.ks.gov/complaint-center/koma-kora-
investigation-request [https://perma.cc/NH5B-9HE4]. 
 380 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-217(g)(3)(B). 
 381 Judy L. Thomas & Bryan Lowry, How Kansas Lawmakers Keep You from Finding Out What 
They’re Doing—Until It’s Too Late, KAN. CITY STAR (Nov. 12, 2017), 
https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article184176596.html [https://perma.cc/3FWS-
ZNMW]. 
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unsealing of criminal affidavits,382 and it has no open data law requiring 
that the government affirmatively publish certain data online in an open 
format.383 In 2015, the Center for Public Integrity gave the state a failing 
grade for transparency and accountability regarding public access to 
information, electoral oversight, executive accountability, judicial 
accountability, the state budget process, procurement, internal auditing, 
lobbying disclosure, and ethics enforcement agencies.384 
These weaknesses in the state statutory regime are amplified by 
certain structural features of state government in Kansas. Transparency 
statutes operate in conjunction with other transparency mechanisms, such 
as periodic elections and legislative oversight of the executive and judicial 
branches. In Kansas, however, the state legislature is only part-time. It 
meets in regular session for only ninety days every two years,385 and 
legislators are paid just $88.67 per day.386 Moreover, some state legislators 
employ relatively small staffs, further limiting their ability to engage in 
time-consuming investigatory and oversight activity.387 
Second, government actors in Kansas have been notoriously wary of 
transparency requirements, particularly during the eight-year reign of Sam 
Brownback,388 who served as governor of Kansas from 2011 to 2018.389 In 
2012, Brownback pushed massive tax cuts through the legislature, 
commonly referred as the “Kansas experiment.”390 The law eliminated state 
income taxes for certain corporate entities and slashed individual income 
 
 382 Laura Bauer et al., When Cops Kill in Kansas, You Probably Won’t Hear Their Names or See 
the Video, KAN. CITY STAR (Nov. 12, 2017), https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-
government/article184172776.html [https://perma.cc/VK92-S98W]. 
 383 Stumpe, supra note 378. 
 384 Id. 
 385 Legislative Session Length, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 2, 2010), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/legislative-session-length.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/QWP4-QTNB]. 
 386 Johnny Kauffman, Low Pay in State Legislatures Means Some Can’t Afford the Job, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/01/09/508237086/low-pay-in-state-legislatures-
means-some-cant-afford-the-job [https://perma.cc/CEA8-2QR5]. 
 387 Full- and Part-Time Legislatures, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 14, 2017), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/full-and-part-time-legislatures.aspx#gold 
[https://perma.cc/AT4H-A48H]. 
 388 See infra notes 395–399. 
 389 Sam Brownback (2011–2018), KAN. ST. LIBR., https://kslib.info/949/Sam-Brownback-2011-
2018 [https://perma.cc/J3MN-7559]. 
 390 Jeremy Hobson et al., As Trump Proposes Tax Cuts, Kansas Deals with Aftermath of 
Experiment, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/10/25/560040131/as-trump-
proposes-tax-cuts-kansas-deals-with-aftermath-of-experiment [https://perma.cc/MJ45-WXZ8]. 
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tax rates.391 By 2016, the state had lost nearly $700 million in tax revenue 
per year,392 forcing schools to implement four-day weeks and consolidate 
classes,393 and causing the state’s bond rating to plummet.394 Underfunded 
state agencies and local governments had fewer resources to devote to 
public records compliance as well. 
As the financial situation worsened, Brownback’s administration 
began to take a harder line on public records requests. For example, it took 
the position that budget recommendations submitted by state agencies were 
predecisional and therefore exempt from disclosure, even though the 
agencies themselves asserted that the documents submitted to the Governor 
were final.395 The head of one advocacy organization in the state who 
routinely relies on public records requests lamented the blanket of secrecy 
that had settled over state government. “There’s something about once that 
culture sets in,” he noted, “[i]t’s really difficult to move out of.”396 
This hostility toward disclosure requirements extended to state 
agencies as well. In the wake of the deaths of children under its 
supervision, for example, the Kansas Department for Children and Families 
asked family members to sign gag orders promising not to talk about the 
circumstances of the death or about the agency’s involvement. Former 
agency officials reported receiving instructions not to document anything in 
the wake of a child’s death and to shred any notes so that they could not be 
produced in response to open records requests.397 The agency also began 
 
 391 Jim Tankersley, Kansas Tried a Tax Plan Similar to Trump’s. It Failed., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/us/politics/kansas-tried-a-tax-plan-similar-to-trumps-it-
failed.html [https://perma.cc/R3D4-TWGZ]. 
 392 Id. 
 393 Emily Richmond, School Building Upkeep Left to Local Taxpayers in Kansas, so Sometimes Sun 
Peers Through the Walls, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.kcur.org/post/school-
building-upkeep-left-local-taxpayers-kansas-so-sometimes-sun-peers-through-walls#stream/0 
[https://perma.cc/R7AS-NPKZ]; Suzanne Perez Tobias, Southeast Kansas District Implements Four-
Day School Week, WICHITA EAGLE (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.kansas.com/ 
news/local/education/article72631157.html [https://perma.cc/W5VR-YZEB]. 
 394 Hobson, supra note 390. 
 395 Tim Carpenter, Brownback Administration Exempting Cabinet Budget Plans from KORA, 
TOPEKA CAP.-J. (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.cjonline.com/news/2016-09-23/brownback-
administration-exempting-cabinet-budget-plans-kora [https://perma.cc/38AU-E2WC]; Bryan Lowry, 
Brownback’s Office Won’t Release Budget Documents, WICHITA EAGLE (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www-
1.kansas.com/news/politics-government/article103744216.html# [https://perma.cc/LK4U-FEHY]. 
 396 Laura Bauer et al., ‘One of the Most Secretive, Dark States’: What Is Kansas Trying to Hide?, 
KAN. CITY STAR (Nov. 12, 2017), https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-
government/article184179651.html [https://perma.cc/2TPW-XQ8P]. 
 397 Laura Bauer, Secrecy Inside Child Welfare System Can Kill: ‘God Help the Children of Kansas,’ 
KAN. CITY STAR (Nov. 12, 2017), https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-
government/article184177786.html [https://perma.cc/SL6P-ZJVK]. 
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issuing high fee estimates, at one point charging nearly $3,000 for copies of 
two days’ worth of e-mails for six employees.398 It even ignored public 
records’ requirements altogether. In one instance, a reporter submitted a 
request for records relating to the death of a ten-year-old who had been 
stabbed by his mother. The agency acknowledged that the records were 
subject to disclosure but stated that it “didn’t have [the] staffing resources 
[at that time] ‘due to its current workload of KORA requests.’”399 
Third, Kansas has been disproportionately affected by the crisis in 
local media and civil society oversight. More than half of the counties in 
the state—nearly the entire western half of Kansas—do not have a daily 
newspaper.400 Between 2004 and 2016, three newspapers in the state either 
closed or merged, and another ten daily newspapers were converted into 
weeklies.401 The state is tied for the fifth highest number of newspaper 
closures in the country, and it has the second highest number of closures 
per capita in the nation.402 Moreover, the newspapers that remain have 
confronted severe reductions in newsroom staffing and declines in revenue. 
Between the mid-1990s and 2018, print circulation for the Wichita Eagle, 
the largest newspaper in Kansas, declined from 122,000 to 30,000.403 The 
newspaper was forced to cut newsroom staff down from more than 100 
reporters to fewer than three dozen, and the newspaper is currently 
distributed in just 10 of the state’s 105 counties, down from its peak 
distribution of 73 counties.404 The paper is now printed 200 miles away 
from Wichita, forcing reporters to adhere to very early reporting deadlines 
and reducing their ability to produce timely coverage of government 
meetings and other nighttime events.405 
 
 398 State Legal Costs Impede KORA, supra note 273. 
 399 Bauer et al., supra note 396. The newspaper that reported the story—the Kansas City Star—was 
later named a Pulitzer Prize finalist for “expos[ing] a state government’s decades-long “obsession with 
secrecy” and efforts to “suppress transparency and accountability in law enforcement agencies, child 
welfare services and other sectors of the government.” The 2018 Pulitzer Prize Finalist in Public 
Service: The Kansas City Star, PULITZER PRIZES, https://www.pulitzer.org/finalists/kansas-city-star 
[https://perma.cc/XWG4-2VTX].  
 400 See Yemile Bucay et al., America’s Growing News Deserts, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (2017), 
https://www.cjr.org/local_news/american-news-deserts-donuts-local.php [https://perma.cc/F4CU-
4Z4G]. 
 401 PENELOPE MUSE ABERNATHY, UNC SCH. MEDIA & JOURNALISM, THE RISE OF A NEW MEDIA 
BARON AND THE EMERGING THREAT OF NEWS DESERTS app. 2 (2016), 
http://newspaperownership.com/additional-material/closed-merged-newspapers-map/ 
[https://perma.cc/RM62-LTAL]. 
 402 Id. 
 403 ABERNATHY, supra note 20, at 21–22. 
 404 Id. 
 405 Id. at 22. 
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Civil society in the state also exhibits troubling weaknesses. Between 
2013 and 2017, employment by social advocacy nonprofits in the state 
decreased 60%.406 Moreover, lobbyist spending has more than doubled in 
Kansas over the last ten years.407 And much of that money is unaccounted 
for: in 2013, nearly three-quarters of lobbying money was categorized as 
“unitemized,” meaning that expenditures were not linked to a specific 
legislator or event.408 While this lobbyist data is not broken down by 
commercial versus noncommercial interests, the vast sums of money 
flowing into the state lobbying apparatus and the lack of transparency as to 
its origins and destination at least suggests that public interest groups in the 
state are comparatively resource-poor in relation to their state-level 
industry opponents.409 
In sum, Kansas measures poorly on all three central prongs of a local 
transparency ecosystem: the robustness of state transparency laws, the 
extent to which government actors effectively implement those laws, and 
the strength of local media and civil society. This has combined to create a 
downward transparency spiral in the state. Lack of media and civil society 
oversight has facilitated the executive branch’s disregard of public records 
requirements, allowed the legislature to enact new exemptions that reflect 
concentrated special interests, and permitted corporate lobbyists to spend 
ever-increasing funds in relative secrecy. These weaknesses in the public 
records law’s text and implementation, in turn, have made it more difficult 
for media and civil society actors to rely on state transparency laws to hold 
government officials accountable. 
B. Transparency Deserts and Federalism Theory 
While this Article primarily identifies holes in the transparency 
scholarship created by scholars’ neglect of the state and local transparency 
 
 406 Compare U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 2017 Nonprofit 
Establishment Employment & Wage Estimates, https://www.bls.gov/bdm/nonprofits/nonprofits.htm 
[https://perma.cc/K9XX-7USQ] (911 people employed in social advocacy organizations in Kansas), 
with U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 2013 Nonprofit Establishment 
Employment & Wage Estimates, https://www.bls.gov/bdm/nonprofits/nonprofits.htm 
[https://perma.cc/K9XX-7USQ] (2,251 people employed in social advocacy organizations in Kansas). 
 407 Reid Wilson, Amid Gridlock in D.C., Influence Industry Expands Rapidly in the States, WASH. 
POST (May 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/05/11/amid-gridlock-
in-d-c-influence-industry-expands-rapidly-in-the-states/?utm_term=.be927545cbcf 
[https://perma.cc/BP36-V862]. 
 408 Dion Lefler & Brent Wistrom, 74% of Lobbyist Spending on Kansas Lawmakers Unaccounted 
For, KAN. CITY STAR (May 4, 2013), https://www.kansascity.com/news/local/article318681/74-of-
lobbyist-spending-on-Kansas-lawmakers-unaccounted-for.html [https://perma.cc/35BD-WFSB]. 
 409 See Seifter, Further from the People?, supra note 34, at 138. 
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regime, the problem of transparency deserts has implications for a second 
body of literature: federalism scholarship. A central normative claim of 
federalism is that lower levels of government are both easier to monitor and 
restrain410 and more reflective of citizens’ preferences.411 This principle is 
reflected in the oft-stated maxim that state governments will be “closer to 
the people.”412 Smaller and more local governments, the theory holds, allow 
citizens more direct access to government officials and greater ease of 
oversight.413 Yet the state and local transparency pitfalls chronicled here 
would suggest that the opposite is true. They suggest that a key component 
of this modern accountability system—public records laws—is less 
available to monitor state and local governments than it is to monitor the 
federal government. The cumulative flaws in state transparency laws, in 
both structure and implementation, expose the fallacy of enhanced public 
oversight at smaller units of government. 
Professor Miriam Seifter has chronicled the weaknesses of civil 
society oversight of state agencies and concluded that “[f]ar from the 
Antifederalist ideal of states as ‘well guarded,’ state administration today is 
a largely unguarded giant.”414 The shortcomings of the state transparency 
regime identified here suggest that this thesis should sweep even more 
broadly—that the accountability gaps Professor Seifter identifies at the 
state administrative level may exist throughout all branches of state 
government. But these implications also extend further. The theory that 
 
410 See Daryl J. Levinson, Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 49 
(2016) (“As the influential Antifederalist Federal Farmer put it, state governments ought to be both 
‘strong and well guarded.’” (quoting Letter XVII from the Federal Farmer to the Republican (Jan. 23, 
1788), reprinted in 17 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 350, 
356 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1995))). 
411 See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 312 (M. Farrand ed., 1911) 
(Madison, J.) (arguing that federal elections should be regulated by the states because they were “best 
acquainted with the situation of the people”); see also Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating 
the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: 
THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987)) (“The first, and most axiomatic, advantage of decentralized 
government is that local laws can be adapted to local conditions and local tastes . . . .”). 
 412 See, e.g., Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 41 (2013) (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (“Because the States are closer to the people, the Framers thought that state regulation of 
federal elections would ‘in ordinary cases . . . be both more convenient and more satisfactory.’” 
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 363 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))). See 
generally Seifter, Further from the People?, supra note 34, at 146–48 (discussing how scholars are in 
general agreement “that states are closer to the people,” but casting doubt on “claims that state 
implementation offers the advantage of proximity to public eyes”).  
 413 Some federalism scholars have suggested that local government may offer a cure for the 
problem of the democratic deficit in the United States in which remote bureaucrats remove important 
decision-making processes from public view. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 147, at 393. 
 414 Seifter, Further from the People?, supra note 34, at 128 (citation omitted). 
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smaller levels of government are closer to the people would suggest that 
local governments would be even more “well guarded” than the states.415 
This review of public records laws suggests that the opposite is true—that 
the smaller the government, the greater the breakdown in public 
oversight.416 It suggests that local governments have even fewer resources 
to devote to complying with public records requirements, and that members 
of the public face even steeper barriers to disclosure.  
These pitfalls in the state public records regime also have implications 
for the states-as-laboratories view of federalism.417 For this theory to work, 
the lessons learned from state experimentation must be disseminated—
there must be informational channels in place to transmit word of 
experimental failures or successes to neighboring governments or to the 
public.418 The existence of transparency deserts calls this assumption into 
question. The combination of poorly crafted transparency requirements, 
inadequate media and civil society oversight, and hostile government actors 
impedes the dissemination of information about state and local governance.  
The existence of transparency deserts also implicates the “political 
market” view of federalism, or the view that jurisdictions compete with one 
another to present “the most appealing bundle of local laws, customs, and 
attitudes.”419 This view is often traced back to Professor Charles Tiebout’s 
classic 1956 article A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, which argued 
that “consumer-voters” may choose local governments based on individual 
preferences.420 The classic Tieboutian concept of local competition and 
 
 415 See Gerken, supra note 125, at 23–24 (summarizing the view among some federalism scholars 
that “localities represent better sites for pursuing federalism’s values because they are closer to the 
people, offer more realistic options for voting with one’s feet, and map more closely onto communities 
of interest”). 
 416 This contradicts the assumption of some transparency theorists that transparency is greatest at 
the local level. See, e.g., Fenster, supra note 14, at 934. 
 417 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the “happy incident[] of the federal system” where a “State may . . . serve as a laboratory”). 
 418 See Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse-1983” in Context, 47 VAND. L. 
REV. 1229, 1234 (1994) (describing the “laboratories” view of federalism as one in which “innovative 
states can conduct controlled legislative ‘experiments’ whose results can be monitored” and “sound 
policy conclusions derived and applied elsewhere, if appropriate”); Hannah J. Wiseman, Regulatory 
Islands, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1661, 1692, 1694 (2014) (arguing that “[i]nformation is necessary for policy 
experimentation because of the need for learning—jurisdictions must glean lessons from others,” and 
that “[d]espite the importance of baseline policy information for quality experimentation . . . this data is 
often unavailable, or available yet incomplete”). 
 419 Amar, supra note 418, at 1236–37. 
 420 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 417–18 
(1956); see also Nestor M. Davidson & Sheila R. Foster, The Mobility Case for Regionalism, 47 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 63, 65 (2013) (describing the Tieboutian model of federalism). 
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mobility has been challenged on a number of grounds.421 But this account 
of transparency deserts bolsters a central critique: lack of knowledge.422 
This view of federalism only works if a citizen has sufficient information to 
know when to leave and where to go.423 
Further, the existence of transparency deserts may undermine the 
federal government’s ability both to monitor state governments’ 
implementation of federal policies and to effectively serve as a check on 
state government power. Under the cooperative federalism view of federal–
state relations, states serve as “servants and allies to the federal 
government,” working to enact federal goals.424 But the transparency 
barriers described here may make it difficult for the federal government to 
monitor whether state and local governments are, in fact, working to 
implement federal policy.425 Media and civil society actors may be unable 
to alert the federal government to breakdowns in state and local 
administration of federal policies and goals.426 
Additionally, absent adequate transparency measures, federal 
congressional and executive actors may remain ignorant of broader state 
and local governance failures. The Department of Justice, for example, will 
be unable to investigate civil rights abuses by state and local law 
enforcement agencies if it remains ignorant of such violations.427 Congress 
may not be alerted to governance failures in areas of civil rights, voting, 
and utilities regulation at the state and local level without these 
mechanisms of transparency. And at the state level, governors may not 
know to step in to assume control of local government in times of crisis.428 
 
 421 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 346, 420–21 (1990) (outlining the social and economic costs that prevent people from moving 
jurisdictions). 
 422 For critiques of Professor Tiebout’s assumption of perfect knowledge, see, for example, Nadav 
Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA. L. REV. 1323, 1355 & n.131 (2014). 
 423 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (arguing that federalism “makes 
government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry”).  
424  See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 23, at 1258. 
 425 Professors Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather K. Gerken have famously described states’ efforts 
to resist federal mandates as “uncooperative federalism.” Id. at 1263. 
 426 Cf. Seifter, Further from the People?, supra note 34, at 165–66 (describing the role of civil 
society in alerting both the state and federal government to breakdowns in the safety and quality of 
Section 8 housing). 
 427 See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012) 
(authorizing DOJ investigations into local law enforcement violations of the Constitution and federal 
statutory law); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3789d (same). 
 428 See, e.g., Mo. Exec. Order No. 14-09 (Aug. 18, 2014), 
https://www.sos.mo.gov/library/reference/orders/2014/eo14_09 [https://perma.cc/7JDU-58N2] 
(Missouri governor, following declaration of a state of emergency in the city of Ferguson, authorizing 
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Transparency deserts may hinder federal and state governments’ ability to 
effectively monitor lower levels of government.429 
V. REFORMING STATE AND LOCAL TRANSPARENCY ECOSYSTEMS 
By chronicling a litany of flaws in the state and local transparency 
regime, this Article begs the obvious question: what can and should be 
done to improve these transparency ecosystems? This Part first addresses 
the threshold question of whether public records laws are worth saving. It 
teases out the central paradox of these laws: that although deeply flawed, 
they are still better than the alternative. In doing so, it demonstrates that 
unique features of state and local government increase the salience of 
statutory transparency mechanisms. It then provides suggestions for 
reform, proposing amendments to both the transparency statutes and to the 
broader information ecosystems that surround them.  
A. Are State Public Records Laws Worth Saving? 
There is a robust strand of skepticism running throughout the federal 
transparency literature today. Scholars have begun to ask whether the 
transparency scale has tipped too far, emphasizing that transparency 
excesses can lead to distinct governance failures.430 FOIA has become a 
particular target of ire. Scholars have argued the law imposes costs that 
grossly outweigh its benefits, and that there are viable alternative 
transparency mechanisms that would adequately serve the needs of the 
public without the enormous financial and resource burdens that the public 
 
the state highway patrol to close streets and activating the state militia); see also Seifter, Gubernatorial 
Administration, supra note 323, at 540 (“[G]overnors commonly use executive actions to take control 
of local affairs in times of crisis.”). 
429 Further, even when the federal government is alerted to a governance problem through 
alternative channels—for example, an affected constituent reaches out to his or her senator or 
congressional representative directly—these transparency deserts may impede the federal government’s 
efforts to investigate and remedy the governance problem. To provide one illustration, a 2015 
investigation into fatal police shootings by the Washington Post uncovered twice as many fatal police 
shootings as the number reported by local police to the FBI. Kimberly Kindy et al., A Year of 
Reckoning: Police Fatally Shoot Nearly 1,000, WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/12/26/a-year-of-reckoning-police-fatally-shoot-
nearly-1000/?utm_term=.e3deaf383cdb (last visited Mar. 29, 2020). FBI Director James Comey stated 
that it was “unacceptable” that a media organization was able to gather more accurate crime statistics 
than the agency could. Id. 
 430 See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT 
SMALL 181–82 (2007) (outlining the costs of too much transparency, including silencing dissenters); 
Fenster, supra note 14, at 902–03, 906–10 (describing the problems that can flow from “potential 
excesses of disclosure requirements”); Sunstein, supra note 14, at 13–15 (arguing that the harms of 
most “transparency inputs” can outweigh the benefits they provide). 
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records statute imposes.431 Academics such as Professor Pozen have 
persuasively argued that while FOIA originated as a progressive tool to 
promote good governance, it now largely functions as a regressive tool to 
advance corporate interests.432 Some have suggested it may be better to 
scrap FOIA altogether.433 
In comparison with the federal law, state public records laws seem to 
impose relatively greater burdens upon government and introduce 
comparatively steeper barriers to disclosure. In other words, state public 
records laws appear to be both more costly to the government and less 
beneficial to the public than FOIA.434 The case for replacing public records 
laws with less onerous alternatives would therefore seem to be even 
stronger at the subfederal level. And yet there are competing 
considerations, specific to local transparency ecosystems, which caution 
against the wholesale abandonment of state public records statutes. 
Namely, unique features of the state and local governance landscape 
increase the salience of public records laws in comparison with FOIA. Put 
another way, although these state laws are deeply flawed, they are still 
worth saving. 
First, legal scholars have emphasized that there is such a thing as too 
much transparency, and that over-accountability in government produces 
its own pathologies.435 Assuming that this is a legitimate concern in the 
federal context, it is still unlikely that we have reached this tipping point in 
the state and local context. Along a variety of oversight measures—from 
media coverage, to the attention of civil society actors, to the effectiveness 
of intergovernmental checks and balances—state and local governments 
 
 431 See, e.g., VERMEULE, supra note 430, at 200–08 (arguing for increased opacity at the early 
stages of the federal budgeting process and for delayed disclosure of certain aspects of the budgeting 
process); Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, supra note 15, at 
1101 (arguing in favor of alternatives for executive branch transparency such as affirmative disclosure 
requirements or denying legally binding effect to government policies and decisions that are not 
publicized in a timely manner). 
 432 Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, supra note 15, at 1111. 
 433 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 16, at 17; cf. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of 
Information Act, supra note 15, at 1156 (“The most promising path forward . . . involves displacing 
FOIA requests as the lynchpin of transparency policy and shoring up alternative strategies . . . .”). 
 434 See discussion supra Sections III.B–III.C. 
 435 See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and 
Transparency in the Administrative State, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1157, 1161 (2009) (noting that federal 
agencies are “some of the most extensively monitored government actors in the world”); Jacob E. 
Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Over-Accountability, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 185, 186–87 (2014) 
(noting that political economy scholarship has identified a “class of situations in which effective 
accountability mechanisms can decrease, rather than increase, an agent’s likelihood of acting in her 
principal’s interests” (emphases omitted)). 
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suffer from too little accountability rather than too much. It is doubtful that 
state and local governments in general are plagued by overattention from 
the public. Wherever this line is drawn, it is unlikely that current levels of 
public oversight of state and local governments have crossed it.436 
Second, the importance of government oversight increases with the 
power and authority of the government entity that is being monitored. And 
state and local governments’ influence over the everyday lives of citizens 
has grown in recent years. State and local governments have grown larger: 
while the number of federal employees has remained fairly steady over the 
last half-century, the number of state government employees has increased 
threefold.437 They have also grown wealthier. Roughly two-thirds of local 
governments’ operating budgets today derive from local sources of 
revenue, permitting local governments’ increased economic 
independence.438 State spending has increased eightfold since 1960 after 
accounting for inflation.439 Many local governments now enjoy substantial 
discretion over the allocation of local budgets, the setting of tax rates, and 
the regulation of local land use. The amount of money in state and local 
politics has also increased, and the majority of these lobbyists—roughly 
70%—represent private sector interests.440 This “bias towards business” is 
even more pronounced at the state level than it is at the federal level.441 
 
 436 See Seifter, Further from the People?, supra note 34, at 169 (noting that while there can be too 
much civil society oversight in theory, this critique is “not apt given conditions in the states today”). 
Another potent critique of FOIA is that by concentrating public attention on the public sector while 
casting little light on the private sector, it creates an “anti-public-sector bias.” See Pozen, 
Transparency’s Ideological Drift, supra note 14, at 156–58. While this criticism applies in the state and 
local context as well, reduced public oversight of state and local government more generally will 
presumably lessen this attention imbalance. 
 437 Seifter, Further from the People?, supra note 34, at 128–29. The state and local workforce is 
roughly six times the size of the federal workforce. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 4. 
438 Roughly two-thirds of local government revenue in 2016 derived from a combination of 
property, sales, and other taxes and miscellaneous charges, such as fees for water collection and parking 
meters. The remaining third derived from state and federal transfers. TAX POLICY CTR., URBAN INST. & 
BROOKINGS INST., THE STATE OF STATE (AND LOCAL) TAX POLICY, 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-sources-revenue-local-governments 
[https://perma.cc/E4FF-JMY8]. 
 439 Seifter, Further from the People?, supra note 34, at 129; see also Stephen S. Jenks & Deil S. 
Wright, An Agency-Level Approach to Change in the Administrative Functions of American State 
Governments, 25 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 78, 80 (1993) (demonstrating the expansion over time of the 
type of state administrative agencies). 
 440 Seifter, Further from the People?, supra note 34, at 137. The number of registered lobbyists in 
the states rose from 15,000 in 1980 to 47,000 in 2013. In the twenty-eight states that disclosed lobbying 
data, $2.2 billion was spent on lobbying expenditures between 2013 and 2014. Id. at 135–36. 
 441 Id. at 137. 
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This financial independence has allowed state and local governments 
to expand into areas previously occupied by the federal government. They 
often exercise control over land use, environmental regulation, public 
health, civil rights, and the local economy.442 They are also tasked with 
implementing a large and growing array of federal programs and grants 
today.443 Governors have consolidated their authority and face few checks 
to their power.444 And local governments exert significant control and 
discretion—delegated from the state government under “home rule”445 and 
delegated from the federal government under direct federal–local 
cooperative efforts.446 This increase in the size, role, and importance of 
state and local governments has increased the need for effective 
accountability mechanisms. Citizens must be able to access information 
about the government entities that wield increasing power over their lives. 
Third, distinctions in the federal, state, and local administrative regime 
rob some of the criticisms of federal transparency law of their force. Most 
notably, the absence of a national security apparatus at the state and local 
level eliminates one of the most potent criticisms of FOIA: that it lacks 
teeth to enforce oversight of the very agencies that require it most.447 To be 
sure, inadequate oversight of domestic law enforcement agencies remains a 
problem in state and local government.448 But there is no equivalent at the 
state and local level to the trillions of pages classified by the federal 
government,449 nor are there gaping transparency holes such as those left by 
federal agencies like the CIA, the NSA, the Office of the Director of 
 
 442 See Davidson, supra note 34, at 588–92. 
 443 Metzger, supra note 22, at 1853. 
 444 See Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, supra note 323, at 518–29. Governors can reorganize 
the executive branch and disband agencies, and many have the authority to veto or rescind regulations. 
Id. at 487–88. 
 445 Davidson, supra note 34, at 570–71. Local governments exercise power through zoning, 
building and housing codes, wage rules, workplace conditions, environmental regulation, etc. Id. at 570. 
 446 See generally Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an 
Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 971–73 (2007) (providing examples of federal–local 
collaboration in areas ranging from criminal justice to homeland security to education). State 
legislatures and courts are often reluctant to interfere with this local autonomy. See Briffault, supra note 
421, at 405–06. 
 447 See, e.g., Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, supra note 
15, at 1118–23. 
 448 See, e.g., BRIDGET DUPEY ET AL., UNIV. OF DENVER STURM COLL. OF LAW, ACCESS DENIED: 
COLORADO LAW ENFORCEMENT REFUSES PUBLIC ACCESS TO RECORDS OF POLICE MISCONDUCT 5 
(2018). 
 449 See PUB. INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BD., TRANSFORMING THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
SYSTEM 5 (2012), https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/pidb/recommendations/transforming-
classification.pdf [https://perma.cc//VX7A-YRPB]. 
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National Intelligence, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence 
offices of the various military branches.450 
Fourth, unique structural features of state and local government 
increase the salience of these statutory transparency measures. At the 
federal level, the system of checks and balances among the three branches 
of government ensures some measure of accountability and transparency. 
The Constitution permits Congress to check the President through 
legislative investigations and oversight committees; the judiciary enables 
public disclosure through its review of legislative and executive action; and 
the public is empowered to express displeasure with the government’s lack 
of transparency through periodic elections.451 
These accountability mechanisms are often weaker at the state level. 
Many states have a plural executive452—a form of government that has 
been criticized for making it more difficult for the public to monitor and 
hold to account.453 Further, state legislative oversight is less robust than 
congressional review. The legislature is a low-paying, part-time position in 
forty states,454 and state legislatures convene far less often than Congress.455 
State executive and legislative branches also tend to be controlled by the 
same party,456 further reducing the likelihood that partisan disputes will 
bring governance failures to light. More robust congressional monitoring 
has been posited as an alternative to FOIA.457 But legislative oversight in 
 
 450 For discussions of the extent to which overclassification prevents the disclosure of records under 
FOIA, see Fenster, supra note 14, at 922–24. 
 451 See FENSTER, supra note 67, at 61. Justice Scalia even questioned whether any transparency 
measures at all are required outside “the institutionalized checks and balances within our system of 
representative democracy.” Scalia, supra note 16, at 19. 
452  See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 28. 
453 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2332 (2001) 
(arguing that a benefit of the unitary executive is that it “simplif[ies] and personaliz[es] the processes of 
bureaucratic governance,” making it easier for the public to hold the executive accountable for policy 
choices); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 427, 430 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) (arguing that a plural executive is more inclined to “conceal faults and destroy responsibility,” in 
contrast with the more “narrowly watched and more readily suspected” unitary executive). 
 454 Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, supra note 323, at 519. 
455 Compare Legislative Session Length, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 2, 2010), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/legislative-session-length.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/RCN9-HQ6A] (showing that many state legislatures impose session limits of ninety 
days or fewer), with Courtney Connley, Here’s How Many Days Congress Will Spend Away from the 
Office in 2018, CNBC (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/29/heres-how-many-days-
congress-will-spend-away-from-the-office-in-2018.html [https://perma.cc/QT36-LVFJ] (noting that 
Congress was in session 145 days in 2017). 
 456 Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, supra note 323, at 520. 
 457 Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, supra note 15, at 1107, 
1110. 
114:1461 (2020) Transparency Deserts 
1541 
the states as it is constituted now is most likely too weak to serve as a 
viable transparency replacement.458 
If these alternative mechanisms of government transparency and 
accountability built into federal democratic systems are weaker at the state 
level, they are virtually absent in the local context. One state supreme court 
has claimed “that the separation of powers doctrine is a concept foreign to 
municipal governance.”459 Many local governments collapse legislative, 
executive, and even judicial functions into a single governing body.460 The 
majority of local governments house the executive branch within the 
legislative branch, and partisan competition at the local level is 
comparatively low.461 As a result, many of the accountability and 
transparency benefits that flow from this interbranch system of checks and 
balances are absent at the local level. 
Moreover, periodic elections serve as a comparatively weak source of 
government accountability in the local context. Many local governments 
are dominated by a political machine, elections are often nonpartisan, and 
turnout at local elections is generally much lower.462 Further, government 
power is often divorced from representation in local government. The 
Supreme Court has applied the principle of one-person, one-vote to 
general-purpose local government elections, such as a city or county 
governing body.463 Yet this rule does not extend to a variety of other forms 
of local government. Some special purpose districts lack any direct 
electoral accountability mechanism.464 And even where there are elections, 
courts have permitted special districts to allocate voting power by acreage 
rather than population.465 In addition, courts have authorized municipalities 
to exert governmental authority over individuals who do not have the right 
to vote in city elections, such as those living in adjacent unincorporated 
communities but who are still subject to the city’s zoning, criminal 
 
 458 See Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, supra note 323, at 520 (“Scholars of legislative 
oversight have theorized that legislators expend scarce resources on oversight only to the extent that it 
is likely to enhance their political fortunes.”). 
 459 Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565, 579 (R.I. 2011). 
 460 See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 28; Davidson, supra note 34, at 571. 
 461 Davidson, supra note 34, at 602. 
462 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 28. 
 463 Avery v. Midland Cty., 390 U.S. 474, 476 (1968). 
 464 Davidson, supra note 34, at 603–04. 
 465 Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 371 (1981). Courts have also allowed business improvement 
districts, which require real property owners to pay additional taxes to the municipality to allocate 
voting authority in a way that privileges commercial over noncommercial property owners. See, e.g., 
Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass’n, 158 F.3d 92, 108 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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enforcement, and health and safety regulations.466 Public records laws offer 
an alternative mechanism of accountability to these nonresidents deeply 
affected by the actions of government.467 
In other words, to the extent that we view transparency laws as part of 
a continuum of democratic accountability—one of a set of choices citizens 
have for holding their government accountable—then the absence of these 
other democratic mechanisms at the local level increases the importance of 
statutory alternatives.468 Statutory measures to promote government 
transparency become increasingly critical to public oversight of the 
government when democratic alternatives such as interbranch checks and 
balances and periodic elections are weakened or wholly absent. 
B. Proposals for Reform 
Scholars’ neglect of state public records laws has normative 
implications as well. The absence of descriptive accounts of these 
subfederal laws—the costs these statutes impose upon government, the 
identity and motivations of requesters, and the flaws in the laws’ 
structure—has skewed the policy debate around transparency in 
government, making it more difficult for policymakers and advocates alike 
to identify pervasive and persistent problems in the current regime. This 
Section draws upon the lessons learned from these state public records laws 
and offers suggestions for reform. While many of these proposals are 
modest in scope, even incremental changes to the local transparency regime 
have the potential to effect meaningful improvements in accountability and 
governance. 
1. Government Reform 
The most obvious—and arguably the easiest—path toward improving 
transparency in state and local government is reforming the statutes 
themselves. Some of these changes are straightforward. Public records 
exemptions that narrowly reflect the interests of powerful corporate actors, 
for example, impose barriers to public disclosure without providing any 
 
 466 See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69–70 (1978). Courts have also 
permitted municipalities to tax the wages of nonresidents who work within city limits. See, e.g., City of 
Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 559 A.2d 513, 514, 516 (Pa. 1989). 
467 The extent to which state judges serve as a more or less robust source of accountability than the 
federal judiciary is a matter open to debate. For a summary of arguments on both sides of the issue, see 
Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, supra note 323, at 523. 
 468 See Davidson, supra note 34, at 627 (noting that administrative processes may help compensate 
for lack of representation). 
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real benefits to the government at large.469 Legislators could revise these 
statutes to ensure that exemptions to disclosure are clearly stated, narrowly 
tailored, and reflective of the public interest. More robust procedures to 
notify the public and facilitate public debate prior to the enactment of new 
exemptions could help constrain powerful interest groups’ ability to 
weaken the laws’ effects. Tightening the regulations that govern asset 
disclosures and conflicts of interest by members of state legislatures could 
help expose links between legislators and special interest groups as well.470 
As scholars have discussed elsewhere, amending these statutes to 
incentivize more robust affirmative disclosure of certain records may 
further improve transparency outcomes.471 This suggestion offers only a 
partial solution: affirmative disclosure requirements cannot adequately 
replace the individual right of request contained in the statutes. Yet 
requiring proactive disclosure of certain categories of records routinely 
generated, such as those containing budgetary information, could increase 
transparency while reducing burdens on agencies.472 Governments’ growing 
ability to post large categories of records electronically presumably reduces 
the costs associated with large-scale affirmative disclosure. And some 
states have already begun to experiment with providing a centralized 
database or website to host government financial data. Utah, for example, 
posts state and local financial data on a centralized website that is designed 
to allow citizens to conduct their own analysis of government spending.473 
More often, however, legislators will confront a trade-off: legislative 
measures that reduce barriers to disclosure also increase costs to the 
government. That being said, there are ways to strike a more effective 
balance. One option is to craft fee schedules that distinguish between 
commercial and noncommercial requesters. Governments could charge 
 
 469 See discussion supra notes 252–255 and accompanying text. 
 470 See Nicholas Kusnetz, Only Three States Score Higher than D+ in State Integrity Investigation; 
11 Flunk, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Nov. 9, 2015, updated Nov. 23, 2015), https://publicintegrity.org/ 
accountability/only-three-states-score-higher-than-d-in-state-integrity-investigation-11-flunk 
[https://perma.cc/KE2F-EDSX] (noting that only two states conduct independent and comprehensive 
audits of legislators’ assets annually). 
 471 See Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, supra note 15, at 
1149–52 (suggesting more robust affirmative disclosure requirements as a partial fix for the problems 
plaguing FOIA). 
 472 See, e.g., Soubhik Barari, Mapping Local Government Transparency in the U.S., MIT 
GOV/LAB (July 2018), https://mitgovlab.org/updates/mapping-local-government-transparency-in-the-
us [https://perma.cc/9BVQ-7C59] (finding that more than half of local governments surveyed in a study 
failed to post financial reports). 
 473 About Transparent Utah, TRANSPARENT UTAH, https://www.utah.gov/transparency/about.html 
[https://perma.cc/29FY-55BM]. 
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commercial requesters a higher fee for records productions and charge 
noncommercial requesters lower fees or even provide them with a fee 
waiver. The federal government and many states already carve out special 
treatment for requests in the public interest, so the definitional problem of 
distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial requesters would 
not be insurmountable.474 These discrepancies in fee schedule could also be 
tailored to allow local governments, which have fewer financial resources 
at their disposal to respond to requests, to impose higher costs upon 
commercial requesters than state agencies.475 
In other cases, the transparency benefits of a particular legislative 
reform arguably outweigh the incremental increase in costs. Establishing an 
independent administrative review process in those states that lack one, for 
example, would impose an additional financial burden. But the independent 
review of request decisions would provide at least some check against 
agency determinations made in bad faith and act as a deterrent to 
government efforts to distort the law to shield government misconduct. 
Such reforms would better align these state statutes with both FOIA and 
with public records statutes around the world, which increasingly 
emphasize the importance of cost-effective administrative-level appeals 
processes.476 Given the high barriers to judicial review of public records 
denials, such administrative review would allow for a meaningful appellate 
check on agency discretion. It is likely worth the costs involved. 
The executive and judicial branches could take steps to improve the 
transparency regime as well. Simply collecting state-level data about the 
 
 474 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (2012) (distinguishing between requests in the public interest and 
all other requests); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 66, § 10(d)(iv) (2017) (same). Some members of the media 
have argued that these fee waivers have been interpreted too narrowly. See, e.g., Shawn Musgrave, For 
Some Agencies, Online Media Doesn’t Count as Media at All, MUCKROCK (July 26, 2013), 
https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2013/jul/26/navy-news-media-limited-publishers-and-
broadcaster [https://perma.cc/4YKD-BW8M] (critiquing federal and state public records laws for 
excluding nontraditional journalists from fee waivers). And some have raised the inverse argument—
that commercial requesters are improperly granted public interest status. See, e.g., Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 
supra note 15, at 1382–83 (describing a repeat requestor for SEC data that has likely been wrongly 
categorized as a media requester). Remedies discussed elsewhere in this Part—such as improved 
administrative appeals processes—may help ease such flaws in the application of such statutory 
distinctions between commercial and public interest requesters. 
 475 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 66, § 10(d)(ii)–(iii) (2017) (allowing local agencies to charge 
requesters after the first two hours of labor but allowing state agencies to charge only after the first four 
hours). 
 476 See DAVID BANISAR, PRIVACY INT’L, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AROUND THE WORLD 23 
(2006), www.freedominfo.org/documents/global_survey2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7JD-NMEX] 
(noting that twenty-two countries have created independent information commissions to handle 
appeals). 
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public records process—how many requests agencies receive, how quickly 
they are fulfilled, and how much money it costs to respond to them—would 
allow legislators to make more informed decisions about how best to 
structure these laws.477 And judges could ensure that doctrines developed in 
the context of federal law are not inappropriately incorporated into the state 
legal context.478 Such reforms only scratch the surface. There are myriad 
ways that these statutes could be amended to give real effect to the 
underlying goals of their drafters. Even the modest solutions proposed here, 
however, illustrate that relatively small-scale changes in the laws could 
elicit real improvements in local transparency ecosystems. 
2. Media and Civil Society Reform 
The decline in both local media and in resource-intensive investigative 
reporting diminishes public oversight of state and local governments. In the 
public records context, reduced media use of these laws creates a 
downward transparency spiral, making it easier for the government to both 
ignore the requirements of the law and to enact changes to the law that 
further reduce its force. Reversing this decline is a massive undertaking, 
one that far exceeds the bounds of this Article. But journalists, scholars, 
and legislators have explored a variety of potential solutions in recent 
years, from enhancing government funding for local journalism479—similar 
to the mixed private–public media models pursued in many other Western 
democracies480—to encouraging social media companies like Facebook to 
feature local news content more prominently in news feeds.481 
 
 477 See Fink, supra note 17, at 111–12 (recommending that states collect more comprehensive 
public records data). 
 478 For example, the Court of Appeals in New York recently permitted state and local agencies to 
invoke the “Glomar response,” or a refusal to acknowledge the existence or nonexistence of records, 
despite the fact this response was developed to protect national security interests. See Abdur-Rashid v. 
N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 100 N.E.3d 799, 801 (N.Y. 2018). 
 479 See, e.g., Rick Rojas, News from Your Neighborhood, Brought to You by the State of New 
Jersey, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/30/nyregion/nj-legislature-
community-journalism.html [https://perma.cc/QU5R-SGAJ]; John Temple, My Newspaper Died 10 
Years Ago. I’m Worried the Worst Is Yet to Come, ATLANTIC (Feb. 27, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/02/who-is-going-to-save-local-news/583696 
[https://perma.cc/6WDH-V3Z7]. 
 480 See, e.g., RODNEY BENSON & MATTHEW POWERS, FREE PRESS, PUBLIC MEDIA AND POLITICAL 
INDEPENDENCE: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF JOURNALISM FROM AROUND THE WORLD 8 (2011), 
https://www.issuelab.org/resources/13259/13259.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LXY-5KZ6] (“In contrast to 
the highly fragmented and mostly commercial American media, the media in virtually every other 
western democratic nation-state are a mix of private and public.”). 
 481 See, e.g., Christine Schmidt, Facebook Is Committing $300 Million to Support News, with an 
Emphasis on Local, NIEMANLAB (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.niemanlab.org/2019/01/facebook-is-
committing-300-million-to-support-news-with-an-emphasis-on-local [https://perma.cc/H8TZ-Y9NE]. 
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Increased nonprofit funding for journalism could also help. Smaller 
nonprofit upstarts such as the Montpelier-based Vermont Digger are trying 
to fill the oversight gaps left by the decline of traditional print-based 
outlets.482 These efforts often involve a commitment to pursuing longer 
term investigative reporting on state and local government. The Digger, for 
example, submitted over 200 public records requests to state agencies 
between January 2013 and July 2018—more than any other news outlet, 
including the state’s flagship newspaper, the Burlington Free Press.483 
Other nonprofit media organizations dedicated to a particular substantive 
area, such as the Trace, which reports on guns in America, and the 
Marshall Project, which reports on the criminal justice system, are also 
helping fill these oversight gaps.484 Nonprofit funding of local journalism 
will not replace the loss of thousands of daily newspapers across the 
country. But it may offer a partial solution in some localities and some 
subject areas. 
The narrower problem of declining access litigation might also be 
addressed in a variety of ways. One solution may be to provide public 
records litigants access to government funding, similar to a government 
program in Canada that secures government financing on behalf of private 
citizens who commit to litigating “test cases of national significance.”485 
Nonprofit organizations could also help address the narrower problem of 
declining access litigation by newspapers. Law school clinics like the 
Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic at Yale Law School 
represent reporters in FOIA and state public records litigation without 
charge.486 And a group of First Amendment clinics and advocacy 
organizations are now creating a national network of organizations engaged 
in pro bono transparency litigation.487 A standalone nonprofit law firm 
committed to First Amendment and right of access work for local media 
outlets might also offer at least a partial solution to falling rates of access 
 
 482 See About VTDigger, VTDIGGER, https://vtdigger.org/about-vtdigger [https://perma.cc/P48P-
NGSZ]. 
 483 2013–2018 Vermont State Dataset, supra note 131. 
 484 See About The Trace, TRACE, https://www.thetrace.org/about-the-trace [https://perma.cc/AS6L-
LMYL]; About Us, MARSHALL PROJECT, https://www.themarshallproject.org/about 
[https://perma.cc/EH32-N3TR]. 
 485 See Court Challenges Program, GOV’T CAN., https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-
heritage/services/funding/court-challenges-program/backgrounder.html [https://perma.cc/WPQ9-
JHEE]. 
 486 See About, MEDIA FREEDOM & INFO. ACCESS CLINIC, https://law.yale.edu/mfia/about 
[https://perma.cc/WPQ9-JHEE]. 
 487 About FELN, FREE EXPRESSION LEGAL NETWORK, https://freeexpression.law/about-feln 
[https://perma.cc/AKX9-53NK]. 
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litigation. Again, these pro bono legal services cannot wholly fill the gap 
left by local media’s collapse. But they could help chip away at the edges 
of the problem and breathe new life into access litigation efforts at the state 
and local level. 
CONCLUSION 
Public records statutes are situated at the heart of the local 
transparency regime. These laws provide the public a direct pipeline to 
government and offer citizens a tool for holding government to account. 
They serve as a check on state and local governments, which have grown in 
power, size, and influence in recent decades, and they allow the media to 
perform its function as the government’s watchdog. Despite the importance 
of both these transparency laws and the governments they monitor, 
however, scholars have largely ignored transparency issues at the 
subfederal level. This Article takes initial steps to illustrate why this 
matters. It is not intended to provide a comprehensive review of the local 
transparency landscape, but rather, to tee up a variety of issues that merit 
further exploration. 
In doing so, it demonstrates that many of the problems that plague 
FOIA are made worse in the state and local context. And it identifies the 
problem of transparency deserts, or discrete geographic areas in which a 
confluence of factors—including poorly written transparency laws, 
deficiencies in the application of these laws, and weak civil society 
organizations—impedes effective government oversight. At the same time, 
a close analysis of these laws in conjunction with the structure and nature 
of state and local government reveals that these transparency statutes, 
although flawed, play an even more critical role at lower levels of 
government than they do in the federal context, where there is a wealth of 
statutory and constitutional alternatives to FOIA to check government 
power. In sum, these laws are both more important and more flawed than 
the legal scholarship has previously recognized. This makes it all the more 
urgent that legislators and policymakers take steps toward reform. 
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